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INTRODUCTION 
The central theme of this study is the subject of time 
in Descartes. Two considerations provoke this undertaking. 
Despite the wealth of literature on Des~artes, there has 
been no one single volume work that has offered an incisive 
and comprehensive examination of Descart~s• theory of time. 
What has been attempted in the way of studies, for the most 
part, has treated time in a modified way as a tangential 
issue in Descartes' philosophy; or the studies have assumed 
a narrower vision and focused on a single aspect of the 
Cartesian theory of time. Secondly, and more importantly, 
is the consideration that time presents itself as a con-
voluted concept in Descartes' philosophical works. Descartes 
never treated time in any systematic fashion as a special 
subject of examination. What he says about time is dis-
persed throughout the corpus of his works. Hence, we find 
misinterpretations and objections by critics that may arise 
from a failure to view time within its immediate context, 
and, more importantly, within the broader context of 
Descartes' overall philosophical concerns. Because of these 
considerations, our intent is to provide an in-depth study 
that will examine the myriad aspects of Descartes' theory 
of time and will give a clear understanding of the role 
time plays in the Cartesian philosophy. 
Four goals will distinguish our study from others. 
First of all, this study will view time as an integral and 
important component in Descartes' philosophy, a system of 
interrelated issues understood in terms of one another. 
The point of departure and yet the ultimate point of refer-
ence for our analysis is Descartes' fundamental and primary 
goal to establish a universal science. Descartes was com-
mitted to the belief that this universal science, which is 
most accurately described as a mathematical kind of physics, 
could provide the solutions to all the questions of nature. 
Without equivocation, Descartes made known that his 
metaphysics was meant solely to serve as a foundation for 
his physics. Distinguished by its radical dualism, 
Descartes' metaphysics polarizes the finite order into two 
separate and independent kinds of substances. There is the 
material substance having the sole attribute of extension 
and there is the thinking substance having the sole attri-
bute of thought. Common to both kinds of substances are 
existence, unity, substance, and duration, yet these sub-
stances remain essentially heterogeneous. Although time 
is a feature of both kinds of substances insofar as these 
substances share a common duration, their radical disparity 
cannot be overcome. Hence, an account of a Cartesian theory 
of time has to explain how time as such is to be a property 
of each kind of substance. 
2 
Time cannot be interpreted as a univocal predicate 
applicable to both kinds of substances. Descartes' meta-
physical dualism makes it necessary to examine time as an 
analogical concept. Such an approach provides us with a 
perspective of time that is in accordance with the exigen-
cies of Descartes' metaphysics and with his philosophy 
taken as a systematic whole. It is our intent to validate 
our approach by providing a developmental argument. It 
starts out with the genesis of Descartes' project, and 
proceeds on to various aspects of time and then relates 
time to his metaphysical dualism. 
The second goal of this study is to address ourselves 
to the questions raised about the apparent paradoxical 
nature of Descartes' theory of time. We will consider the 
standard thesis that the doctrine of continuous creation 
entails the discontinuity of time as well as the indivisi-
bility of the moment of time. As a result of our analysis, 
we will be able to resolve these questions so as to leave 
little doubt regarding the coherency of Descartes' theory 
of time. 
The third goal of the study will be to pursue the 
mathematical dimensions of time. This is prompted by 
Descartes' belief that the questions which arise in any 
science are essentially mathematical questions since their 
common consideration is the various relationships or pro-
portions between objects. Ultimately, these questions give 
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rise to problems about order and measure, the concerns of 
mathematics. Appropriately, we will consider time from a 
mathematical dimension because time, too, is directly 
related to the questions of order and measure. 
Descartes presents us with a description of time that 
has mathematical implications. For Descartes time is the 
"number of movement" and a "measure of duration," and in 
accordance with Descartes' view that number expresses both 
order and measure, time as a number can validly be applied 
to duration. The justification for this is the fact that 
all substances share a common successive kind of duration, 
the parts of which are ordered one to another as 'before' 
and 'after'. As such, each part as a unit falls under the 
category of discrete numerable quantity. The duration of 
substances is also continuous, and for that reason can be 
conceived as measurable quantity analogous to extension. 
Hence, time as a number can express both the order and 
measure that characterizes the duration of substances. 
This study will spell out the dynamics of time when it 
functions as a number. Our analysis will provide analogies 
using concepts and elements found in the sciences of 
arithmetic and geometry. When appropriate, we will use 
graphic mathematical illustrations as Descartes himself 
does in the Rules when he wishes to make clear his meaning. 
Finally, we will offer a comparative analysis between 
Descartes' theory of time and Aristotle's theory of time and 
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also St. Augustine's theory of time. Descartes' descrip-
tions of time as a "number" and "measure" are clearly 
similar to elements found in Aristotle's treatment of time. 
Descartes' definition of time as a "mode of thought" intro-
duces a psychological aspect of time that is reminiscent of 
st. Augustine's theory of time. For these reasons, there 
is merit in considering both Aristotle's and Augustine's 
theories of time to trace the roots of Descartes' theory of 
time. The knowledge of these theories will contribute to 
our understanding of Descartes' theory. In addition, the 
comparative analysis will illumine some of the points made 
in previous chapters. 
These four goals will be developed in the following 
manner: Chapter I will establish that our dual perspective 
approach is warranted for an accurate understanding of the 
Cartesian theory of time. The justification for this is 
grounded in the inextricable, but definitive relationship 
between three constitutive elements in the Cartesian phil-
osophy, namely, his scienfific concerns, his metaphysical 
dualism, and time. The first and ultimate point of refer-
ence for the latter two is Descartes' conviction that his 
mission in life was to found a mathematical kind of physics 
characterized by its self-evidency and certitude. With 
this committed vision Descartes formulated a metaphysics 
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as a foundation for his physics. Epistemological considera-
tions prompted Descartes to propose that the created order 
was comprised of two heterogeneous kinds of substances: 
the material substance, defined solely in terms of extension 
and the thinking substance, defined solely in terms of 
thought. 
Under the rubric of science, such simple dualism 
translates into a relationship between the inanimate, 
material substance as the object known, and the dynamic, 
thinking substance as the knowing subject. Since Cartesian 
matter is essentially extension, the universe is geo-
metrical. Further, nature is fundamentally knowable because 
it operates in accordance with the principles and laws of 
mathematics. Since the thinking substance is essentially 
endowed with a faculty for knowing truth, the mind need 
only act in accordance with a method of prescribed rules 
to accurately know nature. Given the essential constitution 
of both the known and the knower, a mathematical kind of 
universal physics is theoretically possible. 
Bound up with Descartes' scientific concerns and his 
metaphysical dualism is the subject of our study, time. 
Time, for Descartes, has objective reality. It is a 
property of all existing things insofar as they have a 
successive duration. However, the temporality of the two 
kinds of substances cannot be, and is not, manifested in 
the same way. The material substance as an extended body 
is a geometrical inanimate entity. The thinking substance 
as a soul is a dynamic subject of cognitive activities. 
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Both kinds of substances share a common duration. In light 
of Descartes' primary scientific concerns, the mutual co-
existence of two radically distinct kinds of substances 
means that the thinking substance can relate to material 
substances as knower to the known. Hence, the temporality 
of the thinking substance is significant in terms of the 
latter's distinction as an agent of knowing, and the tempo-
rality of the material substance is significant solely in 
terms of its distinction as an object that is known. This 
dual perspective must condition our understanding of time 
and the role it plays in Descartes' philosophy. 
Descartes describes time as a "measure of duration" 
and the "number of movement," stipulating that the latter 
description is applicable to both kinds of substances 
insofar as they are characterized by a successive duration. 
As we proceed in the study, the manner in which these 
descriptions of time are uniquely applied to the material 
substance and its local motion, and to the thinking sub-
stance and its cognitive activites will become evident. 
Time is a "number" and a "measure". If something is 
numbered and measured there must be a soul to do the 
numbering and measuring. Thus, we find Descartes intro-
ducing a psychological aspect of time by calling it a "mode 
of thought". It is the way in which we think about the 
duration of things. In the remaining chapters it will 
become clear what Descartes thinks about the duration of 
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each kind of substance and how it is temporally manifested 
in accordance with each one's respective essential attri-
bute. 
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Prior to examining time as it relates to both the 
material substance and to the thinking substance, Chapter II 
will consider the genesis of a time-paradox that evolves 
within the context of Descartes' doctrine of continuous 
creation. The primary concern of this doctrine is to 
establish the existence of God. Time, nevertheless, becomes 
an important issue. The creature in itself is nothing and 
has no power of conservation whereby it can continue to 
exist from one moment to the next. Hence, God's continuous 
creative activity must renew the creature in existence at 
each and every moment or else the creature would cease to 
exist and fall into nothingness. As regards time, each of 
these moments is independent and can be separated from the 
the moment before and the moment after. Since there is no 
necessary connection between any two moments, it would 
appear that these units cannot be conceived as contiguous 
units which form a true continuity, an unbroken unity. 
Is Descartes, then, guilty of a real contradiction or simply 
an apparent contradiction? Does Descartes, as some critics 
claim, draw continuous time from discontinuous moments? 
What is at issue here in this chapter is whether 
Descartes' doctrine of continuous creation, upon which the 
critics base their thesis, does, in fact, establish the 
discontinuity of time. One of the main points we will 
consider is the argument that, for Descartes, contiguity is 
identified with continuity. If this is true, what follows 
is that discontiguity is identified with discontinuity. 
Hence, since the moments are not necessarily connected, 
that is, they can be separated, they are discontiguous, and 
thus discontinuous. An examination of the texts will 
determine if the line of argument is valid. 
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In addition, does Descartes draw duration from moments 
that have no duration? The same critics who allege that 
time for Descartes is discontinuous, also presume that it 
is constituted by moments that have no duration. This 
chapter, then, will address itself to the thesis that: 
Descartes' theory of time is paradoxical, but the reader 
must be alerted to the fact that this thesis cannot be 
sustained or disproved by appealing to arguments based on 
the scattered texts presented by the critics. It can only 
be resolved by examining time and how it functions within 
the broader context of Descartes' metaphysical dualism and 
the scientific concerns which dominate his philosophical 
life. Our study will accomplish that resolution. 
Chapter III will be directed to an examination of time 
as the "number of movement" insofar as it applies to the 
material substance. Initially, the chapter will examine 
the concept of 'movement' found in the pre-Principles period 
of Descartes. There are two reasons for considering this 
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period separately. The first is that in Descartes' early 
writings he espoused the existence of a vacuum and explained 
the movement of falling bodies in terms of the force of 
gravity. Secondly, prior to 1640 Descartes considered weight 
to be an objective quality in bodies and a factor in move-
ment. Descartes abandoned both positions and he no longer 
believed in the existence of a vacuum nor did he consider 
weight an objective quality in bodies. After 1640 Descartes' 
definition of bodies now included only their extension and 
the displacement of their extended parts. 
Given this geometrical concept of bodies, Descartes 
found it necessary to redefine motion. After 1640 Descartes 
conceived only local motion to be possible, defining it as 
a transference or instantaneous displacement of one part 
of matter by another part in the immediate vicinity. As 
our analysis will bear out, this concept has a myriad of 
implications that condition our understanding of time. 
In the pre-Principles period time played only a minimal role 
in Descartes' concept of movement. However, after he 
redefined bodies in the Principles time becomes a decisive 
factor in the explanation of local movement. 
Descartes' theory of the instantaneous transmission of 
light plays a pivotal role in his philosophical system and 
within his physics. Consequently, this chapter will 
examine that theory apart from the concept of 'movement'. 
Part of that examination will include a consideration of what 
Descartes means by the term 'instant', since it is the 
temporal condition for the transmission of light. 
Chapter IV will shift from time as it relates to the 
material substance to a consideration of the temporality 
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of the thinking substance as it is manifested in the mental 
events which constitute its duration. Descartes abandons 
the term 'instant' when he speaks about the thinking 
substance. The Cogito and all other truths are seen in 
that primary moment known as the 'present'. For Descartes, 
the 'present' has epistemological consequences. His meta-
physics is formulated to define the thinking substance as 
an agent of knowing. It is from this perspective that we 
must approach the temporality of the thinking substance 
since its essence is limited solely to thought. 
The Rules cannot be dismissed simply because they 
were never finished. Descartes offers a systematically 
developing philosophy, and the Rules are Descartes' initial 
attempt to set down a method for attaining truth in the 
sciences. While Descartes may have changed his thinking 
on some minor areas, he never rejected the fundamental 
precepts laid down in the Rules. Clearly enunciated in this 
work is the principle that there are only two means by which 
certitude is possible: intuition and deduction. Hence, 
the efficacy of the thinking substance as an agent of 
knowing is demonstrated when the mind employs these two 
mental operations. As mental events that constitute the 
duration of the thinking substance, they reveal the manner 
in which Descartes thinks the soul's temporality can be 
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and should be most powerfully expressed. In examining 
these two mental activities and their temporal implications, 
special attention will be given to the concept of the 
'present'. Insofar as the past and future are parts of 
time, we will consider in detail the synthetic activity by 
which the mind coalesces the past and future with the 
present so as to constitute an unbroken continuum. 
Since the thinking substance is the noetic foundation 
of Descartes' science, it is worth attempting to ascertain 
its ontological status and determine whether Descartes' 
metaphysics posits a permanent subject whose substantial 
identity is preserved in time. Science as a developmental 
intellectual event requires this. 
Chapter V introduces an historical look at the mean-
ing of time. It examines Book IV of Aristotle's Physics 
and Books XI and XII of the Confessions of St. Augustine. 
Their treatments of time will serve to support and clarify 
the interpretation offered by this study. The comparative 
analysis will demonstrate that one can scarcely deny 
Descartes' obvious affinity to both Aristotle's and Augus-
tine's theories. In the case of Aristotle the parallels 
in language are striking. For both Aristotle and Descartes 
we find time described as the "number of movement" and a 
"measure" that can be applied to motion and the duration of 
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things. St. Augustine's treatment of time provides us with 
a theory that stresses the psychological aspect while-it 
recognizes the objective reality of time as a property of 
created substances. This dual perspective of time is 
integral to Descartes' theory. For Des~artes shares a 
belief that time is real, yet he acknowledges that the point 
of reference for understanding that temporality is the soul. 
Thus, Descartes defines time as a "mode of thought". 
The comparative analysis will establish that the areas 
of similarity between Descartes and his two predecessors 
are pronounced. This lends credence to our claim that 
Descartes made use of their theories in his own philosophy. 
The final chapter will serve to summarize the previous 
chapters and will justify our approach and the four goals 
we set out to accomplish. More importantly, it will 
establish that Descartes' theory of time can stand on its 
own merits as a coherent theory of time that is accommodated 
to his metaphysical dualism and to his more fundamental 
scientific goals. 
CHAPTER I 
THE NEW SCIENCE 
A. A Mathematical Physics 
The fabric of Descartes' philosophical system is 
tightly woven of diverse strands of thought whose meaning 
and value are determined by the manner in which they serve 
to complete the intended design. Because of this an under-
standing of the individual strands is conditioned by viewing 
the system as an integrated whole. Without that insight the 
meaning and significance of any one strand are obscured and 
ultimately become entangled and distorted. In view of this 
our intent is to examine time as it functions within the 
tapestry of Descartes' philosophical system. To do this it 
is necessary to determine the singular fundamental concern 
which provided the impetus for Descartes' philosophical 
endeavors. As a preliminary to the examination proper we 
propose to identify this dominant project which forms the 
central pattern of Descartes' philosophical system. 
Descartes was an innovator and a man with a mission. 
At an early age it became apparent what direction that mis-
sion would take. Sometime in the year 1618, at the age of 
twenty-two, Descartes met Isaac Beeckman, a Dutch physician 
and engineer. Beeckman, himself a committed man, had a 
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vision of a new 'mechanical' philosophy that viewed the 
world as an order of atoms moving according to mathematic-
mechanical laws. Descartes joined Beeckman in a brief 
apprenticeship in natural philosophy and mathematics. 
Together they believed they could construct a natural 
philosophy that would be a combination of mechanics and 
mathematics, a philosophy most properly called 'physico-
mathematics'.1 They never systematized their speculations. 
Influenced by Beeckman's work, Descartes pursued mathematical 
researches on his own. 
The year of 1619 was significant for Descartes. In 
November of that year we are told that Descartes had a 
dream in which the Angel of Truth revealed that he was to 
devote his whole life to science, and that mathematics was 
the sole science that would provide a solution to all the 
secrets of nature. 2 The dream was the confirmation of his 
already held conviction that there could be one single uni-
versal science that included all the narrow sciences and 
that each of the sciences required the same certitude and 
the same method. 3 
The dream of a universal science perdured. Contrary 
to Aristotle, who believed that all the sciences required a 
different method of approach and analysis, 4 Descartes 
believed that all the sciences were identical to wisdom and 
could be comprehended by the same method: 
Il faut done bien se convaincre que toutes les sciences 
sont tellement liees ensemble, qu'il est plus facile de 
les apprendre toutes a la fois, que d'en isoler une des 
autres. Si quelqu'un veut chercher serieusement la 
verite, il ne doit done pas choisir l'etude de quelque 
science particuliere; car elles sont toutes unies entre 
elles et dependent les unes des autres;8 
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The unity of all sciences would mean not only that 
there would be one method of approach and analysis, but more 
importantly, one criterion for certitude.that would embrace 
all things knowable. Descartes' dream of unity was essen-
tially a dream of certitude that would raise science from 
the level of hypothesis to the level of conclusions. He 
deprecated the common philosophers who were content with 
hypotheses and were committed to the thesis that the most 
that could be achieved in the field of physics was to say 
how things could be without proving that they could not be 
h . 6 ot erwise. Descartes adhered to the belief that there 
could be a science more certain than popular belief--
admittedly an infinite work.that no one man could achieve, 
yet possible. 7 Mathematics held the key to that possibility: 
Pour la physique, je croirois n'y rien savoir, si je ne 
savois que dire comment les choses peuvent etre, sans 
demontrer qu'elles ne peuvent etre autrement; car 
l'avant reduite aux mathematiques, c'est chose 
possible.a 
Descartes believed that of all the sciences mathematics 
alone furnishes us with an illustration of self-evidence and 
. d 9 certitu e. If all the sciences could be comprehended as 
one, then whatever method was used in mathematics could 
justifiably be used in every scientific pursuit. 
The dynamics of this method was the primary concern of 
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Descartes' earliest philosophical work which he entitled 
Rules for the Guidance of Our Native Powers. In it Descartes 
sets down a method for achieving truth and self-evident 
knowledge in the sciences. The method, which was to be more 
than provisional, consisted in intuition and deduction and 
was endemic to mathematics: "C'est a l'arithrnetique et a la 
Geometrie seule parmi les sciences deja trouvers, que nous 
reduit l'observation de notre regle.~ 10 The success of the 
mathematician in discovering truth and resolving problems 
led Descartes to propose that this method, which served the 
mathematician so well, could be utilized by every other 
discipline. All the other sciences, such as Astronomy, 
Music, Optics, Mechanics, among others, could employ the 
method since ultimately the questions in these sciences were 
questions that gave rise to problems about order and measure. 
While their objects are different, what they have in common 
are the various relationships or proportions among their 
b . 11 o Jects. 
Et si l'on y reflechit plus attentivement, on remarque 
enfin que seules toutes les choses ou l'on etudie 
l'ordre et la mesure se rattachent a la mathematique, 
sans qu'il importe que cette mesure soit cherchee dans 
des nornbres, des astres, des sons, ou quelqu'autre 
objet; on remarque ainsi qu'il doit y avoir quelque 
science generale expliquant tout ce qu'on peut chercher 
touchant l'ordre et la mesure sans application a une 
matiere particuliere, et que cette science est appellee 
.•• mathematique universelle, parce qu'elle renferme 
tout ce pourquoi les autres sciences, sont dites des 
parties de la mathematique.12 
If all the questions that arise in any science are funda-
mentally mathematical questions, then the method of inquiry 
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used by the mathematician can be universally applicable by 
any scientist regardless of the discipline. The results of 
this will be the attainment of certitude. What is suggested 
in the Rules is that the principles of mathematics could be 
applied to the phenomena of nature. What is only implicit 
in the Rules becomes explicit later on in the Principles: 
Que je ne recois point de principes en Physique, qui ne 
soient aussi receus en Mathematique.~.& que ces prin-
cipes suffisent, d'autant que tousles Phainomenes de 
la nature peuvent etre expliquez par leur moyen.13 
What Descartes has done is to reduce the laws of Physics to 
the laws of Mathematics. 14 As Descartes' letter to Mersenne 
indicates, there is no intrinsic principle of action of 
forces that can explain the phenomena in nature. Nature acts 
in a mathematical manner, and therefore everything in nature 
can be explained by the laws of mathematics. 15 
If there is any question about the extent to which 
Descartes was committed to the belief that the universe 
could be read off in mathematical terms, it is resolved in 
Part I of the Principles: 
Et il est certain que toutes les regles des Mechaniques 
appartiennent a la Physique .•• Car, par example, lors 
qu'une montre marque les heures par le moyen des roues 
dont elle est faite, cela ne lui est pas moins naturel 
qu'il est a arbre de produite ses fruits.16 
As the text confirms, Descartes imposes a mathematical 
quality on the phenomena of nature. There is no distinction 
between living and non-living phenomena; all are subject to 
the laws of mathematics. Radical as this vision of reality 
may seem in contrast to Aristotle's vision, it was the only 
one in Descartes' eyes, that would ensure the certitude 
that was demanded by any science conceived as wisdom. 
J. Goodfield's observation captures it well: "Descartes 
answered Montaigne in the same way Plato answered Socrates, 
by anchoring down the concept of science on timeless geo-
. 1 f d t· 1117 metrica oun a ions. 
B. The Metaphysical Foundation pf Physics 
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Historically, perhaps too much emphasis has been placed 
on Descartes' metaphysics and not enough on his scientific 
concerns. Descartes' Discourse on Method and the Meditations 
remain the required reading in universities, while his 
scientific treatises are relegated to the school of scholars 
with scientific orientations. The metaphysical works of 
Descartes are an essential component of his philosophical 
system, but they play a subordinate role to his overall 
fundamental scientific project. Those who have studied 
Descartes in depth and considered his metaphysical treatises 
as parts of an integrated system acknowledge that Descartes 
proposes to be a metaphysician, but this for the sake of 
. . lf 18 science itse • 
There is evidence to support this theory. The complete 
title of the Discourse written in 1637 is Discourse on Method 
of Rightly Conducting the Reason and of Seeking Truth in the 
Sciences. Primarily a metaphysical work, it was meant to 
be an introduction to Descartes' three scientific treatises: 
Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology. The Discourse was written 
as an autobiographical account demonstrating how Descartes 
himself used the method for discovering the truth contained 
in the physical treatises that followed. Descartes hoped 
that those who learned of the method would appropriate it 
19 for themselves. As an introduction, the Discourse would 
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validate the truth of the treatises; it would demonstrate 
that the conclusions reached were the result of a method 
grounded in principles of knowledge which could yield 
certitude. As history attests, the scientific works which 
Descartes hoped would be read were ignored, and the Discourse 
became the important work. 
Four years after the Discourse, Descartes' major 
metaphysical work, the Meditations on First Philosophy, was 
published. Like the Discourse, it was a means to an end 
and not the end itself. Descartes' purpose in writing the 
Meditations was to provide a metaphysics that would serve as 
the foundation for his physics. 20 The mathematical nature of 
Descartes' physics demanded a metaphysics unlike Aristotle's, 
where all reality was grounded in a world of immaterial, 
indivisible, substantial forms. Such forms failed to meet 
the exigencies of a mathematical science whose principles 
and laws were to be applied to all the phenomena in nature. 
Motivated by his dream to establish a mathematical physics, 
Descartes proposed to establish a new metaphysics that would 
serve as the foundation for such a physics. Not wishing to 
openly reject Aristotle's metaphysics, he, nevertheless, 
21 
confided to Mersenne that this was his intent in writing the 
. 21 Meditations. 
After the Meditations was written Descartes spent the 
next few years writing the Principles. Wishing to solidify 
his metaphysics, Descartes proposed that this new work contain 
all the principles from which one could derive a knowledge of 
all the things in the world. 22 The Principles was structured 
so that the first two parts were to form the ground for what 
followed in the last two parts. Hence, we find in Part I 
the principles of knowledge which included a metaphysics of 
the thinking substance as well as the three proofs for the 
existence of God. In Part II Descartes discusses the princi-
ples of material things. In Parts III and IV he treats of the 
visible world and the earth. The structure of the Principles 
is in keeping with Descartes' belief that science needs a 
firm metaphysical foundation. He prefaces the Principles 
with the well-known claim: 
Ainsi toute la Philosophie est comme un arbre, dont les 
racines sont la Metaphysique, le tronc est la Physique, 
& les branches qui sortent de ce tronc sont toutes les 
autres.23 
As we have seen, Descartes' metaphysics was to be a 
foundation for his physics. As such his metaphysics would 
have to accommodate the mathematical kind of physics that 
he envisioned. While it is not our purpose to evaluate or 
defend each of the constitutional parts of Descartes' meta-
physics, we can sketch out its basic components. 
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When it came to constructing a metaphysical foundation 
Descartes chose to depart from the traditional Aristotelian 
metaphysics. Epistemic considerations prompted Descartes' 
decision. The idea that reality could be explained in terms 
of substantial forms was inadmissable to Descartes. There 
was primarily one reason for this, and it can be traced to 
the fact that these forms failed to provide the necessary 
certitude. In Descartes' estimation these indivisible forms 
had a mysterious quality to them that made them elusive to 
the scientist. The human mind has no notion or particular 
idea to conceive them by. When we talk about them and assert 
their existence we are asserting something we do not conceive 
or understand. 24 
Along with his rejection of the substantial forms was 
the disavowal of the reality of sensible qualities. Again, 
it was the question of the failure of these to yield certitude. 
As the analysis of the wax demonstrates, all sensible quali-
25 ties appear confused and unclear. Neither the substantial 
forms nor sensible qualities could provide a basis for 
certitude. What Descartes was looking for was something that 
was real and could give manifest and mathematical reasons for 
th h . 26 e p enomena in nature. 
In the analysis of the wax Descartes finds the quality 
he is looking for. What remains in spite of the changes and 
ht 1 d d . t' . t . 27 w a appears c ear an is inct is ex ension. Extension is 
the singular attribute that defines the material substance. 
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It is the sole quality that the scientist would have to work 
with in order to attain truth. Descartes' theory stripped 
the world of the animate and rejected physical action by 
imposing an inert quality on the material world. All natural 
action could be explained by mathematical reasons, since 
everything was fundamentally mathematical in nature. The 
Principles definitively establishes the quantitative nature 
of material substances. Descartes affirms that 
••• je ne connois point d'autre matiere ces choses cor-
porelles que celle qui peut etre divisee, figuree, et 
meue en toutes sorte de facons" c'est a dire celle que 
les Geometres nomment la quantite.28 
The essentially mathematical nature of bodies impelled 
Descartes to offer a new definition of movement. Descartes 
rejected the common notion of movement as the action by which 
a body passes from one place to another. Movement is relative 
and essentially no different than rest, "ce qu'il ya de 
positif en la nature du mouvement se trouve aussi bien en 
1 . d' 1 . t . . n29 ce ui que une it vu gairemen ne se point mouvoir. The 
denial of action as an essential property of movement meant 
that Descartes must offer what he believes to be the true 
definition of movement. Movement he says is 
.•• la transport d'une partie de la matiere, ou d'un 
corps du voisinage de ceux que le touchent immediatement, 
et que nous considerons comme en repos, dans le voisin-
age de quelques autres ••• Et je dis,qu'il est le trans-
port & non pas la force ou l'action qui transport, afin 
de montrer que le mouvement est toujours dans la mobile 
& non pas en celui que rneut.30 
Descartes recognizes only one kind of movement and that 
is locomotion: 
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Nous pouvons aussi concevoir fort distinctement ••• diverse 
facons d'entendue, ou qui appartiennent a l'etendue, 
comme generalement toutes les figures, la situation des 
parties & leurs mouvemens, pourvue qt:te nous les con-
siderions simplement comme les dependances des substances 
ou elles font; & quanta ce qui est du mouvement, pour-
vue que nous pensions seulement a celui qui se fait d'un 
lieu en autre, sans rechercher la force qui le produit, 
laquelle toutefois j'essayerai de faire connoitre.31 
It is local motion alone that is clear and distinct. All of 
the diverse phenomena that occur in the world can be explained 
by the diverse displacement of extended parts and the various 
32 dispositions and relations between the particles of matter. 
The world was devoid of animation and physical action. 
Descartes' metaphysics projected a world of automata in 
which there was no difference between artifacts and natural 
bodies. The tree operated according to the same mechanical 
laws as a clock that tells time by the movement of its 
hands. 33 Descartes was convinced that nature was funda-
mentally quantitative. Hence, there was no natural action 
or intrinsic force that could explain the physical occur-
rences. Nature acts in a totally mathematical manner. 
Bodies are extended entities whose relations and 
motions can be described according to mathematically quanti-
fied laws. This understanding of bodies according to such 
laws provides the only clear and distinct way such entities 
can be known. Hence, Aristotle's notion of "natural motion" 
as well as his notion of substantial forms is irrelevant. 
With the world reduced to extended quantity the mathematical 
model was intact. From the standpoint of the object the 
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metaphysical condition for certitude was fulfilled. What was 
needed was someone to apply the principles of mathematics to 
the phenomena of nature. This exigency could be met only by 
structuring a metaphysics of the thinking substance that 
would accommodate his mathematical physics. That substance 
would have to be in the world but not of the world. More 
importantly, it had to be empowered to know the world and to 
know it with certitude. Let us look at that thinking sub-
stance as an epistemic condition for Descartes' physics. 
While we have seen Descartes come to discover the truth 
concerning the nature of material substances, the existence 
of the thinking substance is epistemically prior. As the 
Meditations confirms, it is the discovery of the truth of 
his own existence that constitutes the first principle of 
Descartes' philosophy. The discovery of this truth is the 
necessary prerequisite for the discovery of all other truths 
for three reasons. First of all, it answers the skeptics by 
demonstrating that truth exists. Secondly, it paves the way 
for the establishment of a criteria for truth that can be 
applied to all other questions regardless of the subject 
matter. Thirdly, it demonstrates that the thinking substance 
has the cognitive power to attain truth. As is apparent in 
the structure of the Meditations, Descartes first discovers 
the truth of his own existence and later he determines, 
through the analysis of the wax, that the nature of material 
b t . t . 34 su s ances is ex ension. 
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The Meditations, which Descartes intended to contain 
all the principles upon which he would build his physics, 
would not be complete without establishing God's existence. 
The import of this is made apparent by the fact that 
Descartes offers three separate proofs. 35 The certitude that 
Descartes hoped for could be absolutely guaranteed only by 
calling on an ultimate source of veridical appeal. Notwith-
standing the fact that the thinking substance is empowered 
to attain the truth, he is fundamentally finite. The fini-
tude is radical and cannot be overcome. 36 The truth of this 
is concretely manifested in those moments in which man 
doubts, forgets, is deceived and proves feeble of memory. 37 
These limitations as expressions of man's finitude preclude 
his being the absolute source of truth. He cannot be certain 
of anything unless he knows God exists. 38 It is in the 
knowledge that God exists and has given man a faculty for 
discerning truth that the possibility of truth is guaranteed. 
The efficacy of the faculty is ensured provided that one 
affirms as true only that which is seen clearly and dis-
tinctly.39 Moreover, God guarantees the reliability of 
memory in the process of deduction when the reasons have 
1 . d f . 40 s ippe out o present consciousness. 
In this general overview of the thinking substance we 
have seen how Descartes has formulated his metaphysics so as 
to show the possibility of truth from the perspective of the 
knower. A more germane and ontological concern is to clarify 
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the nature of that substance from which all truths are 
generated. In the primary relationship of knower and known 
there inheres a unity by way of appropriation. The intellec-
tual grasp of some aspect of reality becomes a part of the 
mental warehouse along with the other true ideas. Paradoxi-
. 
cally, the unity is grounded in an ontological difference 
between the knower and the known. 
There exists a radical polarity between the two kinds 
of substances. In defining material substances in terms of 
extension Descartes stripped the world of animism and power. 
To meet the exigencies of his mathematical physics he filled 
the world with inert extended objects. Because of the 
quantitative nature of phenomena, presumably the laws of 
nature could be expressed by mathematical formulations of 
geometrical relations between material particles. The world 
was knowable and could theoretically yield conclusions. 
Descartes had to make a decision. Either man's definition 
would include both body and soul, in which case he was a part 
of the world and assumed its determination; or, he would be 
defined solely in terms of his soul and retain his absolute 
freedom. Descartes chose the latter. In truth he says 
••. je connu de la que j'etais une substance dont toute 
l'essence ou la nature n'est que de penser & qui pour 
etre n'a besoin d'aucun lieu, n'y depend d'aucune chose 
materielle~ En sorte que ce Moi, c'est a dire l'ame 
par laquelle je suis ce que je suis est entierement 
distincte du cors.41 
What then could be said of the human body to which the 
soul was united except that it was like any other material 
substance? The human body could in no way be conceived to 
have any intrinsic power of action. Descartes assumed a 
radical position and proposed that the human body was analo-
gous to a machine that had certain parts and operated in 
accordance with certain mechanical laws. 42 In contrast, the 
soul by which man is defined is the center of action: 
Comine, lorsque je veux, que je crains, que j'affirme 
ou que je nie, je concois bien alors quelque chose 
cominon le sujet de !'action demon esprit.43 
The material substance is marked by its lack of power. The 
dynamic nature of the thinking substance is marked by its 
intrinsic cognitive power: 
Car, que j'ai la faculte le concevoir ce que c'est 
qu'on nomine en general une chose, ou une verite, 
aucune pensee, il me semble que je ne tiens point 
cela d'ailleurs que de ma nature propre.44 
The material substance is projected as an object whose move-
ments are determined according to mathematical laws. The 
thinking substance expresses his freedom as the subject of 
responsibility: 
Mais, pour ce que est des inclinations qui me semble-
ment aussi m'etre naturelles, j'ai souvent remarque, 
lorsque il a ete question de se faire choix entre les 
vertus & les vices, qu'elles ne m'ont pas moins porte 
ou au mal qu'au bien.45 
28 
Finally, unlike the body, which is essentially divisible into 
parts, the thinking substance is without any parts: 
••• lors que je considere mon esprit, c'est a dire 
moi-meme en tant que je suis seulement une chose qui 
pense, je n'y puis distinguer aucunes parties, mais 
je me concoi comine une chose seule et entiere.46 
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Whatever may be the limitations of Descartes' dualistic 
metaphysics it succeeds as a metaphysical foundation for his 
science. The world is knowable and the knower endowed with 
a natural power of understanding need only will to act on 
that power and to use it correctly. The ground has been laid 
for the fulfillment of Descartes' vision of a mathematical 
kind of physics. 
C. Time 
Our first effort has been to set the background for our 
central concern, which is to examine Descartes' thinking on 
time. We are able to give a general meaning to time as the 
measure of the duration of both material and thinking sub-
47 
stances •. However, a more precise determination of its 
nature can be reached. That precision will be the result of 
viewing time in light of Descartes' metaphysical dualism. 
Since Descartes has a two-substance metaphysics, and time 
is a basic feature of both kinds of substances, then an 
account of a Cartesian theory of time must take this into 
consideration. It must explain the manner in which time is 
such as to be a property of each substance. 
We should be able to find a coherency of thought 
between the different elements that constitute Descartes' 
philosophical system. The Cartesian theory of time should 
reflect and support the fundamental philosophical considera-
tion of that system. It has been demonstrated in a general 
way how Descartes' metaphysical dualism accommodates his 
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primary scientific goals. Hence, one way to test the 
coherency of Descartes' theory of time in terms of its role 
in an integrated system is to test its coherency with the 
most immediately related element, Descartes' metaphysical 
dualism. Our study will do this. Later chapters will depart 
from a general notion of time and concentrate on time as an 
analogical concept. That examination will concentrate on the 
distinctions of time that reflect the distinctive properties 
of the two kinds of substances. This will determine if, and 
in what sense, Descartes' theory of time is coherent with 
his basic primary philosophical concerns. 
Our present concern is more general. What is needed 
before examining time as an analogical concept is to give 
some general meaning to time as it presents itself in 
Descartes' philosophy. Descartes offers no clear definition 
of time. Yet the texts tell us several things about time. 
Time is one of those common sensibles like size, shape, 
place, and movement. These are naturally known. If you try 
to define them you only obscure them and cause confusion. 48 
Descartes has more important things to say about time. 
In a passage from the Meditations in which Descartes 
makes the distinction between imaginary or representative 
things and real things as extension, figure, number, etc., 
he places time in the category of real things: 
••• il ya des choses encore plus simples & plus uni-
verselles, qui sont vraie et existantes ••• De ce genre 
de choses est la nature corporelle en general, & son 
entendue; ensemble la figure de choses entendue, leur 
quantite ou grandeur & leur nombre, comme aussi le lieu 
ou elles sont, le temps qui mesure leur duree & autre 
semblables. 49 
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There are three things Descartes says about time in 
this passage. Initially he tells us that time is universal. 
Descartes terms universal any singular idea of which we avail 
ourselves in order to think of all the individuals which have 
. . ·1·t d SO a certain s1m1 1 u e. In the course of-analysis we will 
determine what this similitude is insofar as time is predi-
cated of both substances. Secondly, Descartes tells us that 
time is real. As the text indicates, time is as real as 
extension; it is an essential property of the existing 
substance insofar as that substance endures. Time is both 
universal and real. When we form the idea of time and apply 
it to all material things denoting their similitude, time is 
a universal. That conceptual universality has a counterpart 
in reality. It is important to keep this in mind because 
other texts to be considered later suggest that time is 
simply a construct of the mind. 
The third and most salient point to note in the text 
is that Descartes identifies the real temporal property of 
things when he says that time measures the duration of things. 
Duration is common to all substances: 
Par exemple, a cause qu'il n'ya point de substance qui 
ne cesse d'exister, lors qu'elle cesse de durer, la 
duree n'est distincte de la substance que par la 
pensee.51 
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Insofar as all substances exist, they endure, and in-
sofar as they endure, their duration can be measured by time. 
BY calling time a measure, Descartes introduces a quantitative 
aspect to the notion of time and similarly to the correlative 
concept of duration. Time can only be conceived as a kind of 
measure if there is something measurable, that is, a species 
of quantity. Descartes' definition of dimension implies 
this: 
Par dimension nous n'entendons rien autre chose que le 
mode et le rapport sous lequel un quelconque est juge 
mesurable, en sorte que non seulement la longuerer, la 
largeur et la profondeur sont des dimensions ••• la vitesse 
et ainsi d'une infinite d'autre choses de cette sorte.52 
Dimension is a species of quantity of which there are 
two kinds. Quantity is either discrete, like the point, or 
it is continuous, like spatial magnitude. Points are indi-
visible and are not per se measurable. As discrete quantity, 
they can be counted or they can be ordered in relation to 
other points. Continuous quantity, like the magnitude, is 
measurable, and it is the quality of continuity that presents 
itself as the measurable aspect of things. 
Time can serve to measure the duration of things 
because duration presents itself as a species of continuous 
quantity. Duration is a real property of things since there 
is no substance that does not cease to exist when it ceases 
to endure. When we comprehend that duration it is conceived 
as kind of continuous quantity. Hence, time can function 
to measure that duration. This measurable aspect of duration 
is articulated by Descartes when he says that "la duree est 
un mode ou une facon dont nous considerons cette chose.en 
tant qu'elle continue d'etre. 1153 
Wherever there is a continuum, there we find a measur-
able object that can be conceived in terms of more or less 
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or of long or short. The measurable aspect of duration is 
made apparent in the practical order. We note that the movie 
lasted less than three hours. Or, similarly, we measure the 
duration of the movie as lasting a long time. Duration 
presents itself as a continuum, a kind of stretching out of 
existence that in some sense must be conceived as a species 
of magnitude. This is the case in all questions that con-
sider the 'more' or 'less'. This is implied in the Rules: 
Il faut noter ensuite que rien ne peut etre ramener 
a egalite que ce qui comporte le plus et le moins 54 
et que tout cela est compris sous le nom de grandeur. 
Everything that is measurable is a dimension that has 
the quality of spatial extension. Regardless of the subject 
matter, the exact determination of whether something is more 
or less can only be achieved "par une certain analogie avec 
l'entendu d'un corps figure. 1155 The possibility of measuring 
duration is grounded in the fact that duration is continuous, 
and therefore is analogous to extension. This aspect of 
duration is underlined in Descartes' letter to Burman: 
Notre pensee ••• est etendue et divisible quanta la 
d d d . . t. 56 uree parce que sa uree peut etre ivise en par ies. 
As an extended body with its continuous quantity is measur-
tOYOL~ 
• 
measured by an appropriate standard of measurement such as 
the yardstick, so too is duration measured by a standard. 
That standard is time. 
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As we noted previously, Descartes offers no one clear-
cut definition of time. From the foregoing texts we know that 
time is universal and real, and that it is a measure of 
duration. Another mathematical perspective of time emerges 
in the Principles in which we find Descartes saying that: 
••• le temps, par exemple, que nous dist-inguons de 
la duree prise en general, & que nous disons etre 
le nornbre du mouvement, n'est rien qu'une certain 
facon dont nous pensons a cette duree, pource que 
nous ne concevons point que la duree des choses 
qui sont meuees soit autre que celle des choses 
qui ne le sont point.57 
There are several aspects of this passage that deserve at-
tention. Initially, we should take cognizance of the fact 
that Descartes insists that time can be called a number of 
movement only if one understands that per se movement is not 
being numbered but merely movement insofar as it implies 
duration. Descartes makes this clear when he remarks that 
the duration of things moved is no different from the dura-
tion of things not moved. Time numbers duration and not 
specifically movement. Descartes' definition of time as a 
number complements his definition of time as a measure. 
Duration as measurable is a species of dimension, and 
dimension, because it is a quantity, is numerable. Number 
simply functions to express that measure: 
Enfin il faut remarquer que, quoique nous abstrayons 
ici des nombres les termes de la difficulte, pour en 
examiner la nature, neanmoins il arrive souvent que 
cette difficulte peut etre resolue avec les nombres 
donnes, plus simplement que si on l'en avait abstraite; 
cela se produit a cause du double usage des nombres 
ainsi que nous l'avons deja vu plus haut, les memes 
nombres expliquant tantot l'ordre et la mesure.58 
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When it is a question of measurement and the numbering 
of that measurement there must be some unit that acts as the 
standard of measurement: 
On doit savoir aussi qu'au moyen d'une unite d'emprunt 
les granduers continues peuvent etre ramenees a la 
quantite, Earfois tout entieres et toujours au moins 
en partie. 9 
In the case of a true magnitude, either the metric unit or 
its United States equivalent serves as the standard of 
measurement. In the case of duration, the temporal unit 
serves as the standard by which one can measure the duration 
of things. Thus, a duration of ten minutes is measured by 
the temporal unit of a minute, ten hours by the temporal 
unit of an hour, ten days by the temporal unit of a day, etc. 
If we retain the analogy that duration has with magni-
tude, we understand that as a true magnitude is measured as 
a unit, duration is also comprehended as an actual whole. 
In measuring a continuous magnitude of ten inches, we con-
sider the object as a whole that is potentially divisible 
into parts or units of inches. Similarly, in measuring a 
duration of ten minutes, that duration is comprehended as 
an actual whole that is potentailly divisible into units of 
minutes. When it is a question of measurement, the parts are 
subsumed by the whole. The object of measurement is the 
quantity of the whole as Rule XIV indicates: 
Si nous considerons, en effect les parties que forment 
le tout, on dit alors que nous comptons •.. si nous 
considerons le tout en tant que divise en parties, nous 
le mesurons; par exemple, nous mesurons les siecles par 
les annees, les jours, les heures, les minutes; mais, 
si nous comptons les minutes, les heures, les jours et 
les annee:s,nous finirons par remplir des siecles.60 
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Thus, insofar as time. functions as a number that measures 
duration, its object is per se the whole, that is, the actual 
unit conceived as a length of existence. Or more appro-
priately, it is the quantity of time in which one has 
continued to exist. Insofar as time numbers this quantity, 
it correspondingly measures it. 
In light of what Descartes says in the Rules, it is 
possible to provide another mathematical perspective of time 
as a number: Number also functions to express order. 61 
This double function of number, that is, to express order 
and to measure, has its basis in the mathematical method 
which consists in the reduction of all questions of measure 
into questions of order: 
On doit savoir aussi qu'au moyen d'une unite d'em-
prunt les grandeurs continues peuvent etre ramenees 
a la quantite parfois tout entieres et toujours au 
moins en partie; la quantite des unites peut ensuite 
etre disposee dans un ordre tel, que la difficulte, 
qui etait relative a la connaissance de la mesuree, 
ne depende plus enfin que de la consideration de 
l'ordre progres pour lequel ma methode est d'une 
grand secours.62 
What is measurable is orderable, and number functions to 
express both aspects. This rule can be applied to time 
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since time is a kind of number. 
We have observed the manner in which time functions as 
a number that measures duration insofar as that duration 
presents itself as a continuity analogous to extension. Cor-
responding to the quality of extension as a spatial magni-
tude, duration, when comprehended as a whole, implies the 
divisibility of parts. In the case of duration, these parts 
take on the mode of 'before' and 'after', constituting a 
relationship of order. While the duration -of substances is 
measured as an actual whole, its measurement is made possible 
because duration is fundamentally successive. That is, it 
is not simultaneous. It is constituted by a succession of 
moments related to each other in an order of 'before' and 
'after'. 
This aspect of duration is articulated in Descartes' 
correspondence with Arnauld. To Descartes' treatment of the 
duration of the soul in the third Meditation Arnauld had 
objected that the duration of a spiritual being was non-
successive.63 Descartes' response is emphatic in making the 
point that there is no distinction between the duration of 
thinking substances and that of material substances, both 
are characterized as successive: 
Jene connois pas autrement la duree successive des 
choses qui sont mues, ou meme celle de leur mouvement 
que je fais la duree des choses non mues; car le de-
vant et l'apres de toutes les durees quelles qu'elles 
saient, me parait par le devant et par l'apres de la 
duree successive que je decouvre en ma pensee avec 
laquelle les autres choses sont coexistantes.64 
We are presented with a dual perspective of duration. 
on the one hand, duration is measurable because it is 
analogous to extension, "Notre pensee ••• est etendue et 
divisible quanta la duree". 65 On the other hand, as 
Descartes' response to Arnauld indicates, the extended unit 
is divisible into discrete parts, related to each other in 
an order of 'before' and 'after'. We are in the presence of 
a quantitative object that is both continuous and discrete; 
as such, it is both measurable and orderable. Time as a 
number functions to express both the measure and the order 
in the following manner: 
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A duration measured as a unit of ten days is divisible 
into parts that are related in a successive order. The first 
day comes before the second day which comes before the third 
day and after the first day, etc., until we reach the tenth 
day. Each day is singularly related to the other as either 
a 'before' or an 'after'. This is a concrete example of the 
mathematical method which consists in the reduction of 
measure to order. The applicability of the method is most 
appropriate in the case of duration. The essential consti-
tution of duration is by nature that of order since it is 
successive. It is only after two or more of the units have 
followed in a successive order that they can be measured. 
If one were to inspect any measurement, it would be found to 
be grounded in a relationship of order. 
To give further insight into the mathematical 
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perspective, we cannot ignore the countable factor and the 
relationship that the units have to one another. The 
relationship of order is the primary and essential rela-
tionship between the individual temporal units. While 
the relationship of temporal order implies a numerical 
assemblage of countable units, as countable units per se 
they are not necessarily related. Consider a duration that 
is measured as ten days. At each twenty-four hour interval 
we mark one day, two days, three days, etc. until we reach 
ten days, comprehending the totality as a unit in itself. 
While the units constituting the measure, insofar as they 
are countable units are related, the relationship is not 
essential. Their relationship is parallel to that of units 
in a numerical series where the 'two' is related to the 'one' 
to the extent that you cannot have a 'two' without a 'one', 
but you can have a 'one' without a 'two'. Similarly, you 
can have a 'three' without a 'four' but not a 'four' without 
a 'three'. By analysis one can see that, while the prior 
number in the series is included in the concept of the 
subsequent number, as 'four' includes 'three', the 'four' is 
the result of the addition of singular units each designated 
as one. The relationship is constructed by an external 
factor. In the numerical series neither the 'one' and 'two' 
nor 'three' or 'four' are correlative concepts. This is 
verified by the fact that the concept of 'one' is understood 
apart from the concept of 'two' as 'three' is understood as 
unrelated to 'four 1 • 
In the case of parts ordered one to another the rela-
tionship is essential. An analytic proposition will demon-
strate the point. A rainy day is a wet day. The predicate 
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is contained in the subject. The same holds true for the 
following proposition. The day before precedes the day after. 
The predicate adds nothing to the concept of the subject 
since it is essentially contained in the subject. 'Before' 
and 'after' are understood in terms of each other, and in 
this sense their relationship is essential. If one under-
stands the concept of 'before' one understands that it is 
related to 'after' by virtue of its order. The relationship 
of parts ordered one to another is prior in the order of 
being to that of the relationship of parts constituting 
a numerical assemblage. 
The point can be graphically illustrated: 
Figure 1. Figure 2. 
In both Figure 1 and Figure 2 we have a numerical 
assemblage of six units. In Figure 1 the assemblage consti-
tutes the intelligible geometric figure of a triangle. It 
does this because each of the points has a necessary position 
in relation to the other points. In Figure 2 the assemblage 
does not form any intelligible geometric figure for the 
reason that points are randomly placed. In Figure 1 we need 
only inspect the order to apprehend a triangle. In other 
words, it is not the countability of the points that results 
in the figure of a triangle but the order of the points. 
Figure 2 lacks the relationship of order, hence it is not 
apprehended as an intelligible geometric figure. 
To demonstrate the point further: I am seated at the 
piano with the intention of playing a piano sonata. Unable 
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to remember the order of the notes I play a random selection 
of notes for the first few minutes. I am able to perceive 
each note in the sequence as having some sound and duration 
and can count them as one, two, three, four, etc. As an 
assemblage of sounds their relation to each other is extrinsic 
or accidental. As such, they do not blend harmoniously to 
form the desired melody. If, however, I play the notes in 
accordance with the musical score, they are played in a 
certain order in which each note has a necessary place and 
duration. It is not the simple assemblage of notes that 
constitutes the melody, it is the assemblage of notes in so 
far as each note is ordered one to another. In this sense, 
it may be said that the relationship of parts ordered one 
to another is prior to the relationship of parts constituting 
a numerical assemblage. 
When it is a question of measurement, all numerical 
assemblages can be broken down to the relationship of order. 
This is the essence of what Descartes proposes in Rule XIV: 
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on doit savoir aussi qu'au moyen d'une unite d'emprunt 
les grandeurs continues peuvent etre ramenees a la 
quantite, parfois tout entieres et toujours au moi_ns en 
partie; la quantite des unites peut ensuite etre disposee 
dans un ordre tel, que la difficulte qui etait relative 
a la connaissance de la mesure, ne depende plus enfin 
que de la consideration de l'ordre, progres pour lequel 
ma methode est d'une grand secours.66 
This rule can be translated in terms of time which 
numbers duration. Because duration is continuous time can 
serve to measure it. The temporal measurement is expressed 
by a cardinal number as ten minutes. Because the continuum 
of duration is made up of parts essentially related in a 
successive order of 'before' and 'after', time as a number 
expresses that order. This is done by means of an ordinal 
temporal unit. Thus, the units constituting the measure are 
clocked off as the first minute, second minute, third minute, 
etc. This successive order makes it possible to comprehend 
the assemblage of these units as a measured quantity. In 
other words, the first minute, second minute, third minute 
can be counted as one minute, two minutes, three minutes, 
etc. until the measured quantity of ten minutes is reached. 
As the measure depends on the order, so too does the cardinal 
number depend on the ordinal. 
As measurable and orderable, duration is numerable. 
And time is the number. That which is numerable is numbered 
only if there is a numberer. This subjective aspect of time 
is punctuated in the Principles: 
Ainsi, le temps, par exemple, que nous distingons 
de la duree prise en general, & que nous disons etre 
le nombre du mouvement, n'est rien qu'une certain 
facon dont nous pensons a cette duree .•• 67 
The Principles calls us to the fact that duration is 
numberable, time is the number and the mind does the number-
ing. The process of numbering is twofold. The mind must 
choose a temporal unit as a standard of measurement, as the 
minute, hour, day, etc. and do the actual numbering that 
denotes the order or measure. One of the objective elements 
intrinsic to the subjective process of numbering is the 
duration of things. The other is the temporal unit that 
serves as the standard of measurement: 
Mais, afin de comprendre la duree de toutes les choses 
sous une meme mesure, nous nous ferons ordinairement 
de la duree de certains mouvemens reguliers qui sont 
les jours & les annees, & la nommons temps, apres 
l'avoir rien, hors de la veritable duree des choses, 
qu'une facon de penser.68 
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In addition to the temporal units created by the astronomical 
system are those which are constructs of man: 
C'est en effet quelque chose de reel que la pesanteur 
de corps, la vitesse, ou la division de siecle en an-
nees et en jours; mais ce n'est pas quelque chose de 
reel que la division du jour en heures et en minutes, 
etc. Et cependant toutes ces choses sont equivalentes, 
si on les considere seulement sous le rapport de la 
dimension comme on doit le faire ici et dans les science 
mathematiques;69 
We would be mistaken were we to emphasize the distinction be-
tween the measurement of centuries, years, and days, and that 
of hours and minutes. What is more important is their 
commonality. Whether it be the movements of the heavens or 
the movements created by the hands of the clock, both serve 
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as standards of measurement. 
Time as a mode of thought means that without the mind 
there would be no measurement of duration. And if duration 
is measured, a commonly accepted standard of measurement is 
applied. In the practical order, this objective element 
constitutes the general basis for measuring. In addition to 
this objective aspect of the measuring process is a sub-
jective aspect that has two dimensions. The first is the 
choice of a standard of measurement, and the second is the 
interpretation of the measure. 
Consider the question of a choice. Experience verifies 
that neither the movements of the heavens nor the movements 
of the hands of a clock are always used as temporal standards 
of measurement. The time it takes to drive from A to C does 
not have to be measured by the clock. Depending on the 
subjective circumstances, another standard of measurement may 
be equally appropriate. Rather than compare the duration of 
a drive from A to C to the movements of a clock (ten minutes), 
it may be compared to the length of duration it takes to 
cycle from A to M. It will take as long to drive to the 
drugstore as it does to cycle downtown. The choice of a 
unit of measure reflects the purpose of the measurer and for 
that reason an objective standard of measure need not be used. 
What is necessary is that some movement be chosen as the 
standard of measurement. Whether that be the movements of 
the heavens which create the days and years, or the movements 
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of the hands of a clock which generate the minutes and hours, 
or an arbitrary movement such as cycling, all may be r~garded 
as standards of measurement. 
The second dimension of the subjective aspect of time 
is disclosed in the process of interpretation or evaluation 
of the measure. For the scientist, a movie on microbes that 
has a duration of two hours may seem to have lasted a short 
time. For the dancer, whose interests are far removed from 
microbes, the same movie may be interpreted as having lasted 
a long time. In both cases, the evaluation of the objective 
standard of measurement (two hours) is grounded in subjec-
tivity. Descartes himself alludes to this factor of measure-
ment. In his hopes for utilizing the method he has come to 
discover for attaining truth, he bemoans the fact that it 
must be done in "la court duree de ma vie 11 • 70 How many years 
is short: forty, fifty, perhaps seventy? The temporal unit 
remains objective, the interpretation of that remains 
subjective. 
This brings us back to our initial premise. Time 
measures the duration of both kinds of substances. The 
successive mode of that duration draws them into a relation-
ship to one another in respect of 'before' and 'after'. 
Their coexistence in these moments means that the physical 
events taking place within the universe are simultaneous with 
any mental events. At the same time that some phenomenon 
occurs in the world the substance can intellectually and 
volitionally react to it. This indicates that the thinking 
substance, like the material substance, exists in the 
world, and in that sense is an object. There is a unity 
between the .two kinds of substances. Both the thinking 
substance and the material substance coexist in the world. 
There is another dimension to that unity. It is reflected 
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in the fact that both kinds of substances share a common 
measurement of their diverse types of duration. In spite of 
the unity that exists between the thinking substance and the 
material substance, a difference remains. For while the 
thinking substance is an object, it is also a knowing subject. 
Its successive mode of duration must, it seems, reflect that 
characteristic. 
The two kinds of substances are radically hetero-
geneous. The metaphysical foundation of Descartes' science 
was structured in accordance with the exigencies of his 
mathematical physics. Descartes fashioned a world of 
material substances that were essentially characterized by 
extension. In doing so he provided the mathematical model 
for his physics. The thinking substance that coexisted with 
these spatial entities was defined solely in terms of 
thought. Defined in this way, the thinking substance pos-
sessed a dynamic quality that was absent in material 
substances. It was that dynamic nature in contrast to the 
inert mathematical nature of the material substance that 
established the thinking substance as a knower able to 
comprehend the phenomena in nature in terms of mathematical 
relations. From an epistemic standpoint, Descartes' m~ta-
physical dualism served him well. 
That metaphysical dualism cannot be ignored when it 
comes to the question of time. Material substances and 
thinking substances share a successive mode of duration, and 
time measures that duration. Given the radical distinction 
between the two kinds of substances, their duration cannot 
be manifested in the same way. Nor does it seem that time 
which measures their duration can be predicated of both 
substances univocally. Rather, it is our intent to show 
that a precise understanding of time warrants a perspective 
that views time as an analogical concept. We will see that 
within the philosophical system of Descartes there is a kind 
of static time and lived time that corresponds to the two 
separate substances. Further, we will see if, and in what 
manner, the polarity between the two modes of time is viable 
in terms of Descartes' vision of a universal mathematical 
kind of physics. 
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69Regle XIV, Pleiade, p. 103. H.R. I, p. 62. "Weight 
is indeed something real existing in a body, and the speed 
of motion is a reality, and so with the division of the 
century into years and days. But it is otherwise with the 
division of the day into hours and moments, etc. Yet all 
these subdivisions are exactly similar if considered merely 
from the point of view of dimension as we ought to regard 
them both here and in the science of Mathematics." 
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oisc. A.T. VI, p. 3. My translation is as follows: 
" •.• the short duration of my life." 
CHAPTER II 
THE PARADOXICAL NATURE OF TIME 
We have seen that time functions as a measure of 
duration insofar as duration presents itself as a continuous 
species of quantity. Time also functions as a number for 
duration insofar as that duration is constituted by parts 
ordered one to another as 'before' and 'after'. Duration 
is measurable, it is numerable. It is comprehended as both 
continuous quantity and discrete quantity. Similarly, time 
as a mode of thought by which we think about that duration 
is both continuous and discrete. This dual perspective 
of time and duration evokes two questions. The first 
question concerns the nature of the unity of the moments 
insofar as they are arranged to form a continuous whole. 
A second question is directed to the nature of the individual 
moment as a discrete unit. 
Objections regarding Descartes' theory of time have 
been directed at these two questions. It is important for 
this study to establish if the objections are justified 
since it affects our final evaluation as to whether 
Descartes has a coherent theory of time. However, at this 
stage of the study no definitive resolutions of the issues 
can be offered. These will follow only as a result of our 
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analysis of Descartes' theory of time as it functions within 
the context of his overall philosophical system. The ger-
mane concerns of this chapter are limited to an introduction 
to the genesis of the objections and to an assessment of 
the evidence offered by the commentators in support of their 
claims. Let us begin with the introduction. 
A. Continuous Creation 
The genesis of these two questions can be traced to 
Descartes' doctrine of continuous creation. The import of 
the passage justifies its citation: 
Et encore que je puisse supposer que peut-etre j'ai 
toujours ete comme je suis maintenant, je ne saurois 
pas pour cela eviter la force de ce raisonnement, et 
ne laisse pas de connoitre qu'il est necessaire que 
Dieu soit l'auteur demon existence. Car tout le 
temps de ma vie peut etre divise en une infinite de 
parties, chacune desquelles ne depend en aucune facon 
des autres; et ainsi de ce qu'un peu auparavant j'ai 
ete, il ne s'ensuit pas que je doive maintenant etre, 
si ce n'est qu'en ce moment quelque cause me produise 
et me cree, pour ainsi dire, derechef, c'est-a-dire me 
conserve. En effet c'est une chose bien claire & bien 
evidente a ceux qui considereront avec attention la 
nature de temps qu'une substance, pour etre conserver 
dans tousles moments qu'elle dure, a besoin du meme 
pouvoir et de la meme action qui serait necessaire 
pour la produire et la creer tout de nouveau si elle 
n'etait point encore. En sorte que la lumiere 
naturelle nous fait voir clairement que la conservation 
& la creation ne different qu'au regard de notre facon 
de penser & non point en effet.l 
In the following texts we see that conservation is 
defined in terms of continuous creation: 
Car, tout de meme que, bien que j'eusse ete de toute 
eternite, et que par consequent il n'y eut rien eu 
avant moi, neanmoins, parce que je vois que les parties 
du temps peuvent etre separees les unes d'avec les 
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autres et qu'ainsi, de ce que je suis maintenant, il 
ne s'ensuit pas que je doive etre encore apres, si, 
pour ainsi parler je ne suis cree de nouveau a chaque 
moment par quelque cause, je ne ferais point difficulte 
d'appeler efficiente la cause qui me cree continuellement 
en cette facon, c'est-a-dire me conserve.2 
As the texts indicate, Descartes' argument for the existence 
of God is predicated on the fact that there must be a cause 
who creates and conserves the substance since each of the 
moments of time in which the substance exists can be 
separated and are reciprocally independent of one another. 
The separation of the moments is the manifestation that the 
limited essence of the substance does not contain existence. 
Moreover, it attests to the fact that the substance lacks a 
principle of autocontinuation since it lacks the essential 
power to exist in any single moment. For this reason God 
must not only create the substance in the first moment in 
which it exists but must continue his creative action if the 
substance is to continue to exist. 
According to M. Gueroult, Y. Belavel, and others who 
follow them, Descartes' doctrine of continuous creation 
clearly establishes the discontinuity of time. 3 Gueroult's 
comment expresses this thesis: 
Ayant demontre que Dieu est necessairement l'auteur de 
moi-meme, en vertue de la creation continuee, ayant 
prouve la creation continuee par l'independence absolu 
des diverses parties de temps de ma vie, Descartes 
parait bien soutenir la these de la discontinuite 
du temps. 4 
If this is the fundamental mode of time and duration it is 
contradicted in the order of experience where time and 
duration are experienced as a continuum. Moreover, 
Descartes himself conceives duration as continuous and 
underlines this aspect when he defines duration as a mode 
h . h . ' t S under w 1c we continue to ex1s • This is a continuity 
analogous to extension taken as an unbroken whole. 6 
Descartes appears to have a paradoxical view of time 
and duration. On the one hand, time and duration are made 
up of a sequence of separate and independent moments, none 
of which is necessarily connected to the other. Contrary 
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to this view, time and duration are comprehended as a whole 
that is constituted by moments necessarily connected to 
each other. It seems we are confronted with schism and 
organization, diachrony and synchrony, and discontinuity 
and continuity. It is by no means certain, however, that 
this dualism translates into a real contradiction. Nor is 
it certain that Gueroult is correct when he suggests that 
Descartes has a paradoxical view of time in that he draws 
continuous time from a repetition of discontinuous moments. 7 
B. Discontinuity - Continuity 
In order to sustain Gueroult's allegation it is 
necessary to give evidence that time, for Descartes, is 
discontinuous. Without providing any textual evidence, 
Gueroult claims that discontinuity is defined in terms of 
separation, reciprocal independence, and contingency and 
since the moments of time have these three characteristics, 
they are discontinuous. 8 The texts on continuous creation 
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do not support the claim. 
The texts do not say that the moments are actually 
divided nor actually separated. What the texts do say is 
that the time of my life "can be divided into an infinite 
number of parts" and that the parts of time "can be sepa-
rated one from another." There is a distinction between 
what is actually divided and separated and what is only 
potentially divisible and separable. While actuality 
implies potentiality, what is potential does not necessarily 
imply actuality. 9 That distinction, however, seems to have 
been overlooked by Gueroult. 
Y. Belavel appears to maintain the same line of think-
ing as Gueroult, noting that the separation and independence 
f ' l' h . d' t' 't lO H' · · o moments imp ies t eir iscon inui y. is reasoning is 
based on his claim that Descartes does not distinguish the 
contiguous from the continuous, and since the moments are 
separated and reciprocally independent, that is not con-
tiguous, they do not constitute a true continuity analogous 
to the continuity of a line as an unbroken unity. The 
discontiguity of the moments establishes their disconti-
nuity.11 In order for that claim to be sustained it must be 
shown that, for Descartes, the contiguous is identical to 
the continuous. Here are the texts on which Belavel bases 
his claim: 
(A) This is Descartes' definition of contiguity. 
Mais je n'ai jamais ne qu'elle (la superficie) fuit 
le terme du corps; au contraire, je croi qu'elle 
peut fort proprement etre appelee l'extremite, tant du 
corps contenu que de. celui qui contient, au sens que 
l'on dit que les corps contigus sont ceux dont l~s 
extremites sont ensemble. Car, de vrai, quand deux 
corps se touchent rnutuellement, ils n'ont ensemble 
qu'une meme extremite, qui n'est point partie de l'un 
ni de l'autre, mais qui est le meme mode de tousles 
deux. 12 
(B) This is Descartes' definition of continuity. 
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Des lors, peu importe comment les autres definissent 
continu et contigu: pour moi, je dis qu'il ya con-
tinuite lorsque les surfaces de deux corps sont jointes 
d'une maniere tellement qu'ils entrent simultanement 
en mouvement ou en repos ••. Ceux qui se comportement 
autrement, sont contigus.13 
Implicitly Belavel seems to be drawing from these two 
texts the following conclusions: When Descartes says in 
(B) that when the "surfaces of two bodies are so immediately 
joined that the two begin to move and come to rest simul-
taneously, they are continuous," he implies that the 
continuous bodies are actually bodies whose "surfaces" are 
really one surface. Since (A) says that "surface" can quite 
properly be called "extremity", then the "two surfaces" (B) 
are really the one "extremity" mentioned in (A). The point 
Belavel seems to be making is that the reason why the two 
bodies move and come to rest simultaneously (in which case 
they are continuous) is that their extremities are one and 
the same. But this has not been proven, it has merely been 
stated. 
Al though neither the term '.contiguity' or 'continuity' 
is used in Descartes' letter to Mersenne, Bela~el offers it 
as Descartes' definition of continuity based on contiguity. 
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Here is the text Belavel cites from that letter: 
Pour la superficie que j'ai dit ne faire point partie 
du pain ni de l'air qui est autour, elle ne differe en 
rien du locu Aristotelicus des echoles, ni de toutes les 
superficies que considerent les Geometres, excepte en 
l'imagination de ceux qui ne les concoivent pas comme 
ils doivent, & qui supposent que superficies corporis 
arnbientis soit une partie du cors circoniacent.14 
What the text establishes is that circumjacent bodies have 
a common extremity, and that extremity is not a part of one 
or the other, but the place of contact with other bodies. 
Belavel insists that such contact (contiguity) establishes 
. t' 't 15 their con inui y. There is no justification on the basis 
of this text to consider, as Belavel seems to do, the 
following proposition to be analytict What is contiguous is 
continuous. Rather than supporting his theory, the text 
may, in fact, weaken it. Since Belavel seems to be arguing 
that the contiguous is identical to the continuous, and 
that Descartes' definition of contiguity is identical to 
Aristotle's, the truth of the proposition must be based on 
the assumption that for Aristotle the contiguous is identical 
to the continuous. Is this the case? 
Here is Aristotle's definition of contiguity: 
th . . . d h . t· 16 at is in succession an touc es is con iguous. 
Aristotle's definition of continuity: 
a thing 
Here is 
The continuum is a subdivision of the contiguous. 
Things are called continuous when the touching limits 
of each other become one and the same and are, as the 
word implies, contained in each other; continuity is 
impossible if these extremities are two. This defi-
nition makes it plain that continuity belongs to things 
that naturally in virtue of their mutual contact form 
a unity.17 
Aristotle then proceeds to qualify and explain exactly 
what relationship the contiguous has with the continuous. 
It is not one of identity: 
And if there is continuity there is necessarily con-
tact, but if there is contact, that alone does not 
imply continuity; for the extremities of things may be 
together without necessarily being one; but they cannot 
be one without being necessarily together.18 
An analysis of the texts shows the following: 
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Aristotle's definition of contiguity is distinguished from 
his definition of continuity in this manner: His definition 
of contiguity is defined simply in terms of contact between 
bodies whose extremities may be together without being one. 
Continuity is defined not only in terms of contact but 
contact between bodies whose extremities are one and the 
same in the sense that the touching limit is common to both. 
Aristotle's definition of contiguity is different from that 
of continuity; his definition of continuity is simply 
Descartes' definition of contiguity which is based on a 
common extremity. 
While it is true that Aristotle's definition of 
continuity and Descartes' definition of contiguity have 
something in common--both require two things becoming one--
Belavel has not proved the point that the text was intended 
to make. This for the reason that his argument is based on 
two false assumptions. The first assumption is that 
Descartes' definition of contiguity is identical to 
Aristotle's definition of contiguity (Descartes, it seems, 
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was incorrect in thinking that it was). The second assump-
tion is that Aristotle's definition of contiguity is_ 
identical to his (Aristotle's) definition of continuity. 
If these were true, it could be argued that since Descartes' 
definition of contiguity is identical to Aristotle's, and 
Aristotle's definition of contiguity is identical to his 
definition of continuity, then Descartes' definition of 
contiguity is identical to his definition of continuity. 
However, as the texts demonstrate, these assumptions are 
not true, and Belavel's argument cannot be sustained. 
Descartes' definition of continuity differs from 
Aristotle's. According to Aristotle, things are continuous 
simply by virtue of the fact that their extremity is one and 
the same so that they are necessarily connected. How does 
Descartes' definition of continuity imply something other 
than Aristotle's? Let us reconsider the original texts 
(A) and (B) that Belavel used as evidence that the con-
tiguous is identical to the continuous. In (A) Descartes 
defines contiguity solely in terms of a common boundary. 
In (B) we note that when Descartes defines continuity he 
says that the bodies are so joined that when they move it 
is in a single motion and when they come to rest they do so 
simultaneously. If they act otherwise they are contiguous. 
It is not quite clear exactly what Descartes means by this 
last statement. Rather than identify contiguity with 
continuity it seems that he wishes to distinguish the two. 
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Based on what he says in texts (A) and (a) that distinction 
would be manifested in the following manner: If I rub my 
arm with my hand their extremity (place of contact) is one. 
Thus they are contiguous. They do not, however, move 
simultaneously nor do they come to rest simultaneously since 
at the same time that my hand is moving my arm remains at 
rest. According to the definition of continuity (B), while 
the two bodies are contiguous they are not continuous since 
they do not come to move and to rest simultaneously. Hence, 
texts (A) and (B) that Belavel provides to support his 
claim are insufficient in themselves. 
There is an important point that Belavel has failed to 
observe. In Cartesian physics motion is the principle of 
t . 19 separa ion. In the Principles movement is defined as 
le transport d'une partie de la matiere, ou d'un corps, 
du voisinage de ceux qui le touchent immediatement, et 
que nous considerons comme en repos, dans le voisinage 
de quelques autres.20 
Following that definition Descartes clarifies his meaning of 
the above: 
J'ai aussi adjoute que le transport de corps se fait 
du voisinage de ceux gu'il touche dans le voisinage 
de quelques autres, & non pas d'un lieu en un autre, 
pource que le lieu peut etre pris en plusieurs facons 
qui dependent de notre pensee, comme il a ete remarque 
cy-dessus. Mais quand nous prenons le mouvement pour 
le transport d'un corps qui quitte le voisinage de ceux 
gu'il touche, il est certain que nous ne saurions 
attriber a un meme mobile plus d'un mouvement, a cause 
qu'il n'y a qu'une certain quantite de corps qui le 
puissent toucher en meme temps.21 
The above text has been amended. In the original Latin 
"ceux qu'il touche" is written as "contiguorum. 1122 The 
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correction has been made to conform to the definition given 
of movement (Prin. II, 25) that uses the phrase, "tou~hent 
mutuellement," which in the Latin is written as "immediate 
contingunt. 1123 Since Descartes is defining movement in both 
places, movement can be properly defined as the transporta-
tion of one part of matter from the vicinity of those which 
are contiguous to it. Because movement is the separation 
of one part of matter from another part of matter contiguous 
to it, then contiguity cannot be identical to continuity 
since the latter is defined in terms of two bodies which 
"sont jointes d'une maniere tellement qu'ils entrent 
simultanement en mouvement ou en repos". Whereas in the 
case of contiguous bodies, the bodies can separate, in the 
case of continuous bodies, they move or rest as one. 
However, the case cannot be dismissed entirely. From 
another perspective contiguity implies continuity. There is 
only one movement proper to an individual body since it can 
move away, that is, separate, from a certain number of 
contiguous bodies. Nevertheless, it can participate in 
innumerable movements since all of the bodies are moving at 
the same time. 24 Insofar.as a body does participate in other 
movements, there may be a basis for the position that, for 
Descartes, the contiguous is continuous. The case might be 
argued in the following manner: Because, on the one hand, 
there cannot be any other body between the two, 25 then no 
action can be exercised on either where their surfaces meet; 
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and since, on the other hand, the universe is a plenum and 
the whole system is displaced together at the same time, 27 
the bodies have action exerted on their other sides so that, 
through the effects exercised on them by surrounding bodies, 
they move and come to rest as a unity. 
While it may be intuitively correct that what is 
contiguous is continuous, no textual evidence has been 
offered by Belavel to justify this claim. It has not been 
shown that Descartes himself believed that the discontiguous 
is discontinuous. Since this is the premise upon which 
Belavel's claim that time is discontinuous is made, the 
validity of that claim is periled. 
However, let us grant that Belavel is correct in his 
premise. Is it legitimate to transfer what is valid in 
terms of spatial contiguity to temporal contiguity? Three 
considerations provoke this question. The first is that 
extension is an essential attribute of material substances 
and does not apply to thinking substances. Time, however, 
does. It is a measure of the duration of substances, and it 
is a mode of thought about all substance insofar as these 
substances endure. Hence, time applies not only to the 
extended substance but also to the indivisible thinking 
substance. Secondly, if we accept that what is spatially 
contiguous is spatially continuous, contiguity is essentially 
a spatial property (place} relative to other bodies. Since 
'place' can undergo perpetual change in any direction, there 
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is nothing parallel to 'place' in time. For the parts of 
time have a necessary order of 'before' and 'after'. Unlike 
'place', that order cannot be juxtaposed. Thirdly, in the 
case of spatial extension the parts exist simultaneously. 
This is not the case with the moments of time. Since time 
is constituted by a successive order of moments, no one 
moment can exist simultaneously with another. 
No doubt Descartes' theory of time seems paradoxical. 
On the one hand, the moments of time can be separated and are 
independent of one another; no one moment is necessarily 
connected with any other moment. On the other hand, time is 
experienced as a continuum of moments each of which is 
necessarily connected with the other. However, the problem 
of the discontinuity or continuity cannot be resolved by 
appealing to dispersed quotations. It must be referred to 
the whole Cartesian conception of movement as well as 
Descartes' metaphysics of the thinking substance. This will 
be done in the remaining chapters. Our immediate concern 
here is to address ourselves to another kind of criticism 
that arises from Descartes' doctrine of continuous creation. 
C. Indivisibility - Divisibility 
In addition to the question regarding the kind of unity 
that exists between the moments that form a given continuity 
there is the question of the nature of the moment itself. 
Those who presume that time is discontinuous also 
presume that time is constituted by absolutely indivisible 
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instants that have no measurable duration. If this is so, 
then Descartes has a paradoxical view of time and Gueroult 
is correct when he alleges that the difficulty of Cartesian 
. th th d d . f . t h d . 28 time is a e raws uration rom instan st at eny it. 
What needs to be proven to sustain Gueroult's objection is 
to demonstrate that, for Descartes, the instant is 
absolutely indivisible. 
However, even prior to determining this there is the 
initial question regarding the assumption that the 'moment' 
and 'instant' are identical. The texts on continuous 
creation found in the Meditations and Responses refer to the 
temporal unit only as a 'moment'. Nowhere in these. texts 
do we find the unit referred to as the 'instant'. There is, 
however, evidence for interchanging the terms. 
In the Discourse, where Descartes speaks about the 
action of the light, we see that the light reaches the earth 
in an 'instant': 
Et ici m'entendant sur le sujet de la lumiere, j'expli-
quai bien au long quelle etoit celle qui se devoit · 
trouver dans le Soleil & les Etoiles, & comment de la 
elle traversoit en un instant les immenses espaces des 
planetes & des Cometes vers la Terre.29 
The same action of the light is discussed in the 
Principles. In that text we note that the light reaches the 
earth in a 'moment': 
Mais d'autant que le cercle de la matiere qui se meut 
ainsi ensemble, est plus grand, d'autant le mouvement 
de chacune de ses parties est plus libre, a cause qu'il 
se fait suivant une ligne moins courbee, ou moins dif-
ferent de la droite: ce qui peut servir pour empecher 
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qu'on trouve estrange, que souvent le mouvement des plus 
petits corps etende son action jusques aux plus grandes 
distances; & ainsi, que la lumiere du Soleil & des 
Etoiles le plus eloignees passe en un moment jusques a 
la terre.30 
on the basis of these two texts it seems that, for 
Descartes, the 'instant' and 'moment' are interchangeable. 31 
In neglecting to provide these texts the critics assume a 
premise that should have been argued for. 
To return to the criticism itself. Ferdinand Alquie 
states it in this manner: 
Il (temps) est fait d'une 
est une sorte de neant de 
n'aucune realite propre. 
principe de continuite.32 
suite d'instants dont chacune 
duree. Il n'a aucune force, 
Il ne recele en lui aucune 
The following text is offered to support this: 
Mais, parmi ces natures simples, il convient aussi 
de compter leurs privations et negations, en tant 
que nous les comprenons; car la connaissance par 
laquelle j'ai l'intuition de ce qu'est le neant, 
l'instant ou le repos, est non moins vraie que celle 
qui me fait comprendre ce qu'est l'existence, la 
duree ou le mouvement.33 
As the text indicates, the instant is understood as 
the privation of duration. In which case it may be said 
that the instant is durationless. The problem becomes 
apparent. Either the instant is a duration and can be 
divided into parts or, if it has no duration as the text 
suggests, then it cannot be a part of continuous time and 
becomes a relation between points which are without duration. 
Since duration is extended and divisible into parts, 34 it 
would seem to follow that each of the parts themselves would 
have to be divisible units of duration. If the instant is 
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without duration then it is indivisible; if it is indivis-
ible, how can an assemblage of these form a continuous whole 
that is divisible into parts? That contradiction was 
already anticipated by Aristotle, who maintained that 
indivisibles cannot be arranged so as to compose a continu-
ous whole. 35 
Are the instants per se indivisible? The isolated 
text from the Rules is not sufficient to categorically say 
that the instant is indivisible for Descartes. In justify-
ing his claim that the instant is absolutely indivisible, 
Gueroult appeals to Descartes' theory of light. According 
to Gueroult, if the instant was not absolutely indivisible, 
the light would traverse a distance. This would result in 
a temporal movement and real speed. Descartes' theory of 
light rejects just this. Moreover, Gueroult claims, that 
if light was not instantaneous the entire structure of 
Descartes' physics would be shaken. 36 
Norman Kemp Smith proposes another perspective of 
Descartes' theory of the instant. 
Descartes had no option considering that he viewed 
all changes (qua causal) as instantaneous (effects 
not temporally sequent to causes) than to adopt a 
view of time that consists of atoms, non-durational 
instants independent of every other.37 
If Smith means by atomic that they are indivisible, then in 
what sense are they so? Certainly, for Descartes, the atom 
is inconceivable in relation to bodies since matter is 
. f. . t 1 d' . 'bl 38 in ini e y ivisi e. That divisibility, however, must 
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be qualified. What is conceptually infinitely divisible by 
virtue of the definition is distinct from what is phy~ically 
infinitely divisible. While Descartes espouses the concep-
tual infinite divisibility of matter since the nature of 
matter is extension, he denies the physical infinite divi-
sibility of matter. 39 Regardless of the fact that matter 
is potentially infinitely divisible, it remains true that 
no finite substance is empowered to actually divide it to 
infinity. Yet, if we grant that what is inconceivable in 
relation to spatial entities is not inconceivable in rela-
tion to time, then in what sense is the instant indivisible? 
Since divisibility is qualified in terms of conceptual and 
physical, is not indivisibility qualified? 
We do not know if Smith means that the instants are 
atomic in the sense that they are conceptually indivisible, 
and therefore a fortiori physically indivisible, or that 
they are physically indivisible because we lack the means 
to divide it. Not everyone would agree with Smith's claim 
that the atom necessarily implies non-duration. Diodorus, 
a contemporary of Aristotle, believed that the atom, unlike 
the geometrical point, is a partless unit that has a posi-
tive size. He conceived that temporal atoms were not 
indivisible in the sense that they have no duration, but 
that they were indivisible as partless units. The present, 
as an atomic unit, cannot be divided into a before and 
after; it is a partless minimum in contrast to a longer 
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h 1 t 'bl . 40 period, t e eas percepti e time. 
What this suggests is that the concept of the instant 
is susceptible to interpretation. Even if Smith rightly 
conceives the instant to be an atom and implies by this that 
it is indivisible, the question still remains: In what 
sense is it indivisible? Is it indivisible in the absolute 
sense such that it is both conceptually and physically 
indivisible? Or is it indivisible only in the physical 
sense? If it is absolutely indivisible in the first sense 
then it means that it has no duration. If it is indivisible 
in the second sense then it means that it is not duration-
less. 
According to Jean LaPorte, the instant is indivisible 
in this second sense, but the instant is not indivisible 
in the absolute sense that it has no duration. It is 
divided from the 'before' and 'after' but in itself it is 
41 the shortest segment that can be known. LaPorte offers 
the following text to support his thesis: 
[C]ar encore qu'il arrive quelquefois qu'elles se 
trouvent disposees en meme sorte que celles qui 
sont representees en cette figmre" elles ne s'y 
arrestent neanmoins que ce peu de temps qu'on 
nomme un instant.42 
Again from the Principles LaPorte cites another text which 
indicates that the instant must contain some duration since 
it measures an action that is extremely prompt. Since 
speed is measured by time the quantity of the instant is 
proportionate to the quantity of the speed. This seems to 
be what LaPorte is drawing from this text which says that 
la matiere de premier element qui rempiira incontinent 
tout l'espace qui sera entre-deux, y aura aussi assez 
de force pour en separer encore quelques autres; & 
pour ce que sa force s'augmentera d'autant plus qu' 
elle en aura ainsi separe davantage de la superficie 
de cette tache, & que son action est extremement 
prompte, elle separera presque en un .instant toute 
la superficie de cette tache de celle du Cie1.43 
If LaPorte is correct in his analysis, then the 
instant can be conceived as a present with a depth. While 
its duration cannot be measured, nevertheless, it does have 
an enduring quality. That which is physically indivisible 
is not necessarily conceptually indivisible. Similarly, 
what is physically immeasurable is not necessarily concep-
tually immeasurable. It does not follow that because some-
thing cannot be measured by finite means, it is absolutely 
immeasurable. Measurability is conditional since what is 
measurable can only be actually measured if there is a 
measurer empowered to measure. If the senses and under-
standing in their finite constitution are unable to grasp 
the minuteness beyond a certain point then that thing may 
be said to be physically immeasurable. 
We conceive that there are an indefinite number of 
snowflakes that fall in any given moment. Yet this is 
contradicted in the order of experience where we are able 
to count a definite and limited number. While the order of 
experience may provide a mode of verification sufficient 
for a workable hypothesis, it cannot serve as the absolute 
74 
75 
ground for certitude. If we translate this in terms of the 
instant it may be that it cannot be measured because of its 
extreme minuteness. Does it follow that the instant is 
without duration and is absolutely indivisible, like a 
geometric point? Could it not be the case, as LaPorte 
suggests, that while the instant cannot be physically 
divided into 'before' and 'after' it is not absolutely 
indivisible in the way that a geometric point is. It is a 
partless unit that has some duration notwithstanding the 
fact that we cannot measure it. 
Consider the typist who is rapidly hitting the keys 
with such speed that we fail to note the individual striking 
of the keys but only note the variation in patterns of the 
sounds. There is a similar case in the perception of a 
musical composition where we only perceive chords or pieces 
of melodies and not the individual notes because of the 
rapidity of the playing. In both examples the instant is 
conceived as the unperceivable infinitesimal unit of time. 
Insofar as we cannot measure the instant, it is physically 
immeasurable, but certainly it is not durationless. Nor can 
we say that absolutely it cannot be divided. 
The issue, it seems, is not whether, for Descartes, 
the instant is indivisible, but rather in what sense it is 
indivisible. Is it absolutely indivisible like the 
geometric point, as some critics attest it to be, or is it 
indivisible in the sense that it is a partless unit? 
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Certainly it is important to determine that answer 
since it determines whether or not Descartes' theory of 
time is paradoxical. If the instant is absolutely indivi-
sible in the first sense then there is a paradox: duration 
as a divisible quantity is constituted by a succession of 
indivisible durationless instants. If, however, the 
instant is indivisible only in the sense that it is a 
partless unit, then there is no contradiction in Descartes' 
theory. However, aside from that point there is the funda-
mental importance of grasping a true understanding of the 
Cartesian theory of time as an integral part of a total 
philosophical system. The truth of this will become 
apparent when we see how that theory conditions his physics 
and his metaphysics of the thinking substance in terms of 
its epistemological ramifications. 
D. Metaphysical Resolution 
Let us return to our original point of inquiry. 
Descartes' doctrine of continuous creation initiates objec-
tions reflecting the paradoxical nature of his theory of 
time and duration. We have seen that doctrine to be the 
source of the question regarding the disparity between 
discontinuity and continuity. While the doctrine is itself 
the source of the problem it is seen by some critics to 
provide a metaphysical solution. 44 Negatively, the dis-
continuous duration of the substance is the absence of 
power to exist.on one's own. Positively that duration is 
the presence of God's creative action that provides a 
simulacrum continuity. Through that action discontinuity 
is resolved into an indissoluble continuity. While the 
moments appear to be naturally united, the unity and con-
tinuity that is experienced is essentially a continuous 
repetition of creations whereby the existence of the 
substance is renewed in each moment. It is that perpetual 
repetition which goes unnoticed that generates a unity 
between the moments so that they appear to form a true 
continuity. This seems to be what is implied in terms of 
a metaphysical resolution. 
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Norman Kemp Smith succinctly assesses the paradoxical 
question and its metaphysical resolution when he says: 
Endurance is not proper to the creaturely as such, 
this must mean that God, in creatively upholding it, 
is by His continuous action, at every instant creating 
the new additional time. It is God's active ever 
present agency which is alone continuous & abiding; 
and insofar as the creaturely seems to be, what yet 
it is not, self maintaining continuously enduring, 
it is so solely because of its mirroring, or rather 
seeming to mirror, characters which in their proper 
nature belong exclusively to its Creative Source.45 
The radical finitude of the substance to which Smith 
alerts us is certainly one that is implied when Descartes 
says that, if for one single moment God withdrew his 
creative power, "toutes chose qu'il a crees retournaient au 
neant pour cette raison qu'elles n'etaient qu'un neant 
avant qu'elles fussent crees. 11 46 We know that in any one 
moment the substance could cease to exist. We do not know 
if these moments are discontinuous. Moreover, we know that 
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God's essence is indivisible, simple, absolute unity and so 
is His action, "l'idee que nous avons de Dieu nous apprend 
qu'il n'y en lui qu'une seule action, toute simple et toute 
pure. 1147 From the side of God, the continuous action by 
which God conserves the substance is fundamentally one, 
simple, eternal act and, as such, falls outside the temporal 
series that is proper to created substances whose duration 
is essentially successive. From the side of the creature it 
is the ever-present influence which alone can account for the 
continuous duration of the substance who lacks a principle 
of autocontinuation. 
A question remains: Is any kind of metaphysical 
resolution needed? It is, we suppose, if the moments are 
actually discontinuous. This, however, has not been proven 
by any critic. The texts on continuous creation themselves 
never establish the discontinuity of the moments. Nor do 
they even establish the assumption of the argument - that 
the moments are actually separate and divided one from the 
other and are therefore discontinuous. What the texts do 
establish is the following: The time of my life can be 
divided into an infinite number of parts and these parts 
can be separated one from the other. As a proof for the 
existence of God, it seems that Descartes' point in pro-
posing continuous creation is not that the moments of time 
are discontinuous, but that the continuity of the duration 
of finite substances, deprived of a principle of auto-
continuation, can only be explained by a transcendental 
cause. 
Duration is analogous to extension. And like exten-
sion it is conceived as an unbroken whole that is poten-
. 11 d. . . bl . t 48 tia y ivisi e in o parts. Considering that analogy, 
it is questionable whether or not Descartes meant that the 
moments are actually separate and independent. The texts 
on continuous creation do not establish that they are. 
Hence, the appeal to a metaphysical resolution would seem 
to be unnecessary. 
Even: .if the critics were correct in their assumption 
that the moments are discontinuous and continuous creation 
provides a metaphysical resolution to the discontinuity/ 
continuity question, it does not seem to resolve the other 
question: How can Descartes draw duration from instants 
that have no duration? The question, however, is only 
valid if it is true that the instant is absolutely indivi-
sible. This fact has not been proved. Hence, it has not 
been proved that Descartes' theory of time is paradoxical. 
On the contrary, there is evidence beyond that presented 
which establishes that Descartes has a coherent theory of 
time. The truth is that Descartes has a dual perspective 
of time that is accommodated to his metaphysical dualism. 
Let us turn to consider time and its role in the Cartesian 
physics. 
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NOTES - CHAPTER II 
1III Med. A.T. IX, p. 39. Haldane's translation is 
not used here because he translates "le temps" as "the 
course," which is not accurate. Also, he translates "ce 
moment" as "this instant". My translation is as follows: 
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"For all the time of my life can be divided. into an infinite 
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the other; and thus from the fact that I was in existence a 
short time ago it does not follow that I must be in existence 
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2 I Resp. A.T. IX, pp. 86-87. Haldane's translation is 
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me anew in each moment). I would not hesitate to call that 
cause which continually creates me, that is to say, conserves 
me, an efficient"; c.f. Prin. I, IX, p. 34. 
3Martial Gueroult, Descartes selon l'Ordre des raisons 
(Paris 1953), p. 272; Yvon Belavel, Leibniz critique de 
Descartes (Paris 1960), pp. 229-230; Henri Bergson, 
L'evolution creatrice (Paris 1907), pp. 374-375; Norman Kemp 
Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy (New York 1962), 
p. 131; Jean Vigier, "Les idees de temps, de duree et 
d'eternite chez Descartes," Revue philosophigue 89 (1920, 
p. 322; J. Wahl, Du role de l'idee de l'instant dans la 
philosophie de Descartes (Paris 1920), P~ 18; Ferdinand 
Alquie, L'homme et l'oeuvre (Paris 1956), p. 154; more 
recently, Mikio Kamiya, La theorie cartesienne du temps 
(Tokyo 1982), pp. 121-122; rejecting this standard interpre-
tation are, most notably, Jean LaPorte, Le rationalisme de 
Descartes (Paris 1950), pp. 158-160; Jean-Marie Beyssade, 
La philosophie premiere de Descartes (Paris 1979), pp. 129-
142; 346-3S0. 
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sarily the author of my being, in virtue of continuous 
creation, having proved continuous creation by the absolute 
independence of the diverse parts of the time of my life, 
Descartes appears to sustain the thesis of the discontinuity 
of time," p. 272. 
5Prin. I, 55, A.T. IX, p. 49. 
6Ent. avec Burman, Pleiade, p. 135a. 
7 M. Gueroult, p. 272. 
8Ibid., p. 273. 
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13Ent. avec Burman, Pleiade, p. 1381. Cottingham, 
p. 30. "It is of little importance how others define con-
tinuity and contiguity; for me, I call two bodies continuous 
when their surfaces are joined so immediately that when they 
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CHAPTER III 
TIME - THE NUMBER OF MOVEMENT 
A. Movement - Pre-Principles 
"Thoroughgoing geometrization--the ~ardinal sin of 
Cartesian thought leads to the intemporal: space is re-
tained but time is eliminated." 1 Does Descartes' theory of 
movement imply the denial of time, as A. Koyre and others 
attest? 2 Time is the number of movement, it is the way in 
which we think about that duration. 3 If time is eliminated 
it is because Descartes' concept of movement excludes time. 
An examination of that concept will determine if, and in what 
sense, time is eliminated. 
What Descartes has to say about movement prior to 
1640, when he was writing the Principles, should be con-
sidered separately. There are two reasons for this. The 
first is that in Descartes' early writings he espouses the 
existence of a vacuum. Hence, we find him explaining the 
movement of falling bodies in terms of the force of gravity. 
After 1631, however, Descartes no longer believed that there 
was such a thing as a vacuum and he abandoned his theory on 
the movement of falling bodies. 4 Secondly, before 1640, 
weight was an objective reality in bodies. After that, 
Descartes regarded it as a sensible and subjective quality. 5 
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Descartes could no longer define a body by its weight nor 
consider weight a factor in movement. These shifts i~ 
Descartes' thinking account for the disparity between 
Descartes' earlier notion of movement and his later one. 
Let us briefly consider Descartes' thoughts on movement 
before 1640. 
Commenting on the early writings of Descartes, 
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J. Vigier makes the observation that, for Descartes, the law 
of inertia dominates the material world. That law proposes 
the constancy of speed, and time loses all importance. An 
invariable speed is one detached from time, since it is the 
product of the mass and distance covered; but all other 
speeds increase or decrease with time. 6 Vigier's assess-
ment deserves consideration. 
Descartes provides us with an example of how the 
concept o~ speed is to be understood. In 1629, still be-
lieving in the existence of a vacuum and the reality of 
weight, Descartes gives an explanation of how a body falls. 
Descartes provides a geometrical description in which he 
traces the fall of a body as if it were moving along a 
vertical spatial trajectory: 
Dans laquelle vous me demandez pourquoi je dis que la 
vitesse est imprimee par la pesanteur, au premiere 
moment comme un, au second moment comme deux, etc .••• 
Permettez-moi de vous repondre que je ne l'ai pas 
entendu ainsi; mais la vitesse est imprimee par la 
pesanteur au premier moment comme un, et au second 
moment par le meme pesanteur common un encore, etc. 
Or, un au premier moment et un au. second font deux, 
et avec un au trois, et la vitesse est augmente ainsi 
en proportion arithmetique ••• D'ou il suit certainment 
que, si vous laissez tomber une boule en spatio plane 
vacuo de 50 pieds de haut, de quelque matiere qu'elle 
peut etre, elle emploierait toujours justement trois 
fois autant de temps aux 25 premieres pieds qu'elle 
ferait aux 25 derniers.7 
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In the first moment the body receives an impetus that pro-
duces a motion of a definite speed, that is, the elementary 
speed. In the second moment the body receives a new impetus 
that produces a motion with a speed equal to the elementary 
speed of the first moment. This new elementary speed of 
the second moment is added to the elementary speed produced 
in the first moment so that the actual quantity of speed in 
the second moment is double that of the first. Thus, in 
each moment after the first moment the speed is double, 
then triple, then quadruple, etc. The addition of constant 
speeds means that in each moment the increase in speed will 
always be arithmetically proportional. What we find is 
that the variability of the quantity of speed found in each 
moment, that is, the increase of speed, is constituted by a 
sum of invariable elementary speeds. The uniformity and 
variability can be numerically expressd. (The lower case 
letter represents the new unit of elementary constant speed.) 
Starting with the first moment we can see how the increase 
in speed in each moment thereafter is arithmetically pro-
portional: 1 + 2(1 + la) + 3(1 +la+ lb) + 4(1 +la+ 
l b C + 1 ), etc. Because the elementary speed of each moment 
is invariable, it is possible to project, as Descartes does, 
that the time needed to cover the last 25 feet will be 
three times less than the time needed to cover the first 
25 feet. 
It is evident, however, that speed is the product of 
.the force of gravity and distance traveled rather than the 
time elapsed. A stone, for example, which is attracted to 
the earth in a vacuum, receives a unit of speed and covers 
a single space. In the second moment it receives an addi-
tional unit and covers a double space, and in the third 
moment it covers three times the space covered in the first 
moment, etc. The primary question for Descartes is not how 
fast the body falls but how far. Only secondarily does 
Descartes consider the fact that it will take less time to 
travel the last distances than it did the first. 
Can we say that time is eliminated from Descartes' 
concept of movement? It seems so if we consider that time 
is only an extrinsic factor--one which is simply another 
way of describing the speed. Insofar as Descartes proposes 
the invariability of speed, time is not an intrinsic factor 
in the measuring of speed. Time is merely an extrinsic 
factor in the measuring of speed and acceleration since the 
latter is simply the arithmetically doubling, tripling, 
etc. of the invariable speed-movements. With the invari-
ability of speed, Descartes can eliminate time as an 
intrinsic factor in his consideration of speed since arith-
metic takes the place of time. 
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However, if Descartes deserves to be criticized for 
his belief in the invariability of elementary speed, it is 
not because he detaches it from time. The invariability 
of speed points to Descartes' mistakenly believing that 
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the force which moves the stone remains constant. So long 
as the force remains constant it will produce a constant 
speed since the speed is proportionate to the force. 
Descartes soon discovered that such a law is contrary to 
nature. All natural powers act to a greater or lesser 
degree depending on the manner in which their subject is 
disposed to receive their action. Hence, Descartes realized 
that a stone's disposition to receive a new motion, or an 
increase in speed, is not always the same. A stone moving 
very fast would be more resistent to a new motion than if 
. . 1 1 B it were moving very sow y. So long as Descartes main-
tained a belief in the constancy of force the invariability 
of speed was destined to be a by-product. Since speed was 
invariable, Descartes could dispense with giving primary 
consideration to the question of how much time it takes 
for the body to fall. One could obviously see that, since 
the speed increases in arithmetical proportion, the time 
would be proportionate. As the speeds increase, the time 
necessary to cover the same distance would decrease. 
Let us pursue the claim that time is eliminated from 
Descartes' concept of movement. After 1631 Descartes no 
longer believed in the existence of a vacuum and he 
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abandoned his concept of the force of gravity. 9 The prob-
lem of falling bodies ceased to be a concern to Descartes. 
He then turned to the problem of forces in equilibrium. 
Unlike Galileo, who considered speed a factor in explaining 
forces in equilibrium, Descartes chose to ignore speed. 
Descartes considered only the factors of distance and 
weight: 
La premiere chose dont on peut en ceci etre preoccupe, 
est que plusieurs ont coustume de confondre la consid-
eration de l'espace avec celle de temps ou de la 
vitesse •••• Que si j'avois voulee joindre la considera-
tion de la vitesse avec cette de l'espace, il m'eut 
etre necessaire d'attribuer trois dimensions a la 
force, au lieu que je lui en ai attribue seulement 
deux, afin de l'exclure.10 
From the above text there seems to be every indication that 
Descartes is eliminating speed from his concept of movement. 
What is behind this strategy? Underlying Descartes' 
disavowal of speed and time is his rejection of any concept 
of movement that could be explained in terms of an intrin-
sic principle of action. Such a concept presumably would 
posit an occult quality which would elude calculation. This 
seems to be one of the points that Descartes is making in 
his letter to Mersenne: 
Ce vous dites que la vitesse d'un coup marteau surpend 
la Nature, en sorte qu'elle n'a pas laisir de joindre 
ses forces pour resister, est entierement centre mon 
opinion; car elle n'a point de forces a joindre, ne 
besoin de tem~s pour cela, mais elle agit en tout 
mathematique. 1 
Given the two determinate factors of size and distance, 
Descartes could project the possibility of mathematically 
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calculating the movement of bodies. The greater the size of 
the hammer, the more the air resists it and thus it follows 
that more force is needed to make it go higher. The rate 
of motion is then seen to be the product of the mathematical 
factors of size and distance (extension). Theoretically, 
that rate could be statistically determined. 
It was no doubt Descartes' vision of a mechanical uni-
verse that prompted him to exclude the consideration of 
speed: 
Je voudrais etre capable de repondre ace que nous 
desirez touchant vos Mechaniques; mais encore que 
toute ma Physique ne soit autre chose que Mechanique 
je n'ai jamais envisage particulierement ces questions 
qui dependent de mesures de la vitesse.12 
Why does Descartes exclude speed? How is it inconsistent 
with his mathematical physics? He gives us the answer: 
Je vous prie de m'excuser si je ne repons point a 
votre question touchant le retardement que recoit 
le mouvement des corps pesans par l'air ou ils se 
meuvent; car c'est une chose qui depend de tant 
d'autres, que je n'en saurois faire un bon conte 
dans une lettre; ~ je puis seulement direr que rii 
Galilee ni aucun autre ne peut rien determiner 
toucher cela qui soit clair & demonstratif, s'il 
ne fait premierement ce que est que la pesanteur, 13 
& qu'il n'ait les vrais principles de la physique. 
One cannot consider speed for the reason that one cannot 
perform any experiment accurately enough to determine how 
the speed could be increased or decreased since these 
depend on so many factors which elude perception. There 
was simply ho demonstrative solution when one employed the 
concept of speed. Hence, it was inconsistent with 
Descartes' mechanical physics. 
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Prior to the Principles, time, as merely an extrin-
sic factor in the measurement of speed, plays an in-. 
significant role in the Cartesian physics. Does time ever 
achieve an important role? New insights prompted Descartes 
to reassess his ideas of bodies. This gave rise to new 
ideas and explanations of the movement of bodies and time. 
For one thing, Descartes abandoned his belief in the 
objective reality of weight; it could no longer be a deter-
mination in the rate of motion. In the Principles Descartes 
ranks it among the secondary qualities such as color and 
hardness. As non-essential properties, they could be taken 
away from the body while the substance still would remain 
intact. What is essential to bodies is that they are 
extended in length, breadth and depth. 14 Since bodies were 
no longer defined in terms of weight, motion could no 
longer be understood as the product of weight and distance. 
As far as the Cartesian physics is concerned, all that can 
be clearly and distinctly perceived in these bodies is 
their extension, the division of their parts into different 
sizes, their figure, situation and local movement, which 
latter has all degrees of duration. 15 Having arrived at 
a geometrical concept of bodies, Descartes would have to 
redefine motion in terms of this definition of body. This 
definition would alter the role time plays in the Cartesian 
physics. 
B. Local Movement - Circular Movement 
After 1640 Decartes proposes a theory of movement in 
accordance with his definition of bodies. All the matter 
in the universe is one and the same kind; it is extended 
and divisible and its parts are movable. Given the geo-
metric nature of matter, Descartes conceived only local 
movement to be possible. The latter is properly defined as 
le transport d'une partie de la matiere, ou d'un 
corps du voisinage de ceux qui le touchent immediate-
ment, et que nous considerons comme en repos, dans le 
voisinage de quelques.16 
Since there is no void, in effect all local movement 
translates into circular movement. This view that all 
motion is circular reflects Descartes' belief that our 
planetary system is a huge vortex at the center of which is 
the sun. There are smaller vortices, including the earth, 
which move in the same direction as the larger vortex. 
Moreover, everything in these vortices follows the same 
17 
circular path. Descartes spells out very specifically 
what he means by circular movement: 
Apres ce qui a ete demontre cy-dessus, a sauvoir 
que tousles lieux sont pleins de corps, & que chaque 
partie de la matiere est tellement proportionee a 
la grandeur du lieu qu'elle occupe, qu'il n'est pas 
possible qu'elle en remplisse un plus grand, ni qu' 
elle se referre en un moindre, ni qu'aucun autre corps 
y trouve place pendant qu'elle yest, nous devons con-
clure qu'il faut necessairement qu'il y ait tous-jours 
tout un cercle de matiere ou anneau de corps qui se 
meuvent ensemble en meme temps; en sorte que, quand un 
corps quitte sa place a quelqu'autre qui le chasse, 
il entre en celle d'un autre, & cet autre en celle d'un 
autre, & ainsi de suite jusques au dernier, qui occupe 
au meme instant le lieu delaisse par le premier.18 
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There is no general consensus about Descartes' post-
1640 understanding of time in relation to movement. J. Wahl 
contends that Descartes' definition of movement supposes 
only the ideas of the instant and of immediate contiguity. 
Therefore, in order to understand circular movement which is 
effected instantly, it is necessary to admit a division of 
tl.·me and matter. 19 G lt h · · t th t th' uerou , owever, 1.ns1.s s a 1.s 
is not the case. The absolute indivisibility of the instant 
entails the infinite division of extension rather than the 
divisibility of extension entailing the division of time. 2O 
It is evident that circular movement implies the 
divisibility of matter. Since there is no void, and all 
bodies are moving at the same time, it is necessary that the 
matter constantly divide itself so that it can be accom-
modated to the disproportionate spaces left by contiguous 
parts. It is not so evident, however, that circular move-
ment implies the divisibility of time. Nor is it evident 
that it does not. We know the circular movement takes place 
in the instant. The question is one of determining the 
divisibility or indivisibility of the instant. 
The point of departure for our inquiry is to determine 
if the instants engender real finite speeds. This is war-
ranted because speed is a dimension of motion, and all 
dimension is measurable in the same way that a line is 
measurable. What is measurable is also divisible, it can be 
measured and it can be divided. Since motion is measured 
by time, the instant as a part of time would presumably be 
a measurable quantity falling under the category of 
magnitude and therefore also divisible. The dynamics of 
the relationship between speed and the divisibility or 
indivisibility of the instant will become clearer as we 
proceed to explore the issue. 
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In perusing the Principles we see that contrary to 
Descartes' early thinking he now introduces the factor of 
speed as a major consideration in his theory of movement. 
This decided shift in Descartes' view of movement no longer 
asks the question: How far does a body travel? The quantity 
of motion ceases to be equal to the weight times the dis-
tance. Nor does Descartes propose that bodies are moving 
at constant speeds. The quantity o~ motion is now seen 
to be the product of size (or volume) and speed. We now 
see that speed is variable. 
Car, bien que le mouvement ne soit qu'une facon en 
la matiere que est meue, elle en a pourtant une 
certaine quantite ••• qui n'augmente & ne diminue 
jamais ..• encore qu'il yen ait tantot plus & tantot 
moins en quelques unes de ses parties. C'est pour-
quoi, lors qu'une partie de la matiere se meut deux 
fois plus vite qu'une autre, & que cette autre est 
deux fois plus grande que le premiere, nous devons 
penser qu'il ya tout autant de mouvement dans la 
plus petite que dans la plus grande; & que toute-
fois & quantes que le movement d'une partie diminue, 
celui de quelque autre partie ••• augmente a propor-
tion.21 
Given Descartes' law of the conservation of movement, we 
must conceive that in each instant the same quantity of 
motion is retained regardless of the fact that some bodies 
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are of unequal size and move at unequal speeds. The seven 
rules of impact that follow the general law of the conser-
vation of movement are Descartes' attempt to explain how it 
might be possible to determine, according to the factors 
of size and speed, the exact extent of changed or unchanged 
motion in each body at each instant. 22 
The quantity of motion is always the same, the appor-
tioning of that motion, however, is contingent on size and 
speed. For example, if B was twice as large as Cit would 
transfer one-third of its quantity of motion to C and its 
speed would be reduced by one-third, so that B would need 
as much time to travel a distance of two feet as it 
previously did to travel a distance of three feet. 23 Theo-
retically, according to these rules of impact, one could 
explain in terms of size and speeds how bodies would react 
under ideal conditions. Presumably, one could predict the 
rate of motion and the direction of a moving body in the 
next instant by knowing the size and speed of the body 
moving and those of the body it is contacting in the present 
instant. 
Let us consider what takes place in these instanta-
neous elementary movements. First of all, the divisibility 
of matter is necessary for circular movement. According to 
Descartes, it is not possible for the matter which now fills 
the space G, for example, to fill successively all the 
spaces of gradually decreasing sizes between G and E unless 
these parts adapt their shape and divide themselves to fit 
tl th . bl d' . f h 24 exac y e innurnera e 1mens1ons o t ese spaces. 
secondly, circular movement implies not merely the divisi-
bility of matter but also variable measurable speeds. It 
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is not enough that the bodies undergo indefinite division. 
Something more is required. They must move at different 
speeds. For in the case of an imperfect circle it is the 
speed of the movements that compensates for the inequalities 
of the places, 
toute la matiere qui est comprise en l'espace EFGH 
peut se mouvoir circulairement, & sa partie qui est 
vers E, passer vers G, & celle qui est vers G, passer 
en meme temps vers E, qu'il faille supposer de conden-
sation ou de vide, pourvue que, cornrne en suppose 
l'espace G quatre fois plus grand que l'espace E & 
deux fois plus grand que les espaces F & H, on suppose 
aussi que son mouvement est quatre fois plus vite vers 
E que vers G, & deux fois plus que vers F ou vers H,. 
& qu'en tous ~es endroits de ce cercle la vitesse du 
mouvement compense la petitesse du lieu. Caril est 
aise de connoitre en cette facon qu'en chaque espace 
de temps qu'on voudra determiner, il passera tout 
autant de matiere dans ce cercle par un endroit que 
par l'autre.25 
In Descartes' early concept of movement he proposed 
the invariability of speed and time was not an intrinsic 
factor in his consideration of movement. However, in the 
Principles, Descartes now introduces the variability of 
speed (i.e., acceleration and deceleration) and he re-
establishes the importance of time in his consideration of 
movement. The point in question is how Descartes conceives 
the instant when he sees it as the unit of time in which 
the elementary movements take place. 
99 
Speed is a dimension of motion and dimension is a 
quantity. Quantity is either discrete like the indivisible 
point and countable as arithmetic quantity; or quantity is 
continuous and analogous to extension and therefore mea-
surable as geometric quantity. While a point is used as an 
aid by which we construct a numerical assemblage, Descartes 
makes if clear that if anything can be conceived in terms 
of 'more' or 'less' it falls under the category of magnitude 
and is measurable and divisible. 26 Insofar as there are 
rates of speed that can be conceived in terms of fast and 
slow (that is, more or less speeds), speed falls under the 
category of continuous quantity that is both measurable and 
divisible. Time then becomes that measure by which we 
conceive of the motion of bodies insofar as that motion has 
some speed. Since there are variations of speed (real 
finite speeds) in the instant, and these are measurable and 
divisible, then the instant as a unit of time presumably 
must have the characteristics of measurability and divisi-
bility. For that which serves as a measure must be 
homogeneous with the measured; thus we measure spatial 
magnitudes by spatial magnitudes, that is, by a cubit or a 
yardstick or some other linear measure. 27 
It would seem that Descartes conceives the instant to 
be a measurable and divisible quantity. This is precisely 
the issue. Several texts provide us with a basis for 
resolving the issue. In Article 33, Principle II (cf. 
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ftn. #18), Descartes talks about the elementary movements 
and notes that the bodies "meuvent ensemble en meme temps," 
and "occupe au meme instant le lieu delaisse par le 
premier." In that text, while referring to these instan-
taneous elementary movements, he also notes that in "chaque 
espace de temps" the same quantity of matter will move in a 
circle (cf. ftn. #25). Since all circular movement takes 
place in the instant, we must assume that he is referring 
to the instant as that "espace de temps." For Descartes 
"l'espace" is identical to extension. 28 If Descartes 
conceives the instant as a space of time, as apparently 
he does, then it is analogous to an extended line and 
would be both measurable and divisible. 
A clearer illustration of this concept of the instant 
is implied in the following text: 
On ne sauroit determiner aucune partie si petite entre 
tousles points F & D qu'elles ne soit plus grande que 
celle qui doit sorter a chaque moment hors de la ligne 
FD a cause que pendant tousles moments de temps que la 
boule s'approche de B, elle accourcit cette ligne FD 
et lui fait avoir successivement plus de differentes 
longueurs qu'on n'en sauroit exprimer par aucun 
nombre.29 
In each moment that the globule moves from F to D the 
distance is successively shortened. The length of the 
distance traversed is proportionate to the speed of the 
moving globule in each instant. Let us suppose that the 
length of time it takes for the globule to cover the 
distance from F to Dis five minutes. According to what 
30 Descartes says, in each of the moments the globule is 
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moving at some speed so that no matter at what rate of 
speed it is moving some length of space is always being 
covered. Since some space is covered in each of the moments, 
the remaining time and distance necessary to reach Dis 
proportionately shortened. This would only be possible if 
the moments themselves had some length. For we conceive 
the total time of five minutes as a length of time; time is 
either long or short as when we say that the journey took a 
long time. And just as a line is divisible into units that 
have length, similarly the elementary moments of time are 
conceived as having some length that is both measurable and 
divisible. If the elementary moments of time, i.e., the 
instants, are identical in length, they can serve as the 
common unit of measurement for the extent of distance 
traversed. The fifth law of impact demonstrates the point, 
ainsi, apres que B rencontre C, il iroit d'un tiers 
plus lentement qu'auparavant, c'est a dire qu'en 
autant de temps qu'il auroit parcourir auparavant 
trois espaces, il n'en pourroit plus parcourir que 
deux.31 
The above two passages project both speed and time as dimen-
sional quantities that are extended and divisible into 
parts. If we are to give any credence to what Descartes 
says in these texts, it seems evident that the elementary 
movements have a real finite speed that take place in a 
brief "espace de temps". 
But why do we emphasize the fact that the elementary 
movements have a real finite speed? Because, it is the only 
kind of speed consistent with Descartes' definition of 
speed as a dimension of motion which is measured by time. 
102 
we know that speed is a dimension of motion, and that motion 
can be conceived in terms of fast or slow. Anything that 
admits of a 'more' or 'less' is a matter.of comparison. 
When we are comparing two things there is no way of determin-
ing exactly in what proportion the greater exceeds the lesser 
unless we treat the quantity as being in some way analogous 
t t . d 1 't d th t . f 't d 32 o ex ension an pace i un er e ca egory o magni u e. 
Insofar as we treat the quantity as a magnitude it is 
measurable. The only way in which we can account for the 
fact that the movements are conceived to be fast or slow 
is to assume that they are real speeds that have been 
measured in some way. While it may be impossible to measure 
the exact rate of speed, nevertheless, it can be measured 
in a general way by comparing it with the speeds of other 
movements. We see this in the case of any given magnitude 
that we wish to measure. We may not have·an exact linear 
measure as a cubit or yardstick to measure a given spatial 
magnitude, yet if we compare it with another given magnitude 
we can determine whether or not it is greater or lesser than 
the other. The same holds true for speed. 
It would be impossible to determine the speed of any 
movement as being fast or slow unless it was compared with 
some other movement that had a finite speed. Time is the 
way in which we measure motion. We measure the rate of the 
speed of a car by the time it takes to travel a certain 
distance. The movement of the car can be measured by _time 
because time itself is a movement. Clock time, that is, 
the temporal units of minutes and hours, is nothing more 
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. than the movements of the hands of a clock; and the temporal 
units of days and years are determined by the movements of 
the heavens. 33 
When it comes to measuring the speed of the elementary 
movements it may be true that no exact measure can be deter-
mined. This does not preclude any measurement in terms of 
fast or slow. Since all of matter is undergoing change at 
the same time, it is possible to compare the speed of the 
motion of one part of matter with that of another part of 
matter. It is possible to determine their respective speeds 
relative to each other as being fast or slow. Even in the 
case of invariable speeds where each of the elementary 
speeds remains constant, the fact that one can determine, 
as Descartes did, that the speed of these remains constant 
implies that the speed of the latter movement has been 
compared to the speed of the movement preceding it. 
The comparative aspect of speed is even more apparent 
in the Principles, which manifests Descartes' new thinking 
on movement. Here Descartes has presented us with a concept 
of speed as a real finite quantity. We find that movements 
have relational velocities that are measurable, they are 
fast or slow, and these movements take place in an "espace 
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de temps". bescartes clearly endorses a notion of speed as 
a finite and measurable quantity and an intrinsic factor 
in his understanding of movement: 
Or le mouvement n'etant point une qualite reele, mais 
seulement on ne peut concevoir qu'il soit autre chose 
que le changement par lequel un cors s'eloigne de 
quelques autres, & il n'y a en lui que deux varietez 
a considerer; l'une, qu'il peut etre plus ou mains 
vite; & l'autre, qu'il peut etre determine vers 
divers cotez.34 
There is no evidence that Descartes ever countenanced a 
notion of infinite speed as it relates to movement. Never-
theless, Gueroult has made the categorical claim that the 
speed must be infinite for the reason that the instant is 
absolutely indivisible. 35 Neither is the case. 
Nowhere does Descartes ever talk about speed as 
infinite. Speed is measured in passing time. The finite 
cannot be composed of infinites and in Descartes' view 
infinite speed is a contradictory concept: "Et je puis 
seulement dire qu'il implique contradiction qu'il ya ait 
une vitesse infinie en la nature." 36 We know that speed is 
a dimension of motion, and all dimension is measurable. If 
speed was infinite it would not be measurable. Infinite 
speed, then, is inconsistent with Descartes' definition of 
speed as a dimension of motion. Moreover, it is inconsistent 
with Descartes' mathematical physics since it introduces 
a theoretically incalculable factor in nature. The infinite, 
by definition, cannot be comprehended by the finite 
intellect. 37 Further, Descartes never believed anything, 
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except God (whose concept contains infinity) 38 to be ac-
tually infinite. Even extension can only be called indefi-
nite in the sense that it extends further than any man 
can conceive. 
What we find Descartes saying about speed is that 
there are degrees of speed ranging from extreme slowness to 
extreme swiftness. The following three passages attest to 
the indefinite quantitative aspect of speed. In attempting 
to explain how bodies strive to move away from the center 
of their movement, Descartes uses the example of the motion 
of an ant: 
Jene doute point que le mouvement de cette fourmi 
ne doive etre tres-lent au commencement, & que son 
effort ne sauroit sembler bien grand, si on le rap-
port seulement a cette premiere motion; mais aussi 
on ne peut pas dire qu'il soit tout a fait nul, & 
d'autant qu'il augmente a mesure qu'il produit son 
effet, la vitesse qu'il cause devient en peu de temps 
assez grande ••• Au premiere moment qu'on fera mouvoir 
ce tuyau auteur de centre E, cette boule n'avancera 
que lentement vers Y;39 
As Descartes suggests, speed can be so slow that it is 
almost next to complete rest. One cannot, however, conceive 
it to be so slow that it would be equal to zero speed. 
In contrast to the extreme slowness of the motion of 
some bodies there is the extreme swiftness of the motion of 
other bodies, 
qu'il n'y a point de vide, il faut necessairement 
qu'il s'y trouve une telle matiere dont les parties 
soient si petities & se meuvent si extrement vite, 
que la force dont elles recontrent les autres cars 
soit suffisante pour faire qu'elles changent de figure 40 & s'accomodent a celle des lieux ou elles se trouvent. 
The following passage from the Traite clearly estab-
lishes Descartes' belief that each instant, including the 
elementary phase of movement, contains a movement having 
degrees of speed that can be measured in terms of 'more' 
or 'less'. Discussing God's causality in regarding the 
disposition of movements in the universe Descartes writes, 
des le premier instant qu'elles (movements) sont 
crees, les unes commencement a se mouvoir d'un cote, 
les autres d'un cote, les autres d'un autre; les 
unes plus vite, les autres plus lentement & qu'elles 
continuent par apres leur mouvement suivant les loix 
ordinaires de la Nature.41 
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Speed is a dimension of motion, and dimension is the 
aspect according to which something is measurable. This is 
not to say that the degree of slowness or the degree of 
swiftness can physically be measured. As a matter of fact, 
for Descartes they cannot, 
mais nous n'avons pu determiner en meme facon com-
bien sont grandes les parties ausquelles cette matiere 
est divisee, ni quelle est la vitesse dont elles se 
meuvent, ni quels cercles elles decrivent. Car ces 
choses ayant pu etre ordonees de Dieu en une infinite 
de diverse facons.42 
Speed is a dimension of motion and motion takes place 
in time. The elementary movements, broken down as they are 
into instantaneous movements, are measurable in the same way 
that a length is measurable. Hence, the instant as a part 
of time, however brief, must be conceived as an "espace de 
temps", that is, a measurable and divisible quantity. 
Otherwise, it cannot serve as the condition for speed which 
is a quantitative dimension and, therefore, is both 
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measurable and divisible. The fact that the speed cannot 
actually be physically and exactly measured or divided does 
not affect the truth that theoretically it could be. 
In the Principles Descartes spends considerable effort 
in describing how movements take place in the universe. In 
accordance with Descartes' vortex theory·a11 movement is 
circular. And, as we see, such movements break down into 
instantaneous elementary movements. While all movement is 
circular, nevertheless, it tends to rectilinear movement. 43 
The inclination to rectilinear movement persists, although 
bodies are not actually moving in a rectilinear path. 
Descartes provides us with an example of what he means when 
he says that all circular movement tends to rectilinear 
movement. If a wheel is turned on its axis it would still 
have the inclination to go straight. For if it was released 
from its axis it would in fact do so. 44 The same thing 
applies to a stone that is whirled around a string. As soon 
·t . 1 d 1·t t . ht 45 H h.l 11 as 1 is re ease goes s raig • owever, w 1 ea 
movement tends to be rectilinear, yet because of the 
existence of obstacles, i.e., contiguous bodies, its move-
ment is impeded and is forced to be circular. 46 
The inclination to rectilinear movement can be traced 
to the action of light that is ontologically prior to all 
local movement. For Descartes, the action of light serves 
to explain all the movements that constitute the universe. 
For this reason, Descartes' theory of the transmission of 
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light is the ultimate point of reference for our understand-
ing of the role time has to play in the Cartesian physics. 
No analysis of time would be complete without considering 
that theory. 
C. Instantaneous Transmission·of Light 
There is no question as to the import of Descartes' 
theory of the transmission of light: 
Je vous dirai que je suis maintenant apres a demeler 
les chaos, pour en faire sortir de la lumiere, que est 
l'une des plus hautes & des plus difficiles matieres 
que je puisse jamais entreprendre; car tout physique 
yest presque comprise.47 
To give an exhaustive treatment of Descartes' theory of 
light is beyond the scope of this study. Yet, something 
must be offered in the way of a general overview if we are 
to understand the temporal dimensions of that theory. 
In the Traite de Lumiere Descartes presents a detailed 
description of his theory of light. The Principles, however, 
provide a clearer picture of how that theory is connected 
with the rest of his physics. Ultimately, the action of 
light explains the phenomena of movement in the universe. 
All the matter in the universe is composed of one principal 
kind of matter that is fine and fluid, and differs in size 
and shape. The three elements that constitute the visible 
world all have the properties of light. The first element, 
the sun and stars, is defined by its luminous character; 
it sets up the action of light. The second element has 
interstices that are filled with particles of the first 
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element through which light is transmitted. The third ele-
ment, the earth and the other planets, is defined by its 
48 
opaque character; it reflects the action of the sun. 
While the sun and fixed stars do not move from place 
to place, they are very mobile as they move on their own 
axis. That movement resembles the movement of fire. 49 
Because the sun is composed of very fine fluid and mobile 
matter, it carries the surrounding parts of the heavens with 
it. Each of these heavens moves independently and sepa-
rately around their own center while they move together in 
groups around other points so that a vortex system is 
created. As the sun moves around its own axis, its agitation 
creates a whirlpool effect so that all of the vortices in the 
universe are constantly being agitated by the sun at the 
same time. 50 It was Descartes' belief that the constant 
movement of the three elements, that is, their effort to 
separate and divide, could be traced to the action of light. 
In the third part of the Principles Descartes attempts 
to explain the movements of the first and second elements. 
Light is that 'effort' by which the small particles of the 
first and second elements recede from the center around 
which they revolve. 
Je tacherai maintenant d'expliquer le plus exactement 
que je pourrai, quel est l'effort que sont ainsi, non 
seulement les petities boules qui composent le second 
element, mais aussi toute la matiere du premier, pour 
s'eloigner des centres S, f & semblables, autour 
desquels elles tournet; car je pretends faire voir 
cy-apres que c'est en cet effort seul que consiste la 
nature de la lumiere & la connoissance de cette verite 
pourra servir a nous faire entendre beaucoup d'autres 
choses.51 
Descartes proceeds to move on to the fourth part of 
the Principles in which he explains the movements of the 
earth and planets by the 'action' of light: 
Quant a la lumiere, qui est la troisieme action que 
nous avons ici a considerer •.. je pense avoir des-ja 
cy-dessus assez explique sa nature; il rest seule-
ment a remarquer que ••• bien que tous ses rayons 
viennent en meme facon du Soleil, & ne facent autre 
chose que presser en ligne droite les corps qu'ils 
rencontrent, ils causent neanmoins divers mouvemens 
dans les parties du troisieme element, dont la plus 
haute region de la Terre est composee.52 
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The action of the light consists in a pressure to centrifugal 
motion. Since the sun rotates on its own axis the action of 
the light reaches the earth from all points of the sun's 
surface. Because the pressure does come from all points it 
occurs along straight lines which are the sun's rays. The 
rays are the direction by which the pressure of the sun is 
emitted as it passes through the transparent medium to the 
earth. 
We are prompted at this point to note that while our 
discussion of the nature of light will be incomplete because 
our central concern is not Descartes' physics per se, this 
does not prevent us from raising some questions regarding 
Descartes' theory of light. An appropriate question at this 
time regards the ontological status of light. Descartes 
certainly suggests that light is ontologically prior to all 
other matter in the sense that the action of the light serves 
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as a cause that can account for all the movements in the 
universe. 
The light as a material substance is essentially no 
different than other substance. Nor is it essentially dif-
ferent from any of the other heavens. It has its own vortex 
and the sun is the center. Yet, the sun is the principal 
heaven. It emits a pressure as it continuously turns around 
its own center with "tres grande vitesse" and presses on 
all sides of the matter of the sky, and that matter extends 
without interruption to our eyes. 53 
However, the light, as a material substance, has no 
intrinsic power or force by which it can effect any natural 
action. Yet, Descartes insists the light is an efficient 
cause, 
car si la lurniere, c'est a dire lux, est l'action ou 
le rnouvernent dont le soleil pousse la rnatiere sub-
tile qui l'environne, ••• il ne suit pas de la qu'il 
premier que cette action, ny qu'il en soit la cause 
efficiente.54 
While Descartes refers to the light as an efficient cause, 
does not wish us to consider it as a causa secundurn fieri, 
that is, a cause of corning into being. If it were, the sun 
would not need to exist once it had produced its effect, 
as is the case of the father who begets the son. The sun 
he 
must be understood as a causa secundurn ~, a cause that 
can account for the continuation of the effect. 55 The sun 
continues to shine and the parts of matter continue to move. 
If we conceive of the light as a cause, albeit a causa 
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secundum esse, it cannot be understood in any way as being 
a cause by virtue of an intrinsic principle of action. 
For, it is essentially extended matter. 
The movement of the sun as well as all the other move-
ments of the parts of matter can only be accounted for by 
appealing to a transcendantal cause. Without that cause all 
movements, including that of the light, remain totally un-
explainable. There is, and can be, only one cause in the 
Cartesian universe and that cause is God: 
Pour ce qui est de la premiere (la cause) il me semble 
qu'il est evident qu'il n'y en a point d'autre que Dieu, 
qui de sa Toute puissance a cree la matiere avec le 
mouvement & le repos & qui conserve maintenant en 
!'universe, par son cours ordinaire autant de mouve-
ment & de repos qu'il yen a mis en le creant.56 
As far as the light is concerned, it must be conceived 
as a secondary cause, or more accurately, as the condition 
for movement: 
La reponse que vous leur avez donnee, a savoir que, 
lors que Dieu a dit: fiat Lux, il a fait mouvoir 
les parties de la Matiere, leur a donne inclination 
a continuer ce mouvement en lignes droites, est bonne; 
car cela meme est la Lumiere.57 
Insofar as God always conserves the sun with its movement, 
the rest of the universe moves with this sun. Ultimately, 
God is the absolute cause of all movement. 
If one insists on calling the light a 'cause' it 
remains true that its causality is derivative. In order to 
avoid any misunderstanding of the 'action' of light, the 
latter should be called more accurately a 'condition'. While 
Descartes never refers to the light as a condition, he 
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suggests that this term is appropriate. He makes the 
following analogy: The light is prior to all movement as 
man is prior to his reason. In order for man to use his 
reason, he must first exist. In order for movement to take 
. place, the sun must first exist.SB By appealing to a 
transcendental cause Descartes is able to explain the onto-
logical priority of light as a cause. 
While this metaphysical approach answers the question 
regarding the ontological status of light, it does not make 
it easier to understand what Descartes means by his theory 
of light. This, in part, can be traced to inconsistencies 
in terminology. We have seen Descartes talk about the light 
as an 'effort', and as an 'action' "presser en ligne droit". 
Elsewhere we find Descartes referring to the light as an 
inclination to movement. "Par la lumiere," he writes, "je 
n'entendais pas tant le mouvement lui meme, que l'inclina-
tion ou le propension au movement." 59 Thus far we have been 
led to believe that light is some kind of elusive 'force' 
whose effects are alone experienced. He makes light out to 
be the tendency towards movement or the condition for 
movement. 
Yet elsewhere, Descartes implies that it is some kind 
of movement. In the Dioptrics he refers to the light as 
"un mouvement ou une action qui tend a causer quelque 
mouvement." 60 In that same treatise he leads us to believe 
that light is a movement, noting that "la lumiere ••• est un 
certain mouvement ou une action fort prompte & fort vive, 
qui passe vers nos yeux, par l'extremite de l'air & des 
autres corps transparens." 61 If Descartes wishes us to 
understand light as a kind of movement, it certainly is 
distinguished from other movements. In the Principles he 
clearly says that it is not a movement, but a "force" 
that causes pressure: 
La force de la lumiere ••• ne consiste point en la 
duree de quelque mouvement, mais seulement en ce que 
ces petities boules sont pressees ..• encore qu'elles 
ne s'y meuvement peut-etre pas actuellement.62 
Burman informed Descartes that he found it difficult to 
understand how pressure could happen without movement. 63 
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In reply to Burman, Descartes notes that we can take a metal 
instrument or a piece of wood or metal and press it with 
our hands on either side in such a way that no motion is 
produced since the pressure and resistance on both sides are 
equal. In the same way, pressure from the matter of the 
64 
second element is resisted by the pressure of the eye. 
How can this concept of light as a force that causes 
pressure be reconciled with Descartes' concept of light as 
"uncertain mouvement ou un action fort prompte et fort 
vive"? Is this a real contradiction or only an apparent 
contradiction? Descartes did not seem to think there was 
any contradiction: 
Or d'avoir dit generalement en plusiers endroits qu'elle 
est un mouvement ou un action & en un autre d'avoir dit 
qu' elle es_t qu' une .action.- Ce ne sont point d.eux choses 
qui se contredisent ••• Comme, lors qu'on dit de quelque 
un qu'il est toujours en action, cela veut dire qu'il 
se remue toujours.65 
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Descartes seems to suggest that it is only a matter of 
semantics. Why is it that Descartes can call the light a 
movement? Primarily because the movement of the sun sets up 
the action or inclination to rectilinear· movement. While 
the sun does not move from place to place, it does have its 
own proper movement. The centrifugal force of the particles 
of the sun agitate in such a way (like a flame) that the sun 
causes pressure to be emitted from all of the points of its 
surface. The rays of the sun are the straight lines along 
66 
which the pressure tends. The rays are not light cor-
puscles, however, but simply the direction that the force 
takes. Nothing material passes from the light. 67 We must 
not think that the force of the sun is actually emitted in a 
true rectilinear direction, this is not the case. The same 
laws that apply to movement apply to the tendency to move-
ment: 
Caril est bien aise a croire que !'action ou in-
clination a se mouvoir que j'ai dit devoir etre prise 
pour la lumiere, doit suivre en ceci les memes lois 
que le mouvement.68 
What does this mean? Although the action of the light tends 
to move along straight lines and is emitted equally in all 
directions from the body of the sun, there is no actual 
rectilinear movement. When the rays meet certain bodies 
they are deflected by them or weakened in the same way that 
the movement of a ball thrown in the air is deflected by the 
d 't 69 objects aroun i. While the rays of light always tend 
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to move rectilinearly, since there is no void, no actual 
rectilinear movement is possible. In effect, the rays are 
curved or bent lines; but because there is an infinite 
number of them, they are considered to be straight when they 
pass through the transparent medium. 70 At the instant that 
we open our eyes the pressure from the sun tends in a 
straight line towards our eyes. Yet, because the rays are 
impeded by other bodies they are never exactly straight 
when they reach us. However, in each instant that the 
action of the sun is transmitted, the tendency towards 
rectilinear movement persists. What can be said about that 
instant? 
We know that the force of the light does not consist 
in "la duree de quelque mouvement'' (cf. ftn. #62). When 
Descartes speaks of a durational movement he is thinking of 
a successive kind of movement that takes place in passing 
time. In this sense light is not a movement. The passage 
of light, like the elementary movements of circular motion, 
is effected in the instant: 
Et ici m'entendant sur le sujet de la lumiere, 
j'expliquai, bien au long quelle etoit celle qui se 
devoit trouver dans le Soleil & les Etoiles, & com-
ment de la elle traversoit en un instant les im-
mense espaces des cieux & comment elle se reflechis-
soit des Planetes & des Cometes vers la Terre.7 2 
Since the action of light is conceived by Descartes to be the 
cause of all the elementary movements in the universe and 
since these movements take place in the instant, then what is 
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true of the 'instant' as it pertains to the elementary move-
ments should be true of the 'instant' as it pertains to the 
action of light. 
We have argued that the elementary movements have real 
finite speeds, and that the instant in which the movements 
take place is both measurable and divisible. If we are to 
find coherency in Descartes' theory of time in his physics, 
we should be able to find that the action of light has a 
real finite speed which takes place in a measurable and 
divisible instant. The following passage provides us with 
insight and can serve as a starting point for our inquiry: 
En la lumiere, je ne considere pas le mouvement, mais 
l'action ou !'inclination a se mouvoir laquelle etant 
instantaneous ne peut diminuer.73 
On the basis of this particular text, Gueroult makes the fol-
lowing observation: "Descartes, considering that the instant 
cannot be diminished and is rigorously indivisible, con-
cludes that elementary speed is also absolutely indivisible 
and that real movement (temporal) is derived from the 
repetition of these indivisibles. 1174 
Here Gueroult's claim is based upon questionable textual 
interpretation (only one of the problems of the topic). The 
first difficulty with Gueroult's interpretation is that not 
enough text is provided to make clear Descartes' intent. 
Secondly, there is an overreading of the text (making a 
subtle point on the basis of a text which seems to be saying 
something commonplace and straightforward). Thirdly, there 
is misrepresentation of the text since subsequent portions 
of the text tend to negate the basis of Gueroult's inter-
pretation. Finally, there is the failure to provide 
additional texts to support his claims. 
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Let us consider what Descartes actually says in the 
text and what he does not say. The first point to note is 
that he does not say that the instant is indivisible. Nor, 
in fact, does he ~ay that the instant cannot be diminished. 
He says that the action or inclination cannot be diminished. 
Secondly, as regards the instantaneity of the action, one 
could propose that Descartes means nothing more by this 
than that the action occurs in the shortest time possible, 
that is, a time with a minimum duration. To assume more 
from this passage is to overread the text. More important, 
however, is the fact that Gueroult fails to cite the subse-
quent part of the text which reads as follows: 
Et encore qu'elle diminueroit, il est certain que ce 
doit etre de fort peu, vu qu'elle ne se perd pas toute 
en venant du soleil jusqu'a nous, et ainsi que cela 
ne doit point etre considere.75 
There are two possible interpretations for this last 
text. In citing the first part of the text Gueroult in-
sisted that the instant was indivisible because it could not 
be diminished. If this was what Descartes meant in that 
text, the second text would seem to refute it. For now 
Descartes says that, if the instant would be diminished 
(he does not say if it is or is not), it would have to be 
ever minutely diminished. Obviously, then he is not 
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maintaining a rigid position on the instant. Gueroult's 
interpretation is, no doubt, predictated on the thesis that 
in the first part of the text Descartes is actually saying 
that the instant cannot be diminished. However, this does 
not seem to be what Descartes is saying at all. In fact, 
we know from other texts, that it is the action which can 
be diminished as it passes through a vortex other than its 
own. Speaking about the light, which as we know from other 
texts, Descartes refers to as a 'force' (cf. ftn. #62), as 
well as an 'action', Descartes says: 
Enfin la force de la Lumiere est non seulement plus ou 
moins grande en chaque lieu, selon la quantite des 
rayons qui s'y assemblent, mais elle peut aussi etre 
augmentee ou diminuee par les diverses dispositions 76 des corps qui se trouvent aux lieux par ou elle passe. 
Considering this passage from the Traite de Lumiere, the 
point that Descartes seems to be making in his letter to 
Mersenne (which Gueroult failed to cite in full) is that, 
although the action would be diminished, the diminution 
would be very little since it would still have the force 
to produce its effect. In other words, if the sun lost any 
of its efficacy, it must only be slight since the empirical 
evidence is that the light and its reflection on the earth 
are contemporaneous. In the passage cited from Mersenne's 
letter there is no evidence that Descartes wishes us to 
understand that the instant cannot be diminished, and is, 
therefore, indivisible. Instead, Descartes wishes to 
emphasize the ontological priority of the light. At the 
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same time he wants to disavow its temporal priority since 
the light as a cause is simultaneous with its effect •. This 
interpretation can be sustained. 
The action of the iight is a perfect example for illus-
trating that what is ontologically prior.need not be tempor-
ally prior. 
Car si la Lumiere, c'est a dire lux est l'action ou 
le mouvement dont le soleil pousse la matiere subtile 
qui l'environne .•• il ne suit pas de la qu'il soit pre-
mier que cette action, n'y qu'il en soit la cause 
efficient ••• si vouz voulez qu'il soit premiere qu'elle 
ce sera seulement en meme facon que l'homme est pre-
mier que sa raison, en tant gu'il doit etre au exister 
avant qu'il puisse en user.77 
Light is not propagated according to a local movement 
measured in passing time. The action or movement of the sun 
means that the rays of the sun and its point of emission are 
simultaneous with its illumination of all of the parts of 
the hemisphere. To illustrate what he means, Descartes 
compares the action of the light to the movement of a stick 
in which both ends are moving at the same time: 
Et pour tirer une comparaison de ceci, je desire que 
vous penses que la lumiere n'est autre chose, dans 
les corps qu'on nomme lumineux, qu'un certain mouve-
ment, ou une action fort prompte & fort vive, qui passe 
vers nos yeux, par l'extremite de l'air & des autres 
corps transparens, en meme facon que le mouvement ou 
la resistence des corps, que rencontre cet aveugle, 
passe vers sa main, par l'extremite de son baton ••• 
vous scaves que !'action, dont on meut l'un des 
bout d'un baton doit ainsi passer en un instant 
jusques a l'autre et qu'elle (lumiere) devroit passer 
en meme sorte.78 
There is nothing in this text (nor in any other text that we 
could discover) which could lead us to say that instantaneity 
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is defined in terms of absolute indivisibility. 
Further, if indivisibility means that there is no real 
finite speed, then this is more evidence that the instant is 
not conceived in terms of indivisibility. Considering that 
the light has to pass through different mediums, Descartes 
proposes that the speed of light is not always the same. 
Light is an action upon the subtile matter which fills the 
pores. But some of the matter is less disposed to receive 
the action. Where the light is impeded or weakened it loses 
some of its velocity. Contrary to this, if the medium is 
more disposed to receive the light its speed is augmented. 
A ball thrown in the air moves more rapidly when the wind 
blows on the side that is moving, and it moves less rapidly 
if the wind is blowing against the side that is moving. 
The same applies to the action of light. 79 We have seen 
that the action of light follows the laws of motion (cf. 
ftn. #68). Hence, the speed of light depends on the nature 
of the medium through which it passes. Light travels 
faster in a denser medium in the same way that a ball moves 
faster on a harder surface than on a softer one. 80 Moreover, 
regarding Descartes' discussion of the refraction of light 
rays, Fermat objected to Descartes' failure in La Dioptrigue 
to distinguish between the pressure that is the determina-
tion for motion and the speed of the movement, noting that 
the determination could not have a speed. 81 Descartes' 
response to Fermat was clear and to the point. As far as 
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Descartes was concerned, Fermat's objection was "contre mon 
sens & contre la verite," since 
cette determination ne peut etre sans quelque vitesse 
bien qu'une meme vitesse puisse avoir diverses 
determinations, & une meme determination etre jointe 
a diverses vitesses.82 
Whether Descartes conceives the light to be the 'action' or 
movement, i.e., the transmission of light through the 
different media, or simply the determination or pressure, 
the light always has some finite measurable speed. There 
are certainly no indications that Descartes ever conceived 
h d f 1 . ht b . f' . 83 t e spee o ig to e in inite. 
When Descartes does speak about the speed of the move-
ment of the light (cf. ftn. #61), he describes it as being 
"tres prompte & fort vive". The light is a pressure having 
"tres grande vitesse" (cf. ftn. #53). These are real speeds 
that can be conceived in terms of more or less, can fall 
under the category of magnitude and can be analogous to 
the extension of a body considered measurable and divisi-
ble.84 Again, we see Descartes in Principles describing 
characteristics of light: "Son action est extremement 
prompte, elle separa presque en une instant toute la super-
fice de cette tache. 1185 These descriptions of light, plus 
the fact that Descartes' espouses a medium theory of light 
which entails differences in the speed of light, lend weight 
to the opinion that Descartes believed the velocity of light 
to be finite. 
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Can Descartes give us a clearer picture of what he 
understands by the action of the light when he speaka of its 
instantaneity? We know that the sun appears on a point of 
the horizon and, in an instant illuminates the entire 
hemisphere, even to the extreme points 9f the earth. We 
also know that light passes through different mediums and 
reaches the earth in an instant, and when impeded, its 
speed gets modified. While there are variations in the 
speed of light as it traverses to the earth, it still 
remains true that the light and the reflection of its rays 
on the earth are simultaneous events. That simultaneity is 
an essential characteristic of the light and its importance 
is indicated in Descartes' letter to Beeckman. 
When Beeckman proposed to Descartes that there was an 
interval of time between the emission of the light from the 
sun and the reception of its rays in the eyes, Descartes 
responded, 
elle fait voir manifestement qu'il n'y a pas d'inter-
valle ni de retard de ce genre entre l'instant ou la 
lumiere sort d'un ob~et lumineux et l'instant ou elle 
entre dans nos yeux. 6 
The import of this cannot be underestimated. On it rests 
the whole of Descartes' philosophy: 
Et vous aviez tellement confiance en votre experience 
que vous declariez tenir pour fausee toute votre 
Philosophie, s'il n'y avait pas un intervalle entre 
l'instant ••• Je disais au contraire que, si on per-
cevait un tel retard ce serait l'encroulement de 
toute ma Philosophie.87 
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The instant denies neither speed nor time. It denies 
only causal temporal priority which would demand a de~ay 
between the emission of the rays of the sun and its reception 
by the eyes. There is no question that this is Descartes' 
view: 
Et pour la difficulte que vous trouvez en ce qu'elle 
au mot instant; car il semble que vous le considerez 
comme s'il nioit toute sorte de priorite en sorte 
que la lumiere du Soleil puis ici etre produite sans 
passer premierement par tout l'espace qui est entre 
lui & nous; au lieu que le mot d'instant n'exclud 
que la priorite du temps, & n'empeche pas que chacune 
des parties inferieures du rayon ne soit dependante 
de toutes les superieures, en meme facon que la fin 
d'un mouvement successif depend de toutes ses parties 
precedentes.88 
What Descartes seems to be saying is that the light travels 
so incredibly fast that one could observe no interval between 
its transmission from the sun and its reflection on the 
earth. The instant excludes not only the 'before' but it 
excludes the 'after' because it excludes the concept of 
succession. However, it does not exclude the 'befo~e• and 
'after' absolutely, that is, in the sense that the instant 
is without temporality. What Descartes means is that the 
emission of the sun's rays did not occur before and after 
the rays on the earth were perceived. Descartes clearly 
points out that there is no time delay between the two 
events. The emission of the sun's rays and their reflection 
on the earth are simultaneous events, and in no way does 
the instantaneity of these events deny their temporality. 
Simultaneity is a temporal concept that refers to 
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events taking place at the same time. If I simultaneously 
(at the same time) juggle four balls, two balls in my right 
hand and two balls in my left hand, that simultaneity does 
not mean that the time in which I juggled the four balls 
has no measurable and divisible duration. It only means 
that I did not juggle the two balls in my right hand before 
I juggled the two balls in my left hand. Clearly, the 
juggling of the balls .is a simultaneous event that has 
temporal duration, since the time I started the juggling 
was before the time I finished. 
Instantaneity is a characteristic of the transmission 
of light and its reflection on the earth. These events 
take place at the same time, and that time, the instant, 
is a measurable and divisible segment of time. This is 
made plain in the following text from the Principles: 
[C]ar encore qu'il arrive quelquefois qu'elles se 
trouvent disposees en meme sorte que celles qui sont 
representees en cette figure, elles ne s'y arrestent 
neanmoins que ce peu de temps _9!!'on nomme un instant 
pource qu'elles sans cesse en action pour se mouvoir 
ce qui est cause qu'elles continuent leur mouvement 
sans interruption.89 
To Hyperaspistes he writes, "on ne sauroit admettre meme 
pendant l'instant le plus court ••• , 1190 clearly a description 
of the instant as a segment of time that has some measurable 
duration. 
In defining the instant Descartes excludes the 
priority of time, the instant does not exclude temporality. 
In itself, it has duration, however brief that may be. 
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Descartes presents us with a quantitative description of 
the instant. It is a "peu de temps", "le plus court". 
Conceived in those terms, it may be included under the term 
magnitude which is per se both measurable and divisible. 
Although we may not be able to actually ~easure or divide 
the instant, Descartes leaves us with the idea that it is 
conceptually possible. Any other interpretation does not 
seem to be sustainable. 
D. Discontinouous-Continuous Movement 
We have seen that Descartes' physics comprehends the 
world where everything is extended in one unity and every-
thing depends on everything else. Ceaselessly the world 
is undergoing instantaneous mutations. Yet, the variety 
and multiplicity of the particular configurations and the 
d h . h h h 1 d · 91 spee sat w ic t e c anges occur e u e our perception. 
What we do perceive is continuous movement measured by 
passing time. 92 The instantaneous mutations are imper-
ceptible. This leads us to ask the question again, as we 
did in the second chapter, whether or not time is discon-
tinuous. It is the position of Gueroult, Vigier, and others 
that discontinuous time fundamentally conditions our 
. . 93 
understanding of the Cartesian physics. The fact is, 
however, that continuous time is the only kind of time that 
is actually verifiable in the order of experience. 94 
Therefore, it must be demonstrated that continuous time is 
inconsistent with Descartes' mathematical physics. This 
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has not been done. 
The fact that change takes place in the instant does 
not, in itself, prove that the instants are discontinuous, 
that is, that they are separate and independent in a manner 
that causes a rupture which prevents a true continuity from 
ever being realized. 
Descartes seems to suggest that the instants are 
continuous: 
[Clar encore qu'il arrive quelquefois qu'elles se 
trouvent disposees en meme sorte que celles qui sont 
representees en cette figure, elles ne s'y arrestent 
neanmoins que ce peu de temps qu'on nomme un instant, 
pource qu'elles continuent leur mouvement sans 
interruption.95 
There are two possible interpretations. When Descartes says 
"sans interruption" he could mean there is no break in the 
actual continuity as we would find in the case of a true 
magnitude. Or, Descartes could mean that there is no break 
in the uniformity, that is, in the repetition of separate 
instantaneous mutations. 
Descartes' discussion of the sun would seem to dis-
credit the second interpretation. According to the laws of 
nature the flame, like all bodies, having been once formed, 
"continueroit d'etre" unless destroyed by some external 
cause. The flame, however, can be dissipated by the sur-
rounding air, and for this reason, there must be "renaissance 
continuellement d'autre flame qui lui succede"; unlike the 
flame, "nous voyons pas que le Soleil soit ainsi dissipe 
par la matiere du Ciel qui l'environne; c'est pourquoi nous 
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n'avons pas sujet de juger qu'il ait besoin de nourriture 
comme la flamrne. 1196 Whereas the flame's continuous e~istence 
can be interrupted, the Sun enjoys a continuous existence 
without any interruption or possibility of non-existence 
initiated by an external cause. That c~ntinuity is not a 
repetition of renewals of existence, it is a continuity that 
is projected as an unbroken unity in which the Sun gives 
off its own light without any cessation of its existence. 
And time, as the measure of that duration, must share that 
continuity. 
While the texts suggest that time is continuous, in 
pursuing the issue of the continuity of time, a broader 
reference must be used since it is the critics' contention 
that Descartes' physics is conditioned by discontinuous 
time. Hence, our reference must be Descartes' overall 
philosophical project to construct a mathematical kind of 
physics. What must be determined is whether discontinuous 
time is a condition for Descartes' mathematical physics. 
The fact that it is mathematical, in which case the laws 
of mathematics would apply to phenomena, does not, in itself, 
prove the case for discontinuous time. Insofar as mathe-
matics deals with quantities, it treats both discrete and 
continuous quantity under the rubrics of arithmetic and 
geometry. We must look to see what Descartes had in mind 
when he envisioned his physics. 
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No doubt, in a world where everything is extended 
matter, and movement is defined in terms of instantaneous 
mutations, Descartes has fashioned a mathematical model to 
which one could seemingly apply laws of mathematics. The 
Principles is Descartes' most precise and systematized 
attempt to describe the physical universe and what he 
believed took place within that universe. In that treatise, 
Descartes constructs a mathematical model to which one 
could theoretically apply the laws of mathematics. The 
seven laws of impact found in the Principles are examples 
of what Descartes might have had in mind. These laws are 
nothing more than mechanical rules governing the changing 
relations among material particles. The laws are dominated 
by the principle that the same quantity of motion is con-
served in each instant. Given the factors of size and 
speed, one can presumably determine how that motion will be 
divided between the bodies in contact. An example of what 
Descartes means can be found in the fifth rule, which reads 
in part: 
Ainsi, apres que B auroit rencontre C, il iroit d'un 
tiers plus lentement qu'auparavant, c'est a dire qu'en 
autant de temps qu'il auroit pu parcourir auparavant 
trois espaces, il n'en pourroit plus parcourir que deux. 
Tout de meme si B etoit trois fois plus grand que C, 
il ne lui transfereroit que la guatrieme partie de son 
mouvement, & ainsi des autres.97 
Do these rules of motion and Descartes' general state-
ments about motion presume the discontinuity of the instants? 
Gueroult contends it is the discontinuity of the instants 
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that makes it possible for Descartes to consider the ele-
mentary movement as geometrical relations which, in each 
instant, can be statistically determined. 98 If this were 
true, then presumably the movement of a body in each instant 
would seem to proceed in conformity with a mathematical 
rule. Moreover, to effect such a procedure, it would be 
necessary to envision what H. Bergson refers to as a 
'cinematographic' kind of movement. 99 This concept of 
movement would be one in which each elementary instantaneous 
' 
mutation was viewed like a slide of a movie projector. Each 
movement, like the slide, would be distinct and separate. 
The question seems to be whether Descartes' physics 
was meant to be applied to specific cases; or whether it was 
intended to provide general laws and mechanical models 
about possible patterns of behavior. If they are only 
general laws, then the instant would not have to be dis-
continuous since statistical measurement of the particular 
instants would not even come into question. There is simply 
no evidence that Descartes ever envisioned that his physics 
could actually make it possible to statistically measure 
the elementary instantaneous movements. Given the nature 
of the Cartesian physics, it would be impossible for us, 
to actually formulate any simple mathematical laws regarding 
particular instances. The primary reason is that the world 
is a plenum of contiguous bodies undergoing constant 
change, hence, we cannot isolate phenomena. Descartes was 
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aware that in such a world we can never know all of the 
determinate ways in which the parts of matter are divided 
nor at what speeds they are moving, and, therefore, one 
cannot formulate any mathematical laws regarding particular 
100 phenomE;?na. 
Nor can we dismiss the fact that the Principles were 
intended to be only descriptive. Therefore, whatever laws 
are formulated cannot be used to prove anything. The laws 
yield only a conjecture about the likely patterns according 
to which nature acts. 101 Descartes' aim is to show how 
natural bodies could be made in terms of his mechanical 
models, although one ought not to conclude that they are 
really made in this fashion. 102 E. Brehier and J. Collins 
rightly point out that the Principles do not contain mathe-
matically expressible laws. Descartes' philosophy of nature, 
then, is not intended to convey pure and absolute certitude 
but only a moral certitude sufficient to increase our 
practical grasp of the visible. 103 While Descartes believed 
that some general principles might be known with certitude, 
he was forced to admit that in particular cases experiment 
. . 1 d . . lf . 1 . 104 is vita an in itse inconc usive. Certainly this 
admission by Descartes does not leave us with the belief 
that he ever intended his mathematical physics to function 
in such a way as to ever be able to statistically determine 
movements of particular bodies. The conclusion we must 
reach is that no evidence has been presented by others, nor 
found by us, that Descartes' physics is conditioned by 
discontinuous time. What we find is that continuous time 
is totally compatible with the Cartesian world where 
everything is moving "sans interruption." 
There is little question that Descartes discusses 
movement in terms of instantaneous elementary movements. 
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We have seen how he does this in the case of circular 
movement and in his theory of the instantaneous transmission 
of light. Moreover, given that the nature of matter is 
extension, one has clear evidence that Descartes envisioned 
a mathematical kind of physics, one which always remained 
within the bounds of human limitations. Physical time is a 
reality for Descartes, because it is a property of extended 
substances and a descriptive feature of their duration. 
Granted that the world is a plenum of extended substances, 
nevertheless we observe these substances exist, and for 
them to exist is to endure. That duration which is analo-
t t · lOS t· t·t b d gous o ex ension as con inuous quan i y can e measure. 
And time is the measure. Since duration is measurable it 
is also divisible into moments, and thus duration has a 
quantitative character to it. Time, as a correlative of 
duration, assumes that same character. There is a continuity 
and divisibility that is manifest in the world. For extended 
substances are ceaselessly undergoing change. This is pos-
sible because they have a continuous duration that is 
divisible, and the possibility of measuring duration and 
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separating the moments always persists. 
The condition for that measuring and dividing i~ the 
thinking substance. While time is a property of all sub-
stances, it is more. There is a psychological aspect of 
time. It is the way in which we think about the duration 
of substances. 106 What does this mean? First of all, it 
means that the thinking substance can measure duration with 
a temporal measure of moments, hours, days, years, etc. 
Secondly, it means that it can divide the duration into 
parts of 'before' and 'after' and temporally conceive of 
these as one minute, two minutes, etc., or one year, two 
years, etc. 
More importantly, the thinking substance can focus 
on any single moment that exists in an order of 'before' 
and 'after' and describe what takes place in that space of 
time. Descartes has done this by providing us with an 
account of how he perceives bodies to behave in an instant. 
He has described how the action of light is transmitted, 
and how that action is manifested in the instantaneous 
elementary movements of circular motion. Descartes has 
recorded the events that have taken place in one moment of 
time, the instant. 
We have seen, then, that extension is a property of 
material substances. But time is a property of both 
material and thinking substances. Insofar as these sub-
stances endure, time can serve to measure their duration. 
Having seen how time functions in relation to material 
substances, our dual perspective approach to time dictates 
that we turn our attention to the thinking substance. As 
we examine time from this perspective, we must keep in 
mind Descartes' metaphysical dualism. We have seen that 
Descartes has a coherent theory of time in his physics, 
What we hope to find is a coherency between the 'time' 
that measures the duration of the material substances and 
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the 'time' that measures the duration of thinking substances. 
The material world is projected by Descartes as an 
object of knowledge, and the duration of material substances 
is manifested in terms of that purpose. Descartes' meta-
physics of the thinking substance is designed to meet the 
exigencies of his mathematical physics that requires an agent 
of knowing. Hence, the duration of the thinking substance 
is fundamentally manifested in terms of its essential 
nature as a subject whose cognitive activities establish 
it as an agent of knowing empowered to attain some degree 
of certitude about the phenomena in nature. It is from that 
dimension that we must consider the temporality of the 
thinking substance as it unfolds in the mental events which 
constitute its duration. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DURATION AS A TEMPORAL EVENT 
Things have a knowable essence. They are made up of a 
particular number of constitutive elements; the cognition 
of which can be absolutely certain. 1 However, as the 
Discourse and Meditations both confirm, the discovery of 
the existence and nature of the thinking substance is 
epistemically prior to the discovery of all other things. 
One of the purposes of these writings is to overthrow 
skepticism by establishing that truth exists. The other 
purpose is to establish the efficacy of the thinking 
substance as an agent of knowing durationally. Endowed with 
a faculty for attaining truth, the thinking substance con-
stitutes the noetic foundation for all knowledge. It is 
possible to attain knowledge and "ainsi nous rendre cornrne 
maistres & possesseurs de la Nature. 112 For these reasons, 
one must analyze the efficacy of the thinking substance 
as it reveals itself in temporal durations. 
Not only is the thinking substance epistemically prior 
to material substances, it is ontologically prior because, 
unlike material substances, the thinking substance has an 
intrinsic principle of action. Defined as a substance who 
thinks, wills, understands, believes, opposes and denies, 
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the thinking substance is fundamentally a concrete person 
and "le sujet de quelques actes." 3 Thinking is an action 
and "toutes nos actions se font dans le temps. 114 The 
temporality of the thinking substance is singularly mani-
fested in terms of cognitive actions, and these actions 
constitute the mental events that make up the temporal 
duration of the thinking substance. 
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While the knower maintains his radical essential 
distinction from things in the physical order, the knower 
and known are correlative concepts which suggest that there 
is some degree of affinity between the two kinds of sub-
stances. Common to all substances are such properties as 
their existence, unity, order and their duration. 5 The 
common successive duration of all substances means that 
things, like thought, exist. Things in the physical order 
have essential knowable components and the simultaneous 
coexistence of the knower and known brings the knower in 
contact with the known whereby the latter becomes a possible 
object of knowledge. 
It is incumbent on the knower to "accroitre la 
lumiere naturelle de sa raison" so that he may reap the 
fruits of scientific inquiry. 6 This scientific inquiry 
ideally will lead to an intellectual vision that is imbued 
with the same certitude and clarity characteristic of 
mathematics. Descartes' epistemology is intended to show 
us how the mind can attain that degree of cognitive force 
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precisely through durational knowledge. For while the 
truth is eternal, the actions by which the knower must come 
to see the truth are temporal events in the duration of 
the thinking substance. 
A. Intuition as Durational 
Descartes had a firm conviction that of all the 
sciences mathematics alone furnishes us with an illustration 
7 
of self-evident and certain knowledge which, if durational, 
models all other durational knowledge. Convinced that all 
the sciences could be comprehended as one, Descartes 
believed that whatever method was used in mathematics could 
justifiably be used in every scientific pursuit. 8 The 
dynamics of this method was the primary concern of Descartes' 
earliest philosophical work which he entitled Rules for the 
Direction of the Mind. In it Descartes set down a method 
for achieving self-evident knowledge in the sciences. 9 
The method set down in the Rules is the one used in 
the science of mathematics: No science is acquired except 
by mental intuition or deduction, for these acts constitute 
the way to truth: 
Pour ne tomber ensuite dans la meme erreur, nous allons 
enumerer ici tousles actes de notre entendement, par 
lesquels nous pouvons parvenir a la connaissance des 
choses sans aucune crainte d'erreur6- il n'y en a que deux; l'intuition et la deduction.l 
Although for the most part Descartes abandoned the use of 
the term 'intuition', it is apparently not because he had 
any problems with it. In the original Latin version of the 
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second Responses, Descartes refers to the "cogito, ergo 
11 II • 1 • • t • • • 11 11 sum as a simp ici men is intuitu. Moreover, Descartes 
continued to use the term "connaissance intuitive" in his 
correspondence, a further indication that the term was not 
limited to the Rules and that it captured the meaning 
Descartes intended. 12 
That meaning is projected in terms of a metaphor. 
When Descartes speaks about intuitive knowledge we find him 
clarifying it as "lumiere naturelle ou intuitus menti 11 • 13 
The metaphoric implication attached to the term 'intuition' 
is noteworthy. What it indicates is that Descartes wishes 
us to understand intuition as somewhat _analogous to physical 
sight and to the action whereby we see things in the 
physical order. 
Descartes' entire philosophy is linked to his theory 
of light. In the physical order the action of light is 
ontologically prior to all movement. Analogously, in the 
spiritual order the act of cognition of the "lumiere 
naturelle" is the highest kind of action. Intellectual 
vision of "la faculte de connaitre" that "nous appelons 
14 lumiere naturelle" is akin to sense knowledge. The 
action of the light is the cause of the light being seen on 
15 the earth. Analogously, it is through the action of the 
"lumiere naturelle" that the knower comes to see the truth. 
It is always a matter of seeing what is able to be seen with 
the "lumiere naturelle". In the order of experience, we 
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know that the action of physical seeing is a temporal event 
in which what is present is visible to the eye. If 
temporality is a feature of physical seeing, no less is it 
a feature of intellectual vision. 
Intuition as a method of correct thinking is a mental 
event that takes place in time. That time is the present 
when the mind attends to the actual evidence. It is always 
a matter of seeing something in the "meme temps" and "non 
successive 11 • 16 Successive time includes the past as well 
as the future. Intuition excludes those parts of time. 
All that is seen is seen in a present time which is liberated 
from forgetfulness and doubt. These latter characterize 
respectively the past that no longer exists and the future 
that does not yet exist. 
The "cogito" as a "simplici intuitu" is the primary 
example of the temporality of intuition; "I am", "I exist", 
is necesarily true all the time that I pronounce it or 
conceive it. 17 Implicit in that intuition is the presence 
of what is seen by the mind's eye. Every time that I think, 
I see that my thinking necessarily implies my existence. 
The "cogito" as an intuition is a case of seeing that my 
present thinking is the actual evidence of the necessity 
of my present existence. The existential aspect of intuition 
is not, however, unique to the "cogito", it is an aspect of 
all intuition as a mental vision. It is seeing what is 
present in the present time. 
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While time is fundamentally successive, it has also a 
simultaneous aspect wherein things are said to exist at the 
same time. This coexistence makes it possible to see the 
presence of a coexistent thing and to affirm its presence. 
Just as in the physical order something must be present to 
be seen, intellectual vision demands an actual object. 
Something must be present to the understanding. It is not 
a question of spatial presence but of temporal presence. 
The present measures the actual, namely, that which has 
actual temporal existence. To understand the present as that 
part of time in which intuition takes place is to understand 
it always in relation to some actual object which is 
'present' to the mind and to which the mind can attend 
reflectively. What is clear is what is present to an 
attentive mind: 
Par intuition j'entends, non pas le temoignange 
changeant des sens ou le jugement trompeur d'une 
imagination qui compose mal so.n objet, mais la 
conception d'un esprit pur et attentif, conception 
si facile et si distincte qu'aucun doute ne reste 
sur ce que nous comprenons; ou, ce que est la meme 
chose, la conception ferme d'un esprit pur et 
attentif, qui nait de la seule lumiere de la 
raison et qui, etant plus simple, est par suite 
plus sure que la deduction.18 
Intellectual vision obeys the same laws as physical 
vision. If something is present to the faculty of sight the 
latter necessarily sees what is there. In the same way, the 
mind is of such a nature that it cannot help assent to what 
is present to it. "L'entendement ne peut jamais etre trompe 
par une experience, s'il se borne a avoir !'intuition nette 
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de ce qui se present a lui. 1119 While the self-evidency of 
the truth characterizes intuition, something more is s_ug-
gested in the above Rule. There is, on the part of the 
understanding, a certain passivity; it must affirm what 
is there present to it. 
Yet, intuition is a form of thinking and thinking is 
an action analogous to sensible vision since "chacun peut 
• • t • t • I• 1 • t 1120 ~ par in ui ion qui exis e. On the one hand, 
Descartes maintains that thinking is an action. On the 
other, it remains true that the understanding is passive 
since it cannot deny the truth when the evidence is present 
to it. Descartes finds no difficulty with the disparity. 
The power of knowing, Descartes tells us, is sometimes 
passive and another time active, sometimes the seal and 
sometimes the wax. 21 Like a seal that can receive diverse 
figures, the soul can receive diverse ideas and the receiving 
is not properly an action but a passion, "qu'il n'y a ses 
volontez qui soient des actions. 1122 True; the nature of 
man is simply to think. And yet, willing, understanding, 
imagining, sensing, etc. are just different ways of thinking 
and all belong to the same indivisible soui. 23 
The Cartesian method is grounded on the efficacy of 
the thinking substance as an agent of knowing. However, the 
essence of that method resides in attention in which the 
determining element is the will. The seat of all actions is 
the will which must adapt the attention to the true ideas. 
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Attention is that methodical factor which conditions the 
pure intellectual activity of the mind since attentio~ is 
necessary to avoid the dispersion of the mind over too many 
irrelevant objects. Intellectual vision functions like 
sensible vision. In the physical order, if I see too many 
things at one time, I see them confusedly. For, in order to 
see them clearly and distinctly, I must concentrate on only 
a few things at one time. 24 The same conditions prevail 
for intuition. We must learn how to employ our mental 
faculty of sight in the same way as we employ our eyes. 
If we focus our attention on a multitude of objects we 
become confused and cannot see them distinctly. Therefore, 
we cannot allow ourselves to become distracted by various 
objects, but must attend to the simple constitutive elements 
that we judge to be true. 25 It is a question of restricting 
our attention to the relevant evidence present to the mind. 
Thus, I come to have an intuition of the essence of the wax 
which is "bien claire & distincte, comme elle est a present, 
selon mon attention se porte plus ou moins aux choses qui 
26 
sont en elle, & dont elle est composee." My present 
attention is then the necessary condition for all truth. 
The general principles and axioms (these include mathematical 
propositions and ideas such as God and mind) cannot be denied 
by anyone who regards them attentively. 27 When the will 
obliges the understanding to focus its attention on that 
which is present, the understanding must affirm the truth of 
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the evidence. It is not without reason, then, that Descartes 
was disposed to consider that the highest perfection of man 
is his ability to act freely or through the will. 28 
The soul, without restriction, can extend itself to 
any object in the present. What becomes present in the 
present is initiated by the will which goads the understand-
ing to attend to the true ideas. The actual evidence is 
present only in the present, and simultaneous with the 
presence of the evidence is the affirmation of truth. The 
present measures the actual existence of the knower, the 
object known and (simultaneously) the actuality of truth.-
The existential aspect of intuition cannot be thought of 
apart from the temporal aspect because actuality is confined 
to the present time. What is true is always temporally 
present. This temporal aspect of intuition is clearly 
brought out by Descartes in Rule Eleven: 
Ila fallu proceder ainsi, parce que nous exigeons 
deux conditions de l'intuition, savoir; que la 
proposition soit comprise clairement et distinctement, 
et, de plus, tout entiere dans le meme temps et non 
successivement.29 
One of the features of intuition is its non-successive 
character. What is comprehended by the mind is grasped in 
its entirety all at one time. In excluding succession from 
intuitive thought, Descartes manages to imbue intuition with 
a certitude that is self-evident in the presence of actual 
true ideas. With the exclusion of successive time, there is 
the exclusion of a past that no longer exists and a future 
that does not yet exist. And what does not actually exist 
cannot be seen clearly and distinctly. Descartes giv~s us 
examples of those propositions that the understanding 
intuits. "Chacun peut voir par intuition qu'il existe, 
qu'il pense, que la figure est unie a l'etendue .•. " 30 It 
is always in terms of the present tense that Descartes 
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speaks about intuition. The perception of the wax, "laquelle 
peut etre imparfaite & confuse, comme elle etoit auparavant," 
can be "bien claire & distincte, comme elle est a present. 1131 
Contrary to some historians who contend that intuition 
takes place in nontemporal, discontinuous instants, 32 in-
tuition takes place in a present that has duration. Intui-
tion is an event, and all events are characterized as 
indivisible units from beginning to end. As indivisible 
units, events can be distinguished from other events. The 
Civil War is an historical event that is distinct and other 
than the historical event of the American Revolution. Both 
of these events are indivisible units although the time they 
started was before the time when they finished. Moreover, 
each of the events has its own extended duration. Similarly, 
intuition is a mental event that has some duration to it. 
When Descartes characterizes intuition as non-succes-
sive, we are to understand it in the following manner: 
If I am presently moving my arm at the same time that I am 
walking and not successively, for Descartes this means that 
I did not move my arm before I started walking. It does not 
157 
mean that no time had passed while I performed these two 
actions. However, if I think of one thing (A) and then (B), 
I have not thought of them at the same time, but successively. 
I thought of (A) before (B) and of (B) after (A). Just so, 
if I understand one thing as a whole, that is, no under-
standing of part (A) before my understanding of part (B), 
and of the whole (AB) after understanding (B), this does not 
mean that the time span did not begin before it ended. Nor 
does it mean that there was no time span from when I began 
and when I finished. It means that I did not understand one 
part before and then another part afterwards. 
Thus, while time as a property of all events is funda-
mentally successive, there is also a simultaneous aspect to 
it in which things are said to coexist at the same time. 
The perfect example of that simultaneity is in the intuition 
of the primary truth, the "cogito". One of the conditions 
for intuition is that the proposition is known entirely all 
at once. Descartes adheres to this condition in the case of 
the primary truth. Descartes stresses the point that he who 
says "ego cogito, ergo sum" does not deduce existence from 
thinking by means of a syllogism, rather it is known by a 
II • 1• • • • t • 11 33 simp 1c1 mentis in uitu. It is not a work of reasoning 
by which I first know the proposition I think and then I 
know the proposition I exist. "Je pense, done je suis" is 
"une connaissance intuitive" known entirely and all at once 
per se. 34 At the same time I conceive the necessary 
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simultaneity between my thinking and my existence. This 
truth is apprehended by a simple act of mental vision with-
out any lapse of time. 
While the "cogito" is a psychological event, it is at 
the same time an intellectual event. The knowledge of self 
is known with more truth and certainty than is the wax, also 
1 1 d d . t' 1 35 Th t· f th 1 more c ear y an is inct y. e no ion o e sou 
arises from an inner experience of one's own thought. Its 
certitude, however, goes beyond the perimeters of an indi-
vidual subjective experience. "L'ame ne se concoit que par 
1 , t d " . 't' t' k 36 Th en en ement pur, a primi ive no ion nown per se. e 
nature of spiritual substances is to think, yet not all 
thought is pure intellection. Descartes makes the distinc-
tion between direct thoughts such as the simple thoughts of 
infants which are the feelings of pain, and the reflective 
thoughts which occur when an adult feels something and 
simultaneously perceives that he has not felt it before. 
This latter perception, Descartes says, "je l'appelle 
reflexion et je la rapporte a l'entendement seu1. 1137 
Reflection, as an attribute of pure intellection, is 
integral to the intuitive process. The understanding needs 
"une reflexion et attention particuliere" focused on the 
objects present to it. 38 The objects are only mediately 
seen as the mind sees itself. Intuition calls for a "la 
reflexion de l'entendement sur lui meme": and looking at 
itself, the mind sees the actual evidence that must be 
f . d 39 af irme • · The term "reflexion" is appropriate since 
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Descartes identifies the mind as "intuitus mentis" ou "la 
1umiere naturelle 11 • 40 In the physical order reflection is 
the return of light waves from a surface. In the spiritual 
order reflection is the mind turning back on itself to see 
what is simultaneously existing within the mind itself. This 
reflection illuminates what is present to the understanding, 
and that illumination is nothing more than "une connoissance 
intuitive" or a "simplici mentis intuitu" of the truth of 
the object present to the "la lumiere naturelle." 
In the moment of intuition there is the triple affirma-
tion of the actuality of the soul's existence, the existence 
of the object present, and the existence of truth. To 
exist, for Descartes, is to endure, and that duration is 
d b . 41 measure y time. Insofar as the duration of something is 
actual, it is measured by a 'present' that envelops some 
duration. Simultaneous with the reflection of the mind on 
itself is its affirmation of the soul's existence by which 
the soul comes into contact with its own temporality. In its 
act of thinking the soul necessarily affirms the self-
evidence of its own existence since the substance only 
becomes aware of itself through its actions. 
As the noetic foundation for all truth, the knower is 
always implicitly aware of his own temporality. The soul 
always thinks, and in the very moment of thinking there is 
no thought in us of which the soul fails to be actually 
conscious. 42 Consciousness is not simply a psychological 
event; as an instance of pure intellection it has noetic 
implications: 
Etre conscient, c'est assurement penser et reflechir 
sur sa pensee, ... et toutes les fois qu'il lui plait 
reflechir sur ses pensees, ainsi, etre consciente 
de sa pensee.43 
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The consciousness of one's own thought as an instance of 
pure intellection implicitly contains the consciousness of 
h b t th b . f t" 44 t e su s ance as e su Ject o ac ions. Hence, the 
consciousness of oneself is integral to the conscious 
reflection on one's thought and is, in itself, an instance 
of pure intellection. Further, in the awareness of the 
substance's existence as the subject of actions, there is 
alw~ys contained the awareness of one's own temporality 
since all actions have a temporal dimension to them. It is, 
in fact, the temporal durative aspect of thought that 
Descartes insists on in his letter to Burman: 
Il est faux aussi qu'une pensee se fasse en un instant, 
puisque toutes mes actions se font dans le temps, et 
on peut dire que je continue et iersevere dans la meme 
pensee pendent uncertain temps. 5 
One of these actions is the intuition of the soul's own 
existence. 
In the Cartesian metaphysics the soul's temporality 
can be seen by a single mental intuition. "Je pense, done 
~ suis" constitutes the primary truth from which all other 
truths can be deduced. 46 The primary truth is essentially 
a proposition about temporal existence. That proposition is 
not only a psychological event, it is raised to the level of 
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pure intellection as a "simplici mentis intuitu" seen by the 
"lumiere naturelle" (cf. ftn. #33). The intuition of my own 
existence is an awareness of my existence in time. "Je suis, 
j'existe est necessairement vraie, toutes les fois que je 
. 1 . . .. 47 h la prononce, ou que Je a concois en mon esprit. Tat 
proposition is seen in its entirety all at once. And the 
thought by which I see the necessary simultaneity of my 
thought and of my existence is an action that takes place 
in time. It is an action in which I can continue to 
persevere. 
While my past existence can only be inferred through 
recollection and my future existence is in doubt, my present 
existence is certain every time I presently pronounce or 
conceive it. The thought by which I know myself as pres-
ently existing envelops some duration, "je peut dire que je 
continue et persevere dans la meme pendant uncertain 
temps. 1148 As I persevere in my thought and am conscious of 
my thought I, as the subject of this mental action, continue 
to persevere. I am always being "conserve presentement" in 
existence. 49 
In the order of discovery the Cogito forms the founda-
tion for all other truths. It is my present existence that 
conditions all intuitional acts. In the intuition of that 
first truth we find the primary instance of what Descartes 
means by intuition and the temporal character that attaches 
itself to intuition. The present awareness of the empirical 
temporality of the self is, at the same time, the affirmation 
r 
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of the temporality of thought. Intuition is not conditioned 
by a discontinuous, durationless moment. All intuition takes 
place in a present enduring moment that forms an unbroken 
continuity with other moments. The Cogito, or the primary 
intuition, is a perfect example of this. 
The Cogito is not an isolated thought absolutely in-
dependent of all other thought. While Descartes declares 
that the Cogito is not a result of syllogistic reasoning, 
he admits that the Cogito implies and is contingent on 
previously known notions: 
Je pense done je suis, est la premier & la plus certaine 
qui se present a celui qui conduit ses pensees par ordre, 
je n'ai pour cela ni qu'il ne fallut savoir auparavant 
ce que c'est que pense, certitude, existence et que pour 
penser il faut etre & autre choses semblables.50 
Moreover, the Cogito has a discursive aspect to it. Descartes 
unequivocally maintains that this primary intuition is an 
inference that presupposes a premise: 
Avant cet~e conclusion: je pense, done je suis, on peut 
avoir connaissance de cette majeur: tout ce qui pense 
est, parce qu'en realite elle est anterieure a ma 
conclusion et que ma conclusion s'appui sur elle ••• Mais 
je n'ai pas toujours une connaissance expresse et 
explicite de cette anteriorite, et j'ai connaissance 
auparavant de ma conclusion, parce que je ne fais 
attention qu'a dont j'ai l'experience en moi meme 
savoir; je pense, done je suis tandis que je ne fais 
pas aussi bien attention a cette notion generale: tout 
ce qui pense est; en effet, comme j'en ai averti, nous 
ne separons pas ces propositions des choses singulieres, 
mais nous les considerons en elles.51 
There is no express and explicit appreciation of the temporal 
distance of the major premise because it is implicit and 
integrated into the present intuition. As the above two 
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texts demonstrate, the Cogito is constituted by, and an 
outgrowth of, elements that are distinct, though inseparable 
from the present intuition. 
Intuition is an instance of present conscious thinking. 
Here is what Descartes says about consciousness: 
Etre consciente c'est assurement penser et reflechir 
sur sa pensee, mais que cela ne puisse se faire tant 
que subsiste la pensee precedente, c'est faux parce 
que, comme nous l'avons deja vu, l'ame peut penser 
plusieurs choses en meme temps, perseverer dans sa 
pensee, et toutes les fois qu'il lui plait reflechir 
sur ses pensees, ainsi, etre consciente de sa pensee.52 
The Cogito is the ultimate manifestation of what it means 
to be conscious since it is the consciousness of one's own 
existence. That conscious thought involves reflection that 
takes in several elements which are retained in the present 
field of consciousness. As Beyssade and C. Troisfontaines 
rightly observe, the Cogito is a collection of simple 
truths and the Cogito would lose its present evidence if 
one separated it from its reasons. 53 
The reflective nature of intuition demands a present 
field of consciousness that includes the immediate past. 
At the same time it is apparent that present consciousness 
extends itself to include the immediate future. Two thoughts 
come together in the intuition, "je pense" and "je suis". 
The "je suis" must be anticipated in order to form a single 
simple proposition that first enunciates the "je pense" 
before (done) the "je suis". The cognitive operations of 
retention and anticipation coalesce in the present which 
contains the two temporal modaliti·es of the immediate past 
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and immediate future. Each of the present moments can only 
be conceived as an enduring moment that is perpetually and 
necessarily connected with the other moments to form an 
unbroken continuity. To be aware that "je suis" is to be 
aware that I exist in time, and time, for Descartes, is 
continuous. 
The edifice of science is built on truth that remains 
eternal. Yet the mental events by which the knower comes 
to see these truths are temporal. These temporal events 
constitute the highest expressions of the essential nature 
of the thinking substance whose duration is qualitatively 
measured by a 'present' in which the truth is seen. However, 
these present intuitions form but one link in .the long chain 
of reasoning that culminates in an ordered nexus of intui-
tions. Reason is a dynamic operational principle which 
brings various intuitions together in a single, all-inclusive 
intuition. In the deductive operation we are confronted 
with another way in which the thinking substance manifests 
its own temporality as an agent of knowing. 
B. Deduction as Durational 
There are only a few pure and simple facts that are 
known per~, all the others are deduced from them either 
. d . 1 . t 1 S 4 Th . h 1 . 1 imme iate y or proxima e y. ere is a psyc o ogica 
factor in the inferential process, the movement of the mind: 
La deduction .•• ne parait pas se faire tout entiere 
dans le meme temps, mais elle implique uncertain 
mouvement de notre esprit.55 
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Descartes provides an example of simple deduction: 2 and 2 
equal 3 and 1, 2 and 2 equal 4, therefore 3 and 1 equal 4. 56 
As it turns out, however, deduction is not always as simple 
as deducing a few terms. More often it is complex and in-
1 d d . th f t· 57 vo ve, an receives e name o enumera ion. In the 
process of enumeration the mind repeats the steps already 
deduced. This accomplishes three goals. 
First of all, there is the ultimate goal to arrive at 
a certain and indubitable knowledge: 
Pour achever la science, il faut parcourir par un 
mouvement continu et ininterrompu de la pensee toutes 
les choses qui se rapportent a notre but et chacun 
d'elles en particulier, ainsi que les embrasser dans 
une enumeration suffisante et ordonne.58 
Secondly, in complex cases where the conclusion is remote 
we might have to rely on memory to remember the first and 
intermediate steps. However, memory is weak and liable to 
fail; 59 therefore, we must reduce our dependence on memory 
by reviewing the steps repeatedly through a rapid movement 
of the mind. This second goal of enumeration, diminishing 
the role of memory, is conjoined to the third goal of 
enumeration as a temporal event: namely, to see the series 
as a whole at one time. 60 In essence, it is an attempt to 
reduce the time factor so that what was once apprehended 
successively is now apprehended simultaneously. 
Descartes provides instructions for the mind to follow 
in applying the enumeration method: 
Par exemple, si j'ai reconnu tout d'abord par dif-
ferentes operations quel rapport il ya entre les 
grandeurs A et B, ensuite entre Bet C, puis entre 
C and D, et enfin entre D et E, je ne vois pas pour 
cela quel rapport il ya entre A et E, et je ne 
peux pas l'apercevoir d'apres ceux qui sont deja 
connus, a moins de me les rappeler tous. Ainsi je 
les parcourrai plusieurs fois d'un mouvement continu 
de l'imagination qui, dans le meme t~mps, doit avoir 
!'intuition de chaque chose et passer a d'autres 
jusqu'a ce que j'aie appris a passer du premier au 
dernier assez rapidement pour ne laisser presqu'aucun 
role a la memoire et avoir, semble-a-til, !'intuition 
de tout a la fois, on corrige aussi la lenteur de 
l'esprit et d'une certaine maniere on etend sa 
capacite.61 
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The purpose of enumeration is not to acquire new premises or 
to infer anything new from previously acquired premises. It 
is a method of reviewing and repeating what has already been 
deduced. The repetitive process merely facilitates and 
strengthens the memory. 
C'est qu'en effet la memoire, dont nous avons dit que 
depend la certitude des conclusions qui comprennent plus 
de choses que nous n'en pouvons saisir en une seule 
intuition, etant fugitive et faible, il faut la 
rafraichir et l'affermir par ce mouvement continue et 
repete de la pensee.62 
Two points are worth noting. In the first place, it 
is apparent that Descartes never believed one could totally 
eliminate the role of memory in a deductive process that was 
heterogeneous and complicated. Although he acknowledged its 
weakness, nevertheless he proposed that memory could be 
strengthened so that, nothing being forgotten, we would seem 
to have a vision of the whole all at one time. The repeti-
tive process, then, brings longer and longer sections of the 
deduction chain within intuitional grasp. I must run over 
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the steps so rapidly that there is nothing that falls out of 
the range of the present intuition and the whole seems to be 
grasped all together at one time. 
By the faculty of memory we distinguish past time, 
that which was formerly or 'before'. If we read the texts 
closely, we see that Descartes recognizes two decidedly 
different functions of memory, that of remembering and that 
of retaining. Concomitant with the act of remembering, one 
recognizes that the remembered object was perceived 'before' 
d h . . b . . d . 63 an tat it is now eing perceive anew again. According 
to this view of Descartes', to remember something is to 
~-present a 'before' that has slipped out of consciousness 
because of an intrinsically feeble memory. 
The goal of enumeration is not to eliminate the role of 
memory but to shift the role of memory from its function 
of remembering to its function of retaining. The faculty 
of memory perceives the 'before' as either remote or 
proximate. When the 'before' has vanished from consciousness 
and must be remembered or ~-presented it may be said to be 
remote since it is removed in time from the present. The 
'before' is proximate when it is integrated into the present 
consciousness by the memory which retains what has gone 
before. Enumeration serves to transpose the remote 'before' 
into the proximate 'before' so that the remote 'before' as 
an object to be remembered becomes the proximate 'before' 
which is retained by memory as a part of present conscious-
ness. The 'before' that is retained is not re-presented, it 
is 'present' in the mental field of present consciousness. 
As we have seen, what is demanded in enumeration is 
"uncertain mouvement de la pensee, qui voit chaque chose 
en meme temps par une intuition attentive et qui passe aux 
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autres." The thread of continuity on which the certitude 
of the conclusion is premised can only be unbroken if the 
antecedent falls within the range of the present span of 
consciousness. Here the role of memory as retainer comes 
into operation. Concerning enumeration, Descartes holds that 
"sa certitude depend dans une certain mesure de la memoire, 
qui doit retenir les jugements, portes sur chacun des points 
enumeres pour tirer d'eux tous un jugement unique. 1165 As 
Descartes clearly indicates, the role of memory is not to 
remember or re-present a remote 'before' that has slipped 
out of consciousness. The process of enumeration serves to 
strengthen the memory so that it can retain the proximate 
'before' "as present" within the intuitional grasp. Hence, 
Descartes counts "la memoire aussi ample au aussi present" 
as one of the indispensible qualities which serve to perfect 
the mind. 66 
Enumeration has a deductive and intuitive aspect to it. 
Insofar as enumeration demands an uninterrupted movement 
from one proposition to another, it is deduction. Insofar 
as the deduction forms a series of self-evident propositions 
that are apprehended intuitively, it is intuition. 67 One 
point of view stresses the immediacy and self-evidency of 
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each of the propositions, and the other stresses the in-
ferential aspect. The successive movement of the min4 always 
encompasses an integration of present intuitions because 
each of the intuitions always includes its antecedents 
retained by the memory. 
A necessary adjunct to that memory is the will which 
determines those objects to be retained and those to be 
excluded from the present intuition: 
Une pluralite d'objets ne peut aider l'entendement a 
avoir l'intuition distincte de chaque chose. Mais 
pour extraite quelque chose d'une pluralite d'objets, 
ce qu'il faut souvent faire, il faudra retrancher 
des idees qu'on a des choses tout ce que n'exigera pas 
l'attention du moment, afin que le reste puisse etre 
plus facilement garde dans la memoire.68 
The inferential process is not an arbitrary compilation of 
random facts. The selectivity of objects to be retained 
in the present field of attention is logically determined 
by what has preceded it in the chain of reasoning. The key 
to the Cartesian method is order. 
Turning to mathematics as the ideal science, Descartes 
finds that the secret of mathematics resides in order. 
Primarily, mathematics is concerned with proportions or 
relations between things and the order in which they are 
69 
arranged and deduced from one another. Attempting to 
reach the same degree of clarity and cognitive force that 
characterize mathematics, Descartes applies the mathematical 
method of order as the principal ingredient in his own 
method: 
Toute la methode consiste dans l'ordre et la disposi-
tion des choses vers lesquelles il faut tourner le 
regard de l'esprit, pour decouvrir quelque verite. 
Or nous la suivrons exactement, si nous ramenons · 
graduellement les propositions compliquees et ob-
scures aux plus simples, et si ensuite, partant de 
l'intuition des plus simples, nous essayons de nous 
elever par les memes degres a la connaissance de 
toutes les autres.70 
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As a reviewing process enumeration functions to 
strengthen the retentive power of memory. However, because 
the mind can have several things before it at the same time 
it is important to direct the flow of ideas and retain only 
those that contribute to a logically ordered nexus of 
71 truths. There is a necessary link between the antecedent 
and consequent. They so depend on one another that it is 
impossible for either to change while the other remains 
unchanged. 72 The necessary interdependency means that the 
deduction of a single fact is conditioned by a number of 
other facts that involve one another. The conclusion is no 
more certain than the premises. Hence, if the logical 
sequential order is subverted or a link of the chain is 
omitted, the certitude of the conclusion is threatened. 73 
Since the goal of enumeration as a form of deduction is 
to intuit the whole as a synthesis of necessarily connected 
terms, the inclusion of every term is vital. The point of 
beginning and the point of ending is intuition, and each of 
the steps within the serial intuition is itself an intuition 
necessarily li~ked to its neighbor. One of the characteristic 
features of enumeration is the immediacy and self-evidency 
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contained in each of the intuitions. The intellectual 
illation logically constitutes an uninterrupted sequence of 
self-evident data in which the antecedent is contained in 
the consequent being presently intuited. While each intui-
tion contains the antecedent, it does not contain it as a 
'before' that no longer exists. The antecedent is retained 
"as present" within the present span of attention. 
Each term in the process is simultaneously both an 
antecedent and a consequent since each is related to the term 
'before' and the term 'after'. However, insofar as the 
antecedent and consequent are contained in the present there 
is, in truth, no past which has ceased to exist and no future 
which is yet to exist. There is only the all-inclusive 
present. The temporal goal of enumeration is to reduce the 
time-span and to ideally bring the succession to a quasi-
simultaneity where the whole seems to be grasped all at once. 
The time is diminished in proportion to the extension of the 
present span of attention. The repetitive process facili-
tates the reduction of the time as the memory is strengthened 
to retain more and more objects in the present range of 
attention. Enumeration is the prescription which remedies 
the deficiencies of memory and contributes to extending 
the amplitude of the mental field of attention: 
Apres que nous avons eu !'intuition de quelques pro-
positions simples, si nous en deduisons quelque autre, 
il est utile de les parcourir toutes d'un mouvement 
de pensee continue et ininterrompu, de reflechir a 
leurs relations, et, autant que cela est possible de 
concevoir distinctement plusieurs choses a la fois.74 
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There are three salient points contained in the pas-
sage. The first is that the thread of continuity cannot be 
broken by an interrupted movement. This presumes that there 
is a constituted fusion or unity between the diverse mental 
acts. Secondly, the unity is the creation of the under-
standing via the attentive reflection of the mind. The 
latter, at the same time, sees both the relation between 
the antecedent and consequent as well as the distinction 
between them. Thirdly, the time span of the intuition must 
be long enough to allow the mind to reflect on the distinc-
tion and the bonds that mutually relate the two propositions. 
The time required must be long enough "a reflechir avec 
sagacite aux moindres choses que l'on a precedernrnent 
percues. 1175 The attention that Descartes prescribes is 
equivalent to a "mediation attentive" on what has been 
retained in the memory, "il faut moins les retenir par la 
memoire que les distinguer par penetration d'esprit. 1176 
Descartes' first dictate in Rule IX is to perform 
the inferential process so that the movement of the mind is 
uninterrupted. Movement of even the thinking substance can 
generally be conceived as an action or activity. In the 
case of enumeration, the action is one of concatenated 
reasoning which synthesizes the separate mental acts into a 
unity when the thinking substance perceives the binding 
essential relationship between the implicitly distinct terms. 
Enumeration is a repeated process. First, I find out by a 
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single intuition the relation between A and B, then Band C, 
then C and D and then D and E. Then I run over allot these 
several times in a continuous and uninterrupted movement so 
that ultimately I see the relation between A and E. It is 
possible to do this because, as I run over all of the single 
intuitions I have "dans le meme temps ••• l'intuition de ch~que 
chose et passer d'autres" until I have "l'intuition de tout 
a la fois. 1177 The continuity and rapidity of the movement 
enables the mind to keep within the present attention-range 
all the antecedents and consequents. In the ultimate 
intuition where one sees the relation between A and E, four 
separate mental acts come together simultaneously. 
No doubt, as Descartes admits, while we can view more 
than one thing au a time, we cannot view a multitude of 
particuliar things at the same time. 78 Just as the eye is 
unable to distinguish a multitude of objects at the same 
time, neither is the mind able to distinguish a multitude of 
things. However, through an effort of attentive reflection, 
the mind with its limited field of consciousness can apprehend 
simultaneously several ideas such as some simple premises and 
their immediate consequences. There is the mental field 
that makes it possible to transpose a plurality into a unity 
wherein four acts of thought come together simultaneously. 
The mental field is manifested when the mind attends to and 
grasps both the antecedent and consequent. At the same 
time that the mind is attending to one thing, it is reflecting 
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on "lien qui unit chacun d'eux a ses voisins, cela suffira 
pour que nous disions aussi que nous avons vu comment .le 
• t 1 . . n79 dernier es ie au premiere. 
Enumeration strengthens the power of the mind to 
expand that limited mental field of atte~tion so that it 
can encompass as many things as possible at the same time. 80 
By the distention of consciousness the attentive mind bridges 
the gap from one term to another. Each time the mind re-
peats the enumeration process more and more things are seen 
simultaneously. The discrete intuitions which were 
originally intuited as a successive series of terms ordered 
one to another as 'before' and 'after' respectively, past 
and future, are ultimately integrated into the present 
intuition that grasps the whole at one time. 
That terminal intuition is analogous to the perception 
of a continuous magnitude in which there are no actual parts, 
yet which always implicitly contains potential parts. The 
parts are subsumed by the whole through a process of synthe-
sis. If we look at how the imagination functions in the 
perception of a magnitude we come to a clearer idea of the 
dynamics of the process of synthesis effected by the under-
standing. There are two reasons that justify using the 
comparison. First of all, imagination is a mental action 
included under the category of thought. Secondly, there 
is Descartes' thinking regarding the use of mathematical 
symbols. It is possible, Descartes maintains, that when we 
are attempting to understand proportions or relationships 
between things, regardless of the subject matter, we can 
use geometric figures to aid us in understanding the unity 
that exists between things. 81 
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The unity that is effected in the simultaneous intui-
tion of the whole has a correspondent operation in mathe-
matics. That operation is addition. In addition we add one 
part to another until eventually we reach the whole. In 
addition, we can conceive the subject under the form of a 
line so that we add one segment to another until we reach 
the whole that is now perceived as a continuous magnitude. 82 
Addition is fundamentally a process of synthesis effected 
by the imagination which creates the continuous magnitude 
by uniting one segment to the other. 83 Visually, that 
synthesis is demonstrated in the following manner: 
First we consider the segment (a) ' ' ' ' ' ' then 
(b) I I I I I I 
Then we join (a) to (b) 
And we obtain (c) ' I I 
~ ~ 
I I I I I I I I I I I I 
I I I I I I I I I 
-------------
In the original perception (a) and (b) were ordered to each 
other as 'before' and 'after'. First I consider (a) then 
(b), that is, I consider them successively. As the imagina-
tion moves along, it bridges the span and the order is 
dissolved. (a) and (b) are no longer perceived as distinct 
successive segments but are joined to form (c), a continuous 
magnitude that implicitly contains (a) and (b). In the 
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perception of that magnitude there is no longer the question 
of position or order of parts since there are no actual 
parts. (a) and (b) exist simultaneously as (c) 
The succession is reduced to simultaneity. 
What is present to the imagination is an unbroken line 
which is the product of its own inventive effort. That same 
imaginative power of the mind can make present what is not, 
in itself, actually present. The triangle that I see with 
my mind's eye is not present. Rather, "je considere ces trois 
lignes comme present par la force & application interieure de 
mon esprit. 1184 The triangle is made present through the 
medium of the imaginative power. As the imagination makes 
the triangle present to the mind, similarly, the imagination 
also makes present a continuous magnitude, a whole without 
parts. This is does through a synthetic operation. 
In deduction we find an analogous case. The order in 
deduction comprises a nexus. This synthesis of all the 
discrete mental operations that form the chain of concaten-
ated reasoning can only be effected through the meditative 
effort of attention. The simultaneous intuition of the whole 
is conditioned by a mental field of consciousness which joins 
all of the antecedents and consequents in the chain. The mind 
must have before it 'as present' the antecedents and conse-
quents which are continuously being integrated just as the 
imagination, in the process of addition, has present before 
it the parts that it adds to form the continuous magnitude. 
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Insofar as the antecedents and consequents were 
originally discrete mental operations, they were forme~ into 
a successive series in which each of the terms was related 
to the other as 'before' or 'after'. From the temporal 
dimension their position in the long chain of reasoning could 
be conceived as past or future. Once the antecedent had been 
intuited it became past, and the consequent yet to be in-
tuited was, in respect of that antecedent, future. The 
ultimate intuition, however, does not view the antecedents 
and consequents as 'before' or 'after'. As that order is 
dissolved, so, too, is the past and future as 'past' and 
'future'. The past and future are integrated and contained 
in a field of presence. 
Through a synthetic operation the antecedents and con-
sequents, the past and future, are continuously being 
integrated into the present intuition. Each time that the 
enumeration process is repeated, the antecedents and the 
consequents' 'presence' in the present becomes more pro-
nounced. Hence, in the ultimate intuition whereby the mind 
sees the relationship between A and E, the terms in the long 
chain of reasoning are so 'present' that no longer is the 
repetitive process necessary. The culmination of the 
process, the intuition of an organic whole, presupposes that 
the field of attention has been expanded so that it can 
encompass all of the terms at one time. No link in the 
chain is outside of the present range of attention. 
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We were able to see how the synthetic operation was 
manifested in the process of addition whereby the segments 
were added together to form an unbroken whole perceived as 
an extended line. The perception of a melody provides 
another example of the dynamics of the process of deduction. 
There is a striking resemblance between the operation 
integral to deduction and that found in the perception of a 
melody. Both in the case of deduction and in the perception 
of a melody, it is always a question of integrating parts 
to form a cohesive whole. Descartes' treatise on music 
illustrates how the synthetic operation results in the 
perception of a melody as a whole. 
The basis of music is sound and the attributes of 
sound are primarily two: its differences of duration or 
time and its differences of tension from high to low. 85 
Hence, we are dealing with relations and proportions between 
things, and this is exactly what the mathematician treats. 
There is a basis of similarity between the hearing of a 
melody and the process of deduction. First of all, in both 
cases there cannot be a multitude of objects in question. 
When it comes to the hearing of sounds there cannot be a 
profusion of sounds which would fall on the senses in too 
complicated or too confused a fashion so that the melody 
could not be distinctly perceived. 86 Analogously we know 
that in deduction the mind can see distinctly only a few 
objects at one time; a multitude of objects would cause 
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confusion and ambiguity. 
The second point of similarity is that in a melody the 
perception of a pure and simple consonance depends not only 
upon the qualities of each simple unit, but also upon the 
88 
resonance of all the component elements ~ogether. This 
corresponds to what Descartes says in the Rules regarding 
deduction. If we know the consequent, a simple unit, we 
necessarily know the antecedent, another simple unit. Since 
there is an essential connection between the two, the ante-
cedent is always implicitly contained in the consequent. 89 
The third point of similarity is that in a melody the 
quality of consonance of the entire melody depends on the 
correct order of musical tones. 9° Certainly we know that the 
secret of the Cartesian method of deduction consists wholly 
in the order and disposition of things upon which the 
certitude of the conclusion depends. 91 
Finally, it must be said that music is a science of 
movements insofar as the basis of music is sound, while one 
of the attributes of sound is the difference of duration or 
time, the measure of motion. Moreover, the ear perceives 
these movements, and "moves" along with the sounds and 
integrates them so that they form a unity. Analogously, in 
deduction the mind moves along, always perceiving with the 
mind's eye the antecedent and its necessary connection with 
the consequent, until it finally sees them all as a cohesive 
whole. In attending to these similarities between deduction 
180 
and the perception of a melody, we might take note that in 
both cases a synthetic operation condenses the moments. We 
are familiar with what Descartes has to say about deduction 
(cf. ftn. #61). Here is the passage from the Compendium 
in which Descartes speaks about the proportion of time in 
sound: 
Or cette proportion est souvent gardee avec tant d'ex-
actitude dans les membres d'une chanson qu'entendant 
encore la fin d'un temps, nous nous ressouvenons par 
son moyen du commencement et de la suite de la meme 
chanson ••• car alors ayant entendu les deux premiers 
membres, nous les concevons comme un seul; ayant entendu 
le troisieme, nous le joignons avec les deux premieres, 
en sorte que la proportion est triple: lorsque nous 
entendons le quatrieme, nous le joignons au troisieme, 
et de ces deux derniers nous n'en faisons qu'un; puis 
joignant les deux premiers aux deux derniers, on 
concevra ces quatre membres ensemble comme un seul, 
et c'est ainsi que notre imagination se conduit 
jusques a la fin; ou elle se represente toute la 
chanson comme un corps entier compose de plusieurs 
membres.92 
At the same time that we are hearing one melodic 
phrase, we are retaining what has preceded and are antici-
pating what is to follow so that we are continuously 
integrating the phrases and thus perceiving the melody as 
a whole. If there was a rupture between our perception of 
the melodic phrases, the proportion necessary for the hearing 
of this particular melody would no longer be present. Since 
it is the time-values or the proportions in time that, in 
part, determine how the melody is perceived, a continuous 
movement of the imagination is required. This movement is 
the integration of the preceding and following phrases in 
the present phrase now being perceived. The preceding and 
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following phrases are coalesced in the present melodic 
phrase so that, in effect, no phrase that constitutes the 
melody as a whole is ever past or future in the sense that 
it no longer exists or does not yet exist. As phrases of 
a melody, like the months of a year, the phrases of a melody 
exist simultaneously as a whole. The phrases are not prior 
in time but are perceived simultaneously with the melody. 
It is the movement of the imagination that makes this pos-
sible as it continuously perceives 'as present' what has 
preceded and what follows the present perception. The 
'presentification' of all of the melodic phrases makes it 
possible to experience the pleasure that comes from hearing 
the melody as a whole. 
Analogously, as the understanding moves from one link 
in the chain to another, it stretches itself out to include 
what immediately precedes and what immediately follows. 
Just as a rupture between the melodic phrases would degrade 
the intended melodic effect, similarly in deduction any 
interruption in the movement of the mind would threaten the 
certitude since it would be possible to omit a necessary 
link in the chain. In the hearing of a melody there must be 
a field qf perception that can make "comme present" the 
'before' and 'after' so that the melody is perceived as an 
undivided unity from beginning to end. This is also true 
of the mental field of consciousness necessary in deduction. 
The amplitude of that "field of presence" must be wide 
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enough to attend, at the same time, to both the antecedent 
and the consequent as it moves along. Through the repeti-
tion of the movement the chain of successive links becomes 
shorter and shorter until the whole series is condensed 
into the present intuition wherein the separate links no 
longer are viewed as discrete parts related to each in an 
order of 'before' and 'after'. The u,ltimate intuition of the 
whole is an event in which the parts exist simultaneously 
as an undivided unity. 
In the reduction of the succession to simultaneity, 
the temporal aim of deduction is accomplished. The 'before' 
and 'after' as past and future become integrated into the 
present where all of the parts co-exist at the same time. 
That temporal effect is made possible because the duration 
of the thinking substance, although successive in nature, 
. t' 93 1.s con 1.nuous. While the continuous duration is poten-
tially divisble into moments of 'before' and 'after', 
actually it is an unbroken unity in which the past and 
future are always integrated as present parts into the 
present whole. In light of Descartes' prescribed rules for 
deduction, it would seem logically false to assert that 
time, for Descartes, is discontinuous. For it is only 
through "un mouvement de pensee continu et ininterrompu" 
that we can eventually have an intuition of the whole "a la 
fois." 
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C. The Permanent Self as Durational 
Deduction manifests the epistemic power of the thinking 
substance as an organizing consciousness whose actions take 
place in time. The temporal duration of the thinking sub-
stance is projected as a multiplicity of. successive mental 
events. However, the unification of facts and the develop-
ment of science imply a ground of permanence that makes 
possible the unity. As the noetic foundation of Descartes' 
science, the thinking substance must have ontological status 
as a permanent substance whose substantial identity is 
preserved in time. Without that status science as a 
developmental intellectual event becomes unthinkable. 
The Cartesian doctrine of method ontologically suggests 
that the life of the mind is a succession of epistemic 
events. Yet, there is a permanent self that transcends 
the dispersion of the moments because it is that which 
enjoins the intuitions and reduces them by deduction to a 
single vision. The soul remains ontologically the same 
throughout its durational actions. "Car encore que tous ses 
accidents se changent, par example, qu'elle conceive de 
certaines choses, qu'elle en veuille d'autres, qu'elle en 
sente autres, &, c'est pourtant toujours la meme ame." 94 
While Descartes recognizes the de facto unity of mind 
and body nevertheless, the body is essentially and radically 
distinct from the soul, and the numerical unity of the 
substance as a concrete person resides in "sa forme que est 
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l'ame. 1195 Although the numerical unity of the substance 
resides in the form of the soul, Descartes ascribes to that 
soul no principle of auto-continuation by which it can 
account for its own permanence: 
Si j'avoir la puissance de me conserver moi meme 
j'aurois aussi a plus sorte raison, ie pouvoir de me 
donner toutes les perfections qui me manquent, car 
ces perfections ne sont que des attributs de la sub-
stance, & moi je suis une substance. Mais je n'ai 
pas la puissance de me donner toutes ces perfections; 
car autrement je les possederois. Doncques je'n'ais 
pas la puissance de me conserver moi meme.96 
Since the substance lacks an intrinsic power of conservation 
Descartes must appeal to a transcendental ground of unity. 
It is a recognition of the substance's inability to account 
for its continuance in existence that provides Descartes 
with his second proof for the existence of God. Utilizing 
the infinite regress argument (which is fundamentally one of 
vertical regression that seeks a cause of existence in each 
moment), Descartes posits God as the cause which conserves 
the substance in being: 
Car, tout de meme que, bien que j'eusse ete de toute 
eternite, et que par consequent il n'y eut rien eu 
avant moi, neanmoins, parce que je vois que les parties 
du temps peuvent etre separees les unes d'avec les 
autres et qu'ainsi, de ce que je suis maintenant, il 
ne s'ensuit pas que je doive etre encore apres, si, 
pour ainsi parler je ne suis cree de nouveau a chaque 
moment par quelque cause, je ferais point difficulte 
d'appeler efficiente la cause qui me cree continuellement 
en cette facon, c'est-a-dire me conserve.9 
In the case of substances and their relation to God, it is 
not only a question of their production, it is a question of 
their conservation in existence as the same self. Descartes 
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demonstrates the relation between God and created substances 
as analogous to the relation between the sun and the iight 
which proceeds from it. Drawing on that analogy, Descartes 
proposes that 
[L] 'architecture est la cause de la maison, et la pere 
la cause de son fils, quanta la production seulement; 
mais le soleil est la cause de la lumiere qui procede 
de lui, et Dieu est la cause de toutes les choses 
crees, non seulement en ce qui depend de leur produc-
tion, mais meme in ce qui concerne leur conservation 
ou leur duree dans l'etre. C'est pourquoi il doit 
toujours agir sur son effet d'une meme facon pour le 
conserver dans le premier etat gu'il lui a donne.91r 
Descartes persists in the analogy: 
Il est bien plus certain qu'aucune chose ne peut 
exister sans le concours de Dieu, qu'il n'est certain 
qu'aucune lumiere du soleil ne peut exister sans le 
soleil. Et il n'est pas douteux que si Dieu arretait 
son concours aussitot toutes les choses qu'il a crees 
retourneraient au neant, parce que, avant qu'elles ne 
fussent crees et qu'il ne leur pretat son concourse, 
elles n'etaient rien.99 
The analogy signals the radical finitude of the thinking sub-
stance. Yet the analogy has a positive aspect to it. God 
is "la source de toute lumiere", and in creating and 
conserving the thinking substance, God simultaneously creates 
and conserves the "faculte de connaitre" that "nous appelons 
lumiere naturelle".lOO The Cartesian doctrine of method 
shows how the thinking substance can "accroitre la lumiere 
naturelle de sa raison, 11101 and thereby achieve the 
certitude that is demanded in science. 
The appreciation of knowledge is effected by a knower 
in time. Aware of the brevity of the duration of the 
thinking substance, Descartes, nevertheless, believed that 
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the thinking substance was endowed with a noetic faculty, 
which, if used in accordance with the prescribed metho~, 
could acquire some knowledge of nature. 102 Although the 
progress achieved by the thinking substance is constituted 
by a succession of mental events, the th~nking substance 
as an agent of knowing retains its substantial identity 
throughout the successive duration of its life. That 
permanence, albeit guaranteed by God, is the noetic 
condition for science as an ongoing event. For science 
constitutes the ultimate goal of the thinking substance as 
an agent of knowing and the agent's duration, like the 
duration of all substances, is measured by time. 103 
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without the cooperation of God as there is no sunlight with-
out the sun. There is no doubt that if God withdrew his 
cooperation, everything which he has created would go to 
nothing; because all things were nothing until God created 
them and provided his cooperation." 
lOOPrin. I, 29, A.T. IX, p. 37. " ••• faculty of knowl-
edge .•. we call the natural light." 
lOlRegle I, Pleiade, p. 38. 
102 . V 68 Discourse, A.T. I, p. • 
l0 3Med. I, A.T. IX, p. 15. 
CHAPTER V 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF TIME 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a compara-
tive analysis between the theory of time· of Descartes and 
that of both Aristotle and St. Augustine. These two latter 
historical channels of thought appear to have influenced 
Descartes as he formulated his theory of time. 
Descartes' encounter with Aristotle began at La Fleche, 
where part of his schooling consisted of three years of 
philosophical study. In the second year of this philosophy 
curriculum, Descartes was obliged to read Books I, II and 
XI of Aristotle's Metaphysics as well as Books I through 
VIII of the Physics. Book IV of the Physics contained 
Aristotle's treatment of time. 1 Although Descartes re-
jected Aristotle's metaphysics, 2 there is a decided accord 
in their theories of time. This will become evident in 
our analysis. 
As far as Descartes' encounter with Augustine is con-
cerned, we know that Descartes certainly had read the 
City of God and the Confessions since he refers to passages 
from both of these works. 3 Some historians contend that 
the parallels between Descartes and Augustine make evident 
Augustine's influence on Descartes. 4 The extent of that 
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influence is noted by Henri Marrou, who makes the striking 
observation that not only was Descartes influenced by 
Augustine but what also is true is that Augustine can be 
understood in terms of Descartes: 
Cartesianism was ranked by his first supporters for 
its greater honor as an extension of·Augustianism. 
On the other hand it must be emphasized that by an 
inverse process the reading of Descartes comes to 
influence profoundly and permanently men's under-
standing of Augustine ••• it is often through the 
Cartesian prism that they learn to discover Augus-
tinian thought.5 
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Marrou's point seems to be that Descartes and Augustine are 
so similar that Descartes can be used as a means of access 
to Augustine's thought. 
Descartes never acknowledged any indebtedness to either 
Aristotle or Augustine, yet he did make known that he was 
grateful for the schooling he had received at La Fleche. 
Writing to one of the Jesuits at La Fleche, Descartes ex-
pressed his gratitude: 
[C]ar je serai ravie de retourner a La Fleche, ou j'ai 
demeure 8 ou 9 ans de suite en ma jeunesse, et c'est 
la que j'ai recu les premieres semences de tout ce 
que j'ai jamais appris, de quoi j'a toute l'obligation 
a votre Compagnie de Jesuites.6 
Descartes never pretended to be original in all of his 
thinking and ideas. What he did claim was that he made the 
truth, whatever its origin may be, to conform to the 
exigencies of reason: 
Et je ne me vante point aussi d'etre le premier inven-
teur d'aucunes, mais bien, que je ne les ai jarnais 
receues, ny pource qu'elles avoient ete dites par 
d'autres, ny pource qu'elles ne l'avoient point ete, 
mais seulement pource que la raison me les a 
persuadees.7 
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What this admission suggests is that Descartes appropriated 
the thoughts and ideas of others if they were true and use-
ful for his own purposes. 
Our comparative analysis will focus· on the areas where 
there are essential and intrinsic similarities between 
Descartes' theory of time and the theories of time of 
Aristotle and Augustine. What will become evident is that 
the resemblance and parallel areas of thought between 
Descartes and these two historical predecessors are so 
apparent that it can hardly be doubted that both Aristotle 
and Augustine exercised some influence on Descartes in the 
latter's treatment of time. Aside from accomplishing that 
goal, a historical investigation of this nature will illu-
minate and cast more light on points that have already been 
treated in this study. 
A. Aristotle 
1. Time as the Number of Movement 
Unlike Descartes, who treated time in a dispersed and 
coincidental manner, Aristotle considered time as a special 
topic in itself confining his treatment to Book IV of the 
Physics. After working out some difficulties connected with 
time, Aristotle arrives at a brief definition: "It is clear, 
then, that time is the number of movement in respect of the 
'before' and 'after', and is continuous since it is an 
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While Aristotle's thesis is that time is not independent 
of motion, time is the number of movement by virtue of. the 
fact that the motion is constituted by a succession of 
changes ordered on to another as 'before and after'. Thus, 
wherever we find things changing we find time. In essence, 
time numbers not only local motion but anything that under-
goes some change. The following text verifies this: 
But neither does time exist without change; for when 
the state of our own minds does not change at all, or 
we have not noticed its changing, we do not realize 
that time has elapsed ••• If, then, the non-realization 
of the existence of time happens to us when we do not 
distinguish any change, but the soul seems to stay in 
an indivisible state, and when we perceive and dis-
tinguish we say time has elapsed, evidently time is 
not independent of movement and change.13 
The text establishes three things: First of all, time 
is the number of movement only insofar as movement involves 
change. This suggests that wherever we find change of any 
kind that change can be numbered by time. This would then 
include the changes found in the soui. 14 SecondlY,, when 
Aristotle says that the soul only notices time when it 
notices the changes in thought he also implies that like 
physical things the soul has a successive duration and is in 
time. For only things which do not change and are "always" 
are not in time (cf. ftn. #13). Aristotle maintains that if 
the soul does not perceive any change it "seems to stay in 
an indivisible state (cf. ftn. #11). This "seems to stay" 
is important. What it denotes is that the soul is not 
actually in an indivisible state, that is, a state of 
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"always", a state in which there is no change. Rather, 
although the soul does not perceive any change in its state 
of mind and hence does not perceive that time has passed, 
nevertheless the soul is changing. Therefore, like physical 
things, the soul is in time. The third ~oint made in the 
text is that it is the perception of change in our minds 
that is the subjective index of our perception of time. 
Here Aristotle wishes to emphasize the interdependency of 
time and change and is not specifically concerned with change 
insofar as it pertains to the soul. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the soul's awareness of the succession in its 
thought is the ground for the perception of time. 
We find a similarity between Aristotle's and Descartes' 
conception of the soul's relationship to time. For both 
Aristotle and Descartes, the soul's awareness of its own 
change signals its temporality: 
Jene connois pas autrement la duree successive des 
choses qui sont mues, ou meme celle de leur mouvement 
que je fais la duree des choses non mues; car le de-
vant et l'apres de toutes les durees quelles qu'elles 
saient, me parait par le devant et par l'apres de la 
duree successive que je decouvre en ma pensee avec 
laquelle les autres choses sont coexistantes.15 
Here Descartes articulates what Aristotle has implied, 
namely, that all things have a successive duration in which 
there is found the 'before' and 'after'. Both spiritual 
and material substances have a successive duration, hence, 
Descartes can easily adopt Aristotle's definition of time as 
a number and apply it to both spiritual and material 
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substances. 
We have further clarification of what Aristotle means 
when he calls time a "number of movement". Any movement 
must cover some distance in a period of time. Magnitude is 
continuous, and the movement goes with th~ magnitude. There-
fore, the movement is continuous and, if the movement is 
t . . t· 16 con inuous, so is ime. There is, however, a discrete 
aspect of time, the 'now': 
[M]otion, as we said, goes with the magnitude, and time, 
as we maintain, with motion. Similarly then, there 
corresponds to the point the body which is carried 
along and by which are are aware of the motion and of 
the 'before' and 'after' in it ••• But the 'now' cor-
responds to the body carried along, as time corresponds 
to the motion. For it is by means of the body that 
is carried along that we become aware of the 'before' 
and 'after' in the motion and if we regard them as 
countable we get the 'now' •.• The 'now' corresponds to 
the moving body and is like the unit of number.17 
At this point of the discussion, Aristotle is concerned 
with the function of the 'now' as a number for time. Inso-
far as the phases of motion are perceived by the intellect, 
they can be numbered. Thus, we perceive the successive 
phases of motion, that is, the 'before' and 'after', each 
one being a 'now' as they are perceived. These are countable 
as units of one, two, three, etc., just as we count the 
minutes on a clock. No motion in the real order, however, 
can be broken up into units of motion since movement and 
time are existentially continuous. 
Number is used in two senses: that which is counted or 
countable, and that by which one counts. 18 Insofar as the 
'before' and 'after' phases of motion are perceived as 
discrete quantities, they can be regarded as countable. 
When they are so, we get the 'now'. When Aristotle comes 
204 
to describe the 'now' as a number in the sense of that which 
is countable, the 'now' is not a part of time. Just as the 
point is not a part of the line, and the line is not com-
posed of indivisible points, neither is time composed of 
. d' . 'bl , , 19 in 1v1s1 e nows. The 'now' as a number is the discrete 
aspect of time and corresponds to the discrete aspect of 
motion, namely, the 'before' and 'after' phases which can 
be isolated only in thought. The mind perceives the 'before' 
and 'after' as indivisible phases of motion which exist in 
a certain order and which can be numbered. The 'now' as 
discrete quantity is a construct of the intellect just as 
a point on a line is imposed on the line by the intellect. 
As a number, the 'now', like the point, functions 
differently. Aristotle tells us that the 'now' when used as 
one is both a uniter and divider. "Time, then, also is both 
made continuous by the 'now' and divided by it. 020 The 'now' 
as a link unites the past with the future as midnight joins 
Monday to Tuesday. The 'now' as divider divides the past 
from the future as midnight divides Monday from Tuesday. 
The intellect determines how the 'now' is to function, that 
is, whether or not the 'now' is to be used as that which 
unites the parts of time or as that which is a potential 
divider of time. 
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For the recognition of time there must be recognition 
of the 'before' and 'after'. In order for this to happen 
the 'now' must function as two: 
But we apprehend time only when we have marked motion, 
marking it by 'before' and 'after'; and it is only when 
we have perceived 'before' and 'after' in motion that we 
say that time has elapsed. Now we mark them by judging 
that A and Bare different, and that some third thing 
is intermediate to them ••• For what is bounded by the 
'now' is thought to be time.21 
The 'now' as we see has a threefold function: As one point, 
the 'now' can serve as 1) a connector of time and 2) as a 
potential divider of time. The 'now' has an additional 
third function: Used as two points, the 'now' is considered 
as the extremes that bound the motion. Each of these ex-
tremes is a different 'now' to which the mind attends in its 
perception of continuous motion. Regardless of the function 
of the 'now', the 'now' as a number is a mental construct. 
Can motion be numbered without a numberer? What 
Aristotle says about the 'now' as a number presupposes that 
unless there is a soul to number the 'before' and 'after' 
in motion, there is no time. While Aristotle glosses over 
the psychological aspect of time he does not fail to see the 
implications of his definition. He raises the question, 
Would there be time without a soul to actually number the 
motion? 
Whether if soul did not exist time would exist or not, 
is a question that may fairly be asked; for if there 
cannot be someone to count there cannot be anything 
that can be counted, so that evidently there cannot 
be number; for number is either what has been, or what 
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can be counted. But if nothing but soul, or in soul 
reason, is qualified to count, there would not be time 
unless there were soul, but only that (movement) of 
which time is an attribute, i.e., if movement can exist 
without soul, and the before and after are attributes 
of movement, and time is these qua numerable.22 
We might say that what time is materially is found in motion, 
namely, the 'before' and 'after', but time is formally 
achieved only in the enumerating process of the soul. 
While Aristotle defines time as the number of movement, 
this definition implies that time is also a mode of thought. 
Without the soul to number there would be no time, but only 
that which can be numbered, the 'before' and 'after' found 
in motion. Therefore, when Vigier claims that Descartes' 
concept of time as a mode of thought is a departure from 
Aristotle's definition of time as the number of movement, he 
fails to fully comprehend what is implicit in Aristotle's 
definition. The difference between Descartes' and 
Aristotle's definitions of time is that Descartes wishes to 
emphasize the psychological aspect, while Aristotle, in 
keeping with his intent to treat time as would a natural 
philosopher, chooses to exclude the psychological in his 
definition. However, as the above text indicates, the 
psychological aspect of time is intrinsic to Aristotle's 
definition of time as the number of movement. 
We have seen Aristotle's treatment of the 'now' insofar 
as it relates to the ordinal aspect of motion. The 'before' 
and 'after', indivisible phases, are perceived by the 
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intellect and taken as countable. Each of the 'nows', when 
perceived as a discrete quantity, is like a unit and hence, 
is numerable. This last concept of the 'now' belongs to the 
order of the intellect; for in the existential order motion 
cannot be broken up into indivisible phases. Movement 
corresponds to the magnitude and time to the movement, and 
all three are continuous. 23 
2. Time as a Measure of Motion 
When time functions as an attribute of continuous 
motion, the motion in itself is not per se numbered. It is 
only measurable because the parts of the motion exist 
simultaneously without any order of prior and posterior. 
Motion as measured is analogous to an extended magnitude 
that has no actual parts; for we measure a line of 10 ;inches 
as an unbroken unit even though mentally it can be divided 
into 10 parts or inches. In considering motion as a con-
tinuum Aristotle describes another function of time. "Time 
. f . 1124 is a measure o motion. Duratibn ·is not Aristotle's 
primary concern; yet, when time serves as a measure of mo-
tion, it measures what is perceived as continuous existence. 
While time directly measures motion it indirectly 
measures the existence of things: 
If a thing is 'in time' it will be measured by time. 
But time will measure what is moved and what is at 
rest, the one qua moved, the other qua at rest ••• Hence 
what is moved will not be measured by the time simply 
insofar as it has quantity but insofar as its motion 
has quantity.25 
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To be in time is to have one's being measured by time. Al-
though Aristotle is treating time as would a natural 
philosopher, nevertheless time also extends to the duration 
of corruptible non-physical substances. These substances 
manifest some kind of change, namely, a c?ange in thought, 
and hence time exists for them because of this change (cf. 
ftn. #13). The following text clearly indicates that time 
serves as a measure of the duration of both physical and 
non-physical substances since all things are subject to a 
temporal duration: 
[A] thing whose existence is measured by it [time] 
will have its existence in rest or motion. Those 
things therefore which are subject to perishing and 
becoming - generally those which at one time exist 
and at another do not - are necessarily in time. 26 
We have earlier noted that Descartes adopted Aristotle's 
definition of time as the number of movement. Following 
Aristotle, who describes time as a "measure of motion", we 
find Descartes similarly calling time a "measure": 
[I]l ya des choses encore plus simple & plus uni-
verselles, qui sont vraie et existantes .•• De que 
genre de choses est la nature corporelle en general, 
& son etendue; ensemble la figure de choses etendue, 
leur quantite ou grandeur & leur nombre, .comme aussi 
le lieu ou elles sont, le temps qui measure leur 
duree & autre semblable.27 
When Aristotle calls time a number of motion the phases of 
motion are perceived as discrete quantitites. When he 
considers the durational aspect of motion he also refers to 
time as a measure of motion. In this last function time 
measures motion insofar as the latter is perceived as 
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continuous quantity which corresponds to the magnitude. In 
the same way, Descartes can call time a "measure" because 
duration is the mode under which we conceive things insofar 
as they continue to exist. 28 Since in his eyes the duration 
of material and of thinking substances is the same, time 
can serve to measure the duration of both kinds of substances. 
While Aristotle as a natural philosopher emphasizes time as a 
measure of motion, nevertheless, as we have seen, time also 
measures the duration of all temporal things (cf. ftn. #26). 
In describing time as a measure of motion there is 
always the question of a standard of measurement. Aristotle 
proceeds in his discussion of time as a measure to tell us 
that time not only measures the motion but the motion 
h . 29 measures t e time. He then goes on to indicate what motion 
it is that serves as a measure of time. The ideal chro-
nometer is the motion of the astronomical system: 
Time is measured [by motion] as well as motion by 
time ••• if then what is first is the measure of every-
thing homogeneous with it, regular circular motion 
is above all else the measure, because the number of 
this is the best known.30 
What Descartes has to say about a standard of measure 
seems to be an adaptation of the above: 
Mais, afin de comprendre la duree de toutes les choses 
sous une meme mesure, nous nous ferons ordinairement 
de la duree de certains mouvemens reguliers qui sont 
les jours & les annees, & la nommons temps, apres 
l'avoir rien, hors de la veritable duree des choses, 
qu'une £aeon de penser.31 
Descartes' points seem to be the same as Aristotle's, namely, 
that time and motion are reciprocally measured and that 
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circular motion, being the most uniform and regular, serves 
as the optimum standard of measure. In conjunction with the 
motions of the heavens Descartes also recognizes that the 
motion of the hands of a clock serve equally well as a means 
f . . 32 o measuring time. 
While Descartes acknowledges time and motion as recip-
rocal measures, something more is involved. Descartes' 
preoccupation with mathematics adds a nuance to the issue. 
From a mathematical perspective it is less a question of 
the reciprocity of time and motion in their measuring as it 
is a question of their intrinsic measurability. Time can 
only be conceived as a kind of measure if there is something 
measurable, that is, a species of continuous quantity. Des-
cartes' definition of dimension bears this out: 
Par dimension nous n'entendons rien autre chose que le 
mode et le rapport sous lequel un quelconque est juge 
mesurable, en sorte que non seulement la longuerer, 
la largeur, et la profondeur sont des dimensions ••. 
la vitesse et ainsi d'une infinite d'autre choses de 
cette sorte. Par la il est clair qu'il peut y avoir 
dans un meme sujet une infinite de dimensions dif-
ferentes, que celles-ci n'ajoutent absolument rien 
aux choses mesurees, et qu'elles sont comprises de la 
meme maniere, soit qu'elles aient un fondement reel 
dans les sujets eux-memes, soit qu'elles aient ete 
inventees par notre esprit. C'est en effet quelque 
chose de reel ..• la division du siecle en annees et 
en jours; mais ce n'est pas quelque chose de reel que 
la division du jour en heures et en minutes, etc. 
Et cependent toutes ces choses sont equivalentes, si 
on les considere seulement sous le rapport de la 
dimension.33 
Fundamentally, there is no difference between the motion of 
the astronomical system or the motion of the hands of a clock. 
They are both species of measurable quantity which is per se 
continuous quantity analogous to spatial extension. 34 In 
sum, Descartes adds a mathematical perspective to his 
treatment of time--a matter which Aristotle does not con-
sider in Book IV of the Physics. 
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However, the question of measurement per se is treated 
by Aristotle in Book X of his Metaphysics and we can apply 
what he says there to time. Any measuring process uses 
number. Although Aristotle distinguishes time as the number 
of movement from time as a measure of movement, neverthe-
less, time as a measure is still a number or it could not 
measure quantity: 
For measure is that by which quantity is known; and 
quantity qua quantity is known either by a 'one' or 
by a number, and all number is known by a 'one•.35 
Time as a number functions to express the ordinal aspect of 
motion. The 'before' and 'after' phases.of movement are 
perceived as discrete quantities which, like the unit, are 
countable. Since all measure uses number and since time is 
a measure, time also is a number by which continuous motion 
qua quantity is known. 
Following Aristotle, Descartes defines time as the 
number of movement. In doing this, Descartes recognizes 
that duration has an ordinal aspect to it, namely, the 
'before' and 'after' and that time serves as a number to 
express this order. Moreover, like Aristotle, Descartes 
describes time as a measure of duration and that duration 
. . d 1 t . 36 is continuous an ana ogous to ex ension. As a measure 
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of duration time is also a number. This is so because, as 
Descartes recognizes, there is a "double usage des nompres ••• 
les meme nombres expliquant tantot l'ordre et la mesure. 1137 
In Aristotle's discussion of time as a number, the 
'now' was projected as a construct of the intellect. How-
ever, when Aristotle shifts from the abstract order to the 
concrete order where changes take place in continuous time, 
the 'now' must be perceived in terms of having actual 
existence. Thus we no longer find that the 'now' is not a 
part of time (cf. ftn. #19). As a part of continuous time 
the 'now' has ontological status. The move from the epis-
temic aspect of the 'now' to the existential aspect of the 
'now' places the 'now' with the other moments in time, 
so that since the 'nows' are in time, the 'before' 
and 'after' will be in time too; for in that in which 38 the 'now' is,. the distance from the 'now' will also be. 
Yet the 'now' as a part of continuous time is indivisible. 
'Presently' or 'just' refers to the part of future time 
which is near the indivisible present 'now' . 39 We might ask 
how the 'now' can be indivisible and still be a part of 
continuous time since "nothing that is continuous can be 
composed of indivisibles 11 ? 40 In what sense does Aristotle 
understand the 'now' to be indivisible? The answer can be 
found in Aristotle's Metaphysics, where he discusses the 
concept of the 'one'. We can think about something as being 
one in itself and in this sense it is indivisible. 
'[T]o be one' means to be indivisible; means being 
essentially a 'this' and capable of being isolated 
either in place, or in form of thought; or perhaps to 
be whole and indivisible.41 
213 
The line as a continuum is a whole in itself, yet it is 
divisible into parts. But that divisibility still remains 
potential, so that the line perceived as an actual whole is 
really indivisible. Moreover, the line is indivisible in 
the sense that it is one and not another. It is distin-
guished as a unit itself apart from other extended wholes. 
Analogously, the 'now' as a part of time is one in itself. 
It is neither the past nor the future, in which case it may 
be said to be indivisible in itself since it contains nothing 
of the past or of the future. The 'now' is that part of time 
to which the other parts of time are related to as 'before' 
and 'after': 
But 'before' is used contrariwise with reference to 
past and future time; for in the past we call 'before' 
what is farther from the 'now', and 'after' what is 
nearer, but in the future we call the nearer 'before' and 
the farther 'after'. So that since the 'before' is in 
time, and every movement involves a 'before' evidently 
every change and every movement is in time.42 
The 'now' as a part of time has duration, for at one time 
the 'now' was a 'before' and later it will become an 'after'. 
Thus just as the 'before' is always in time, so every 'now' 
is in time. The 'now' as the indivisible present is simply 
the negation of the past and future. Nevertheless, it is a 
negation that is always referable to the soul since it is 
the soul that isolates the 'now' in the form of thought and 
separates it from the past and future. 
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As Aristotle notes in the above passage, we call 
'before' what is farther from the 'now' and 'after' what is 
nearer. The 'before' and 'after' have existence as parts 
of time in the sense that every change and movement involves 
a 'before' and 'after' phase; a body is here and then it 
is there. In the same way the 'now' is a part of time in 
the sense that there is always a present phase of motion. 
To this present phase the soul attends and calls it 'now'; 
to it the soul orders the other phases as 'before' and 
'after', temporally known as the 'past' and 'future'. Thus, 
time which includes the past and future in addition to the 
'now' can only be conceived in terms of the soul. For the 
latter perceives the phases of motion as occurring in a 
succession in which there is always a 'before' and 'after'. 
At the same time, the soul perceives the present phase 
which the soul distinguishes from the 'before' and 'after' 
phases. 
Inevitably Aristotle cannot extricate himself from the 
fact that time is a mode of thought and that it is the way 
in which we think about the duration of things insofar as 
that duration is constituted by successive numerable and 
measurable change. Time is the number of that change. 
Consequently, Descartes' definition of time simply makes 
explicit what is implicit in Aristotle's definition, namely, 
that time is a mode of thought. Aristotle alludes to the 
fact that the existence of the soul is a condition for time, 
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but he does not spell out the dynamics of that process. Yet 
the soul is necessary for time. And while Descartes' theory 
of time, as we have analyzed it, bears a striking resem-
blance to Aristotle's, Descartes, as a metaphysician, could 
go further and introduce the psychologic~l aspect. He does 
this while utilizing Aristotle's definition which comes from 
the standpoint of a natural philosopher. 
3. Summary of Aristotle vs. Descartes 
From different perspectives and for distinctly dif-
ferent purposes, Aristotle and Descartes both consider time 
as the number of movement and measure of motion. Their 
respective concerns are not the same but there is a con-
sensus on the basic elements that define time. As a student 
of nature, Aristotle's chief concern was the locomotion of 
physical substances and he explored time in relation to that 
concern. Hence, his treatment of time was an integral part 
of his Physics. His metaphysical thoughts were subjects 
treated in a separate work. From a different vantage point 
Descartes chose to incorporate time into his dualistic 
metaphysics, yet in accordance with Aristotle he viewed time 
as the number of movement. He did this, however, with the 
v
1 stipulation that such a definition is appropriate only if we 
understand that it applies to both material and spiritual 
substances. For they both have a common successive duration 
in which there is found a 'before' and 'after' that can be 
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numbered by time. For this reason, Descartes was inter-
ested in formulating a theory of time that would acconuµodate 
his dualistic kind of metaphysics. While that theory was 
part and parcel of his physics, he never treated it as a 
topic that fell under the category of physics. Although the 
goals of Aristotle and Descartes remain different, the dif-
ference is of no substantive consequence. 
Aristotle proposed that time is a number of movement 
insofar as the changes in movement can be perceived as 
'before' and 'after'. As such, they are countable units 
that can be numbered. Yet Aristotle also implies that time 
as a number can apply to the changes that take place in the 
soul since these changes take place in an order of 'before' 
and 'after', by which we can regard them as countable. 
Aristotle describes time as a measure of motion that in-
directly measures the duration of all temporal things, 
including the soul. As we have seen, however, the durational 
aspect of time and its relation to motion were of secondary 
importance to Aristotle, and even less important to him was 
the durational aspect of time as it relates to the soul. 
For Descartes, on the other hand, time measures the 
duration of both material and spiritual substances. In 
terms of the Cartesian physics, the ordinal aspect of time 
predominates. Movement, conceived as continuous quantity, 
was of secondary importance, although Descartes recognized 
the durational aspect of motion and admitted its measurability 
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since it is a species of continuous quantity. However, in 
terms of Descartes' goals for a mathematical kind of physics, 
the ordinal and discrete aspect of both motion and time 
played a more important role insofar as it applies to 
material substances. 
Such is not the case when he considers time as it 
relates to the soul. While Aristotle was not interested in 
developing with any amplitude a theory of time as it related 
to the soul, Descartes' main objectives demanded that he 
propose a theory of time which would focus on the duration 
of the thinking substance. For it is the "cogito ergo sum" 
that constitutes the noetic foundation for Descartes' 
science. That truth serves as the primary truth from which 
all others could be deduced, and it establishes the thinking 
substance as an agent of knowing whose duration is a con-
tinuous movement toward an ever-increasing knowledge about 
the mysteries of nature. Because the soul plays such a 
pivotal role in the Cartesian philosophy, it follows that 
unlike Aristotle, Descartes does not hesitate to stress 
the psychological aspect of time. 
The comparative analysis between Aristotle and Descartes 
reveals obvious similarities of terminology and parallels in 
thought which provide strong reasons to surmise an Aristo-
telian influence on Descartes' view of time. To what degree 
Aristotle's theory of time was operative as a positive and 
decisive influence cannot be assessed with an incontestable 
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certitude. Yet the correspondence of thought between 
Descartes and his predecessor and the familiarity of D~s-
cartes with Aristotle, are supportive evidence that Descartes 
utilized Aristotle's theory of time for his own purposes. 
This Descartes was able to do without alt~ring or under-
mining any of the intrinsic components of Aristotle's theory 
of time. What he found valid in Aristotle's theory he was 
able to appropriate as his own because, by his own admit-
tance, Descartes submitted all of his ideas to the test of 
reason, regardless of their genetic origin (cf. ftn. #7). 
While not diminishing the worth of Aristotle's theory 
of time, J. Callahan makes a point that is well taken: 
To perceive an order in the 'nows' and number motion 
accordingly demands that there be some recollection 
of the 'nows' that are no longer in existence. But the 
process by which the mind does this does not belong to 
natural philosophy. Aristotle passes over the psycho-
logical aspect of time, which was later to be stressed 
by St. Augustine.43 
Because the psychological aspect is vital to Descartes' 
theory of time, we can look to Augustine for further in-
sight into the role that the soul plays in relation to time. 
B. St~ Augustine 
~n Books Eleven and Twelve of the Confessions, St. 
Augustine provides a concise and concentrated treatment of 
time and eternity. He looks at both the metaphysical and 
psychological aspects of time. From the metaphysical 
perspective, time has objective reality. Addressing God, 
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st. Augustine says, "you are the maker of all times ••• the 
eternal creator of all times, and [that] times are never 
co-eternal with you. 1144 As a created reality, time is ~is-
tinct from eternity. For time does not exist without some 
change, while in eternity there is no change. In eternity, 
which applies only to God, we find that the whole is present 
all at once. In time we find creatures that undergo change, 
the parts of which cannot be simultaneous, but succeed one 
another. 45 
In the Confessions, St. Augustine chooses not to 
develop an elaborate treatment of the correlation between 
time and change. Elsewhere, however, he is explicit about 
the fact that where we find change of any kind we find time: 
God then, who lives in an unchangeable eternity, created 
simultaneously all things from which the course of time 
would run and space would be filled and the ages would 
unfold by the movement of beings in time and space ••• 
He established the spiritual creation above the cor-
poreal because the spiritual is changeable only in time 
but the corporeal is changeable in time and place. For 
example, a soul moves in time, remembering what it had 
forgotten or learning what it did not know, or wishing 
what it did not wish.46 
Augustine has made two salient points. First of all, time 
is contrasted with eternity since in the former we find 
successive change, and in the latter we find no change nor 
do we find succession. In eternity, the whole is present 
all at once. Secondly, Augustine has made the point that 
incorporeal substances manifest cognitive change and there-
fore are timely; whereas corporeal creatures are changeable 
both in time and in place. Time is an intrinsic property of 
all creatures. These points are reiterated by Descartes. 
In discussing the duration of the thinking substance, ~e 
categorically opposes that duration to that of God's dura-
tion, noting the successive duration of the thinking 
substance that is revealed in the successive nature of 
thought: 
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Et quand meme il n'y aurait pas de corps du tout, on ne 
pourrait pas dire pourtant que la duree de l'esprit 
humain fut tout a la fois tout entiere, comme la duree 
de Dieu, parce que nous avons manifestement connaissance 
de la succession dans nos pensees, tandis qu'aucune 
succession ne peut etre admise dans les pensees 
divines.47 
From a metaphysical perspective, St. Augustine hypos-
tasizes time and establishes that time is a created reality. 
However, it is clear that if there were no creatures whose 
duration admitted of successive changes, there would be no 
time. Time and successive duration are correlative concepts, 
and St. Augustine never means to suggest that time would 
exist in itself apart from created substances. "If there 
were no motions of either a spiritual or corporeal creature, 
by which the future moving through the present would succeed 
the past, there would be no time at all. 1148 Where we find 
successive change we find time, and correlatively, where we 
find time we find successive change. Since all creatures are 
created by God, it follows that, concomitant with creation, 
time came into being. 
What is time? With that question Augustine offers a 
descriptive analysis starting with a presentation of the 
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difficulty. We know time exists for we perceive and 
measure it, yet what is it we measure? For the past is no 
longer, and the future is not yet, and the present is per-
t 11 . t b d' d b · 49 pe ua y ceasing o e and ten ing towar non- eing. 
While the past and future are obvious parts of time that do 
not exist, it remains to be seen whether the present exists 
to be measured. In an interesting analysis, St. Augustine 
concentrates on the meaning of the 'present'. What evolves 
from his analysis is that what we call 'present', whether it 
be the present hundred years, the present year, month, day, 
or even the present moment, are not really 'present'. For 
we find that each of these parts of time can be divided into 
past and future parts. The present year, for example, con-
tains both the past months and the future months, so that 
the present year is, in fact, not wholly present. What 
then can be called the 'present'? 
If any part of time is conceived that can no longer be 
divided into even the most minute parts of a moment, 
that alone it is which may be called the present. It 
flies with such speed from the future into the past that 
it cannot be extended by even a trifling amount. For 
if it is extended it is divided into past and future. 
The present has no space.SO 
In commenting on the above passage, Gilson makes the 
following observation: 
It is the essence of time to have only a fragmentary 
existence because the past of anything is no more at 
the moment of duration, and its future has yet to be. 
As for its present, it can only consist of an indivi-
sible moment, because if it is extended in duration 
ever so little, it falls into a past which is no more 
and an immediate future which has yet to be. There is 
scarcely any need to point out that this conception 
of time will also be that of Descartes.51 
222 
Gilson is correct on this point: for both Augustine and 
Descartes, time has only a fragmentary existence. For 
Augustine, time is fragmentary because it is an attribute 
of fundamentally finite creatures whose·existence in time 
depends on God. For "if He [God] were, so to speak, to 
withdraw from created things His creative power, they would 
straightway relapse into the nothingness in which they were 
before they were created." 52 God, in creating timely 
beings, created time and so, without the conserving power 
of God, not only creatures but also time would cease to 
exist. 
Descartes' concept of time in substances parallels 
Augustine's. Time is an intrinsic property of all created 
substances. If time is fragmentary, it is solely because 
it corresponds to the fragmentary duration of created 
substances. Such duration is constituted by a succession 
of moments in which the past, no doubt, is irrevocably non-
existent. Because the substance lacks a principle of auto-
continuation, any future existence is uncertain. 53 More-
over, even the present moment carries within it the 
tendency toward non-being. If God withdraws his power of 
conservation, the substance may "cesser d'etre dans chaque 
moment de sa duree." 54 The parity in language between what 
Augustine says (cf. ftn. #52) and what Descartes says in 
one of his letters cannot be more obvious: 
Et il n'est pas douteux que si Dieu arretait son 
concours, aussitot toutes les choses qu'il a crees 
retourneraient au neant parce que, avant qu'elles. 
ne fussent crees et qu'il ne leur pretat son con-
cours, elles n'etaient rien.55 
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In analyzing Descartes' agreement with St. Augustine 
on the concept of the 'present', it must be said that Gilson 
incorrectly maintains that, for St. Augustine, the present 
can only consist of an indivisible moment because, if it 
is extended in duration ever so little, it falls into a 
past which is no longer and an immediate future which has 
yet to be. St. Augustine does not say that the present is 
not extended in duration. What he says is that it cannot 
be divided into past and future, and that the present has 
no space (cf. ftn. #50). The import of this last statement 
cannot be dismissed. Augustine conceives the present to be 
indivisible. The mathematical point as discrete quantity is 
opposed to geometric extension under the category of con-
tinuous quantity. As discrete quantity, the point is a 
countable unit, but it cannot be measured or divided. 
Analogously, the 'present' conceived as discrete quantity 
has no extension and is, therefore, not measurable or 
divisible into parts. However, like the point, the 'present' 
is discrete quantity and an indivisible unit in itself. 
As a unit it can be distinguished from other units. This 
does not mean that it is absolutely indivisible in the 
sense that it has no duration. It means only that it is 
one in itself and not another, namely, it is neither the 
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past nor the future. 
Moreover, the 'present' to which St. Augustine ~efers 
in Gilson's quot~tion is not the concrete 'present' moment 
that constitutes one of the parts of the duration of the 
created substance. It is the 'present' ~onsidered in the 
abstract. An analysis of the concept reveals that the 
'present' could not be 'present' if it is divided into a 
past and future. Since it cannot be divided, it is (analo-
gously to the mathematical point) indivisible. Obviously, 
then, it is not extended (in space). This abstract per-
spective says nothing at all about the 'present' as it 
pertains to the existing creature. If the 'present' is 
quantitatively unextended (has no space) as an analysis 
of the concept implies, this does not mean that the 
'present' is unextended in the concrete order as it applies 
to the duration of created things. And nowhere in this 
particular text (cf. ftn. #50) does St. Augustine ever say 
that the present is without duration. Hence, Gilson is 
mistaken in his interpretation of this particular text, 
and, as our own study demonstrated, Descartes never proposed 
that the present was indivisible in the sense that it has 
no duration. 
As St. Augustine proceeds further into the inquiry 
and focuses on the intervals of time, he asserts that while 
the past and future are said not to exist, certainly, the 
d . t 56 present oes exis . Time is measured and what is measured 
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must be perceived. Now "nothing can be seen except what is 
present", therefore, it is the 'present' that is perceived 
and measured. 57 This 'present' that is measured must have 
duration, for if it were absolutely indivisible and without 
duration, it could not, in fact, be measµred. We cannot 
measure the past because it is gone and we cannot measure 
the future because it has not yet come. What we measure 
must be the 'present'. Since we measure the past as being 
'long' or 'short' and the future as being 'long' or 'short' 
they must in some sense be 'present'. 
St. Augustine finally arrives at the insight that what 
we perceive is not the 'past' itself but images of the past 
which are present to the mind through memory. And in the 
future what exists is not the 'future' itself but those 
signs or causes which are 'present' through premeditation 
or expectation. Thus, it is a misnomer to say that there 
are three times, past, present, and future. We might say 
that there are three times only with qualification: 
It is now plain and clear that neither past nor future 
are existent, and that it is not properly stated that 
there are three times, past, present, and future. But 
perhaps it might properly be said that there are three 
times, the present of things past, the present of things 
present, and the present of things future. These three 
are in the soul, but elsewhere I do not see them: the 
present of things past is in memory; the present of 
things present is in intuition; the present of things 
future is in expectation.58 
Even if the past and future are present, still that 
present is not extended in space. Thus what do we measure? 
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Since time is what we measure, St. Augustine proposes the 
possibility that the movements of the sun, moon and s~ars 
constitute time. He dismisses this as untenable. For even 
if the movement of the heavenly bodies would stop, one would 
still have the movement of the potter's.wheel and there 
would still be time. 59 St. Augustine finally arrives at 
a definition of time by appealing to the psychic order. 
"Time is nothing more than a distention: but of what thing 
I know not, and the marvel is, if it is not of the mind 
't lf 1160 1 se . 
As to the question of what I measure when I measure 
time: Augustine says that I measure tracts of time in my 
soul. The 'present' state is what I measure, not the things 
which pass away nor the things that are yet to come. 61 If 
the 'present state' is what I measure, how can this yield 
a measure since all measurement presumes a standard of 
measure to which the measured can be compared? Augustine 
answers this by alluding to the fact that the mind experi-
ences different states of consciousness and it can estimate 
the duration of one state by comparing it with the duration 
of another state: 
How is it when we measure stretches of silence, and 
say that this silence has lasted for as much time as 
that discourse lasted: Do we not apply our thought to 
measurement of the voice, just as though it were 
sounding so that we may be able to report about the 
intervals of silence in a given tract of time? Even 
though both voice and mouth be silent in our thought 
we run through all poems and verses, and any discourse, 
and any other measurements of motion. We report about 
tracts of time how great this one may be in rela-
tion to that, in the same manner as if we said 
them audibly.62 
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Even if there existed no objective standards of measure 
outside the soul, the latter can still measure the 'present 
state' as 'long' or 'short' by comparing or contrasting it 
with another state of consciousness that has its own inter-
val of time. 
Augustine defines in a fuller way what he means by 
the 'present state'. "The impression that passing things 
makes upon you [mind] remains, even after those things have 
passed. That present state is what I measure, not the 
things which pass away so that it be made. That is what I 
measure when I measure tracts of time. 1163 Implicit in the 
'present state' is the permanence of attention through which 
the mind conserves the impressions of the past and antici-
pates the future. The mind through its present intention-
ality stretches itself out so that the present state 
includes the past and future 'as present': 
If someone wished to utter a rather long sound and he 
determined by previous reflection how long it would 
be, he has in fact already silently gone through a 
tract of time. After committing it to memory he has 
begun to utter that sound and he voices it until he 
has brought it to his proposed end. Yet, it has 
sounded and it will sound. For the part of it that 
is finished has surely sounded; what remains will 
sound. So it is carried out, as long as his present 
intention transfers the future into the past, with 
the past increasing by a diminution of future, until 
by the consumption of the future the whole is made 
past.64 
The present attention of the mind acts as the permanent 
element in the transition from the past to the future~ 
Through an act of intentionality the subject unifies the 
moments: 
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But how is the future which as yet does not exist, 
diminished or consumed, or how does ~he past, which no 
longer exists, increase, unless there are three things 
in the mind, which does all this? It looks forward, 
it considers, it remembers, so that the reality to 
which it looks forward passes through what it considers 
into what it remembers ••• Yet attention abides, and 
through it what shall be present proceeds to become 
something absent.GS 
The amplitude of the mental field of attention must be 
wide enough to include past and future as present. Augus-
tine provides an example of how the mind synthesizes the 
moments into a cohesive whole: 
I am about to recite a psalm that I know. Before I 
begin, my expectation extends over the entire psalm. 
Once I have begun, my memory extends over as much of it 
as I shall separate off and assign to the past. The 
life of this action of mine is distended into memory 
by reason of the part I have spoken and into forethought 
by reason of the part I am about to speak. But at-
tention is actually present and that which was to be 
is borne along by it so as to become past. The more 
this is done and done again, so much the more is 
memory lengthened by a shortening of expectation, 
until the entire expectation is exhausted. When this 
is done the whole action is completed and passes into 
memory. What takes place in the whole psalm takes 
place also in each of its parts and in each of its 
syllables. The same thing holds for a longer action, 
of which perhaps the psalm is a small part. The same 
thing holds for a man's entire life, the parts of 
which are all the man's actions.66 
While the moments pass, attention abides and provides the 
unity and continuity to the totality of the moments which 
constitute the successive duration of the subject. 
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We know that the mind performs three functions: 
memory, expectation, and intuition (cf. ftn. #58). Through 
the medium of attention the past and future are held to-
gether and integrated into the present state. Insofar as 
attention is projected by Augustine as the activity by 
which the past and future are synthesized into the present 
attention, it serves to transpose the succession into a 
quasi-simultaneity in which there is a co-incidence of the 
past, present, and future. From an epistemic standpoint, 
that quasi-simultaneity appears as the 'present' in which 
the mind has an integrative insight (praesens de prae-
sentibus contuitus) of the cumulative whole (cf. ftn. #58). 
Viewed from that perspective, the present (in which 
the mind focuses its attention and has a direct perception 
or intuition [contuitus] of things present to the mind) 
resembles Augustine's description of eternity in which the 
"whole is present" simultaneously (cf. ftn. #45). Thought 
is transitory although the things that are thought are not 
transitory. Yet attention abides for a while and by means 
of it the soul turns the "mind's eye" to behold a vision 
of "the intelligible things in an incorpreal light that 
t t th Of the ml.'nd."67 are so presen o e gaze 
The epistemic aspect of Augustine's theory of time 
that we noted calls to mind Descartes' doctrine of method 
for attaining truth in the sciences. In the context of 
that method we find an affinity between certain elements 
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descriptive of both Augustine's and Descartes' theories of 
time. There is, for Descartes, as there is for Augus~ine, 
a synthetic activity of the mind that conjoins the past and 
future with the present to form a whole in which there are 
no distinguishable parts. From an epistemic standpoint, 
that synthesis culminates in a present intuition in which 
the mind has an immediate and simultaneous perception of the 
whole. The synthetic operation that Augustine describes in 
the recitation of a psalm has a correlate in the synthetic 
operation found in the enumeration method, the goal of 
which is to have an integrative intuition of the total 
series of intuitions. 
In Rule XI Descartes explains how intuition and 
enumeration aid and complete each other. Enumeration pre-
supposes that all of the steps in the deductive process 
have been intuited by single intuitions. Descartes wishes 
to prescribe the manner in which the mind should function 
in order to keep all of the links within its present range 
of attention. As he says, "nous cherchons plutot tout ce 
qui peu aider a retenir !'attention de notre pensee." 68 
When the deductive process includes many complex facts 
enumeration is used to coalesce the single intuitions. In 
brief, we can see how the two processes work together: 
(C]es deux operations s'aident et se completent 
mutuellement, au point de paraitre se confondre et 
en une seule, par uncertain mouvement de la pensee, 
qui voit chaque chose en meme temps par une intuition 
attentive et qui passe aux autres.69 
At the very moment that the mind has a vision-like knowl-
edge of one fact, it passes at the same time to another. 
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As the text indicates, the consequent must be included in 
the present range of attention. However, the enumeration 
process is constituted by a chain of pr~positions that are 
ordered one to another as antecedent and consequent. The 
purpose of enumeration is to strengthen and renew the power 
of the mind so that it can extend its present range of 
attention to include both the antecedent and consequent. 
In a more detailed manner, Descartes spells out the dynamics 
of the enumeration process: 
Apres que nous avons eu !'intuition de quelques 
propositions simples, si nous en deduisons quelques 
autre, il est utile de les parcourir toutes d'un 
mouvement de pensee continu et ininterrompu, re-
flechir a leurs relations mutuelles, et, autant que 
cela est possible, de concevoir distinctement plu-
sieurs choses a la fois; car c'est ainsi que notre 
connaissance acquiert beaucoup plus de certitude 
et la puissance de notre esprit une plus grande 
etendue.70 
In every moment the mind attentively reflects on both 
the antecedent and consequent. The reflection is necessary 
to insure that no link is left out in the long chain of 
reasoning, for without the inclusion of every link the 
' d f h 1 . ' . d' d ?l M certitu e o t e cone usion is Jeopar ize. oreover, 
the other condition for certitude is the uninterrupted 
movement of the mind which insures a cohesiveness between 
the diverse mental acts. If the enumeration process is 
effected as prescribed, attention abides long enough to 
focus on both the immediate antecedent and consequent so 
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that the mind can simultaneously see their binding rela-
tionship as well as their distinctions. This is poss~ble 
only if the antecedent and consequent are included in the 
present intuition. The antecedents and consequents as 
original single mental operations were at one time future 
and another time past. However, in the process of enumera-
tion they are "as present" in the moment of attention. 
Descartes then has the instrument by which he can enjoy 
Augustine's three 'presents' as Augustine does in the 
contuitus. 
For Augustine, memory plays a pivotal role in the 
synth~tic process. It must be noted that when he gives us 
an example of the recitation of the psalm he states that it 
is a psalm that we already know. Thus, before we begin 
we have a preview of the whole psalm. This presumes that 
we have the psalm committed to memory and that during the 
recitation of the psalm the memory extends itself to a 
certain portion which is about to be uttered. The due order 
of words are uttered in succession because we are able to 
foresee in thought what comes next. It is our memory of 
what comes next that enables us to foresee the proper order 
of what follows. Hence, contrary as it may sound, anticipa-
tion presumes memory. Memory preserves the order of the 
syllables about to be uttered, and it is that retention of 
the order that insures the goal of the recitation, which is 
to perceive the psalm as a unified whole. 
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Like Augustine, Descartes recognizes an equally 
important and similar role for memory in the synthetic. 
process. In enumeration, as a repeated process of review-
ing previously perceived truths, the function of memory 
cannot be conceived apart from anticipati?n· Intrinsic to 
the process is the uninterrupted movement of thought which 
preserves the correct order of the steps that constitute the 
series. If the intended result is achieved, it presumes 
that what has been retained by the memory is continuously 
being anticipated in the inferential movement from ante-
cedent to consequent. The mind must continuously anticipate 
the next step (previously perceived and at present retained 
by memory) so that no link is missing, the latter condition 
being vital for the certitude of the conclusion. While 
memory and anticipation can be distinguished by analysis, 
in the enumeration process they are essentially united. 
The reciprocity of anticipation and memory is demonstrated 
in the following rule: 
[P]lusieurs choses sont connues avec certitude, bien 
qu'elles ne soient pas elles-memes evidentes, pourvu 
seulement qu'elles soient deduites a partir de 
principes vrais et connus, par un mouvement continu 
et ininterrompu de la pensee qui a une intuition 
claire de chaque chose. C'est ainsi que nous savons 
que le dernier anneau d'une longue chaine est relie 
au premier, meme si nous n'embrassons pas d'un seul 
et meme coup d'oeil tousles intermediares dont 
depend ce lien, pourvu que nous avons parcouru ceux-
ci successivement, et que nous nous souvenions que 
du premier au dernier chacun tient a ceux qui sont 
proches •••• [deduction] elle recoit en un sens sa 
certitude de la memoire.72 
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We must guard the memory of the order of antecedents and 
consequents to insure that the conclusion drawn is incon-
testable. Paradoxically, the memory of the order always 
implies a memory of the future, those steps in the inferen-
tial process that follow one another in .succession. While 
memory (and its implied anticipation of the future) plays 
a decisive role in the enumeration process, it only finds 
its import in terms of the broader synthetic activity of 
the mind. 
For both Augustine and Descartes, that activity is 
fundamental not only in terms of particular given instances 
such as the recitation of a psalm or in the enumeration 
process; the synthetic activity of the mind has broader 
ramifications in the explication of Augustine's and Des-
cartes' theories of time. That cognitive activity provides 
a compelling case for the continuity of time as well as the 
continuous duration of the soul. The import of the synthe-
tic activity justifies further consideration and clarifi-
cation. 
In the De Musica, Augustine provides a clear example 
of the dynamics of the synthetic operation by which the soul 
integrates the past and future into the present. For 
Augustine, music is the science of moving well, for whatever 
moves and keeps harmoniously the measuring of times and 
intervals can already be said to move well. 73 Besides 
giving a definition of music in Book One, Augustine also 
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discusses the species and proportions of time-laden move-
ments, matters which belong to the consideration of this 
discipline. Hence, we are given a mathematical theory of 
music which discusses sound and its harmony in terms of 
movements collated in a certain order. The essence of 
movement is order. The time values have a "bond of order" 
and we derive pleasure if "the first are harmoniously bound 
with middle and middle with the last 11 • 74 
There are areas of correspondence between Descartes' 
Compendium Musicae and Augustine's De Musica. Considering 
music to be a form of applied mathematics, Descartes, like 
Augustine, presents a mathematical theory of music. At the 
outset, Descartes establishes that the basis of music is 
sound and one of the attributes of sound is the difference 
of duration or time. 75 Following Augustine, Descartes 
discusses music in terms of time-values, that is, propor-
tions and types of mensuration used in music. One of the 
main points Descartes treats is the pleasure that the melody 
produces. Such pleasure is contingent on the correct order 
of the musical tones that constitute the consonances. The 
proper sequence of notes must be followed throughout the 
entire time-intervals of the melody if the intended sound 
is to be heard. 76 
While Descartes confines his discussion of time-
mensurations as they occur in the science of music, St. 
Augustine extends his consideration of time-values to the 
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movements of sound in general. In the context of that broad 
category we find a correspondence between Augustine's. 
treatment of time in Book XI of the Confessions and Book 
Six of the De Musica, where we see how the soul is dis-
tended and how it synthesizes the parts .into a cohesive 
whole. Even in the recitation of a syllable there must be 
a mental field of attention that includes the past and 
future: 
For any syllable, no matter how short, since it begins 
and stops, has its beginning at one time and its end-
ing at another. Then it is stretched over some little 
interval of time and stretches from its beginning 
through its middle to an end. So reason finds spatial 
as well as temporal intervals which have an infinite 
division and so no syllable's end is heard with its 
beginning. And so, even in hearing the shortest 
syllable, unless memory helps us have in the soul 
that motion made when the beginning sounded, at the 
very moment when no longer the beginning but the 
end of the syllable is sounding, then we cannot say 
we have heard anything.77 
There are three points regarding this passage of 
which special mention should be made. First of all, there 
must be a synthesis of the antecedent and consequent parts 
'· 
in order for the syllable to be heard as a unit in itself. 
The soul must be able to retain the beginning of the sounded 
syllable while it is uttering the end of the syllable. 
Secondly, there corresponds to the movement of speech 
uttered in a time interval, a motion in the soul that must 
take place in the same time interval. Thirdly, the motion 
in the soul must be continuous so that the attention is 
always fixed on what has immediately preceded and what 
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immediately follows. Otherwise, as St. Augustine tells us, 
we will be unaware that a sound has been heard. If the 
motion of the soul were interrupted, then there would be 
no synthesis which is the condition for the perception of 
the syllable as a whole. 
It is only by virtue of a continuous synthesis that 
the elements that compose a whole are not lost. Since each 
and every element within the whole is essential to that 
whole, then the soul, through its synthetic operation, must 
carry along all of the preceding parts as it hears the 
present sound. What is true of the perception of a syllable 
is true in the case of a poem: 
And in a poem, if syllables should live and perceive 
only so long as they sound, the harmony and beauty of 
the connected work would in no way please them. For 
they could not see or approve the whole, since it would 
be fashioned and perfected by the very passing away of 
these singulars.78 
Let us compare what Augustine says in the above two 
passages with a passage from Descartes' Compendium Musicae. 
Discussing the parts of a composition and the proportions 
which must prevail therein Descartes writes: 
Or cette proportion est souvent gardee avec tant d' 
exactitude dans les membres d'une chanson, qu'entendant 
encore la fin d'un temps, nous nous ressouvens par 
son moyen du commencement et de la suite de la meme 
chanson; ce qui arrive ordinairement si toute la 
chanson est composee de 8, 16, 32 ou 64 membres et 
davantage, pourvu que toutes les divisions augmentent 
en proportion double; car alors ayant entendu les 
deux premiers membres, nous les concevons comme un 
seul; ayant entendu le troisieme, nous le joignons 
avec les deux premiers, en sorte que la proportion 
est triple; lorsque nous entendons la quatrieme, 
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nous le joignons au troisieme, et de ces deux derniers 
nous n'en faisons qu'un; puis, joignant les deux 
premiers aux deux derniers, on concevra ces quatre 
membres ensemble comme un seul, et c'est ainsi que 
notre imagination se conduit jusques a la fin, ou 
elle se represente toute la chanson comme un corps 
entier compose de plusieurs membres.79 
Here is an echo of what we found in the passage from St. 
Augustine. In the above text of Descartes we note that a 
synthesis of the antecedent and consequent must be taking 
place in each time interval when the latter constitutes 
the present range of attention. That synthesis binds the 
antecedent to the consequent in a necessary relationship 
while it simultaneously distinguishes the two. Secondly, 
the movement must be continuous and uninterrupted so that no 
element is missing from the work. Thirdly, the mind must 
be able to retain its attention long enough so that the 
present can include the antecedent and consequent "as 
present". The synthetic operation illustrates the manner 
in which the soul moves in time, a clear indication and 
reflection of the fundamental successive, yet continuous, 
nature of the soul's duration. 
Going back to St. Augustine's De Musica, we find him 
alluding to the fact that time is in the soul and that time 
is projected as a species of continuous quantity analogous 
to extension: 
Why in rests isn't our sense offended by a deficiency, 
if not because what is due that same law of equality, 
although not in sound, is yet made up in a spread of 
time? Why, too, is a short syllable taken for a long 
one when followed by a rest--and not by convention, 
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but by natural consideration directing the ears--if not 
because by the same law of equality we are prevented, 
in a longer time-span, from forcing the sound into a 
shorter time? And so the nature of hearing and passing 
over in silence allows the lengthening of a syllable 
beyond two times; so what is also filled with rest can 
be filled with sound.so 
Commenting on the first part of this passage, R. Taliaferro 
makes the following observation: "The rest, the absence of 
a sensible motion, is itself the object of the time-count and 
plays its role on the same level as a sensible sound. Its 
absence is counted by the 'spread of time' (spatium tem-
poralis). This is the forereunner of the distentio animi 
of the Confessions. 1181 What is also worth noting in the 
text is that the spread of time can be occupied by either 
rest or sound. This demonstrates that the duration of the 
soul is both successive and continuous since there occur 
in the soul changes in thought that are spread over periods 
of time. The awareness of the absence of sound, i.e., the 
awareness of rest, follows the awareness of the sound itself. 
And these changes continue to transpire over the course of 
the perception of the syllables being sounded. 
Moreover, the awareness of the 'before' and 'after' 
parts of the verse is primarily an awareness of the changes 
of thought that occur in the time intervals which are 
ordered one to another as 'before' and 'after'. If the soul 
were only aware of sound, i.e., sensible motion, then 
perhaps time may well be, as Aristotle maintains, the number 
of motion as it applies to the physical order. However, as 
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Augustine notes, we measure not only the motion of a body 
but also its rest by means of time. 82 In the case of the 
soul, the awareness of rest corresponds to some part of the 
distention of the soul's duration and that duration has its 
own time. The soul can measure the time of its awareness 
of rest and contrast it with the time of the awareness of 
sound, calling one "longer" and the other "shorter". The 
consciousness of rest must be conceived as a species of 
motion. If nothing else, it is a change in thought that 
involves a movement from the 'before' to the 'after'. For 
what preceded it, the awareness of sound now becomes an 
awareness of something different, the awareness of the 
absence of sound. That change in thought is accompanied by 
a change in time. For where we find change, we find time, 
and this time, like the duration of the soul, is successive. 
In the Compendium Musicae Descartes introduces the 
concept of 'rest' as a positive factor in the perception of 
a musical composition. Variety in all things is most 
pleasing, and it is necessary for the enjoyment of the 
composition. 83 "Rest" is "nothing in itself". Yet it 
introduces novelty and variety and lends pleasure to the ear 
in the perception of the composition as an entire work. 84 
The awareness of 'rest' has its own time and that awareness 
when contrasted with an awareness of sound, which has its 
own time, provides a variant that enhances the perception of 
the composition. Descartes recognizes time, in itself, to 
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be an intrinsic positive feature in music. In music, time 
has such power that it alone can be pleasurable by itself 
since the ear has nothing to attract its attention but the 
time. 85 Hence, the intrinsic variety that 'rest' lends to 
the composition is the temporal variatio~ by which the time 
of rest can be contrasted with the time of sound. The two 
modes of rest (silence) and movement (sound) which consti-
tute the composition are intermingled throughout the entire 
composition. Since rest is nothing in itself, that is, not 
a mov~ment, the awareness of the time of rest is, for 
Descartes, as it is for Augustine, a perception of the soul's 
own duration that is spread over the time of rest. 
It is apparent that the subjective aspect of time is 
critical to Augustine's theory of time. However, we have 
seen that time has ontological status as a created reality 
(cf. ftn. #44). It is legitimate to ask the question how 
Augustine's subjective view of time as existing in present 
consciousness is consistent with his recognition of an 
objective temporal order. As we have seen in Book XI of the 
Confessions, Augustine assumes a subjective perspective of 
time, noting that "I measure tracts of time in the soul." 
In Book XII, he makes a shift and assumes an objective 
position. While it remains true that the soul measures 
tracts of time as it relates to consciousness, nevertheless, 
there are corresponding tracts of time in the objective 
order: 
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Out of this unordered and invisible earth, out of 
this formlessness, out of this almost-nothing you 
made all things, of which this mutable world stands 
firm, and yet does not stand firm, in which mutability 
itself is apparent, in which tracts of time can be 
perceived and numbered off. For tracts of time result 
from the changes of things, according as the forms, 
for which the aforesaid invisible earth is the matter, 
are varied and turned about.86 
Time cannot be without created being, and all things, in-
cluding the soul, are in time insofar as they manifest 
some change. The soul exists simultaneously with time and 
with all other creatures in time. In order to measure time, 
the soul compares the time required by one motion with the 
time required by another motion, calling one 'longer' and 
the other 'shorter•. 87 
Here, time is an activity of the soul, since what is 
being measured is primarily the soul's own perception of 
the external motion. The perceptions, however, consist in 
the representations and images of the successive motion. 
The soul, as disentio animi, is extended through its sense 
memories, present sensations and future projections. In 
this way the soul makes contact with the objective order. 
We may quote Augustine to support this view, for he writes: 
"Through its attention, it directs the senses outwardly 
towards a body and unites with it in order to see it and 
to fix its gaze upon it 11 • 88 The soul as an indivisible 
unity is directly aware of the body's sensations that are 
"directed to changeable and corporeal things" and the soul 
"takes in the likenesses of realities through the senses." 89 
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Since the' operations of the soul, including sensation 
and cognition, can be performed simultaneously, the soul 
can perceive the objective order and intellectually measure 
90 the movement of corporeal creatures. The soul, like 
things, is extended in time and therefore can be cognitively 
aware of the movement of things that simultaneously exist 
with the soul. While what is being measured are tracts of 
time in the soul, these are the spiritual couterparts of the 
sensible phenomena in the objective temporal order. Thus, 
the soul as distentio animi cooperates with its extended 
senses and by that means the soul realizes a unity with an 
objective order in which the soul perceives and can measure 
the movement of corporeal creatures. 
Although it is the motion in the soul that gives rise 
to the consciousness of time, nevertheless, that motion 
coincides with the successive motion in the objective order. 
One need only read Book VI of the De Musica to see that this 
is the case. For in the recitation of the syllable we find 
that there is "in the soul that motion made when the begin-
ning sounded". 91 While the soul is independent of the laws 
to which external motions are subject, nevertheless, the 
soul is in time, and is subject to changes (spiritual 
motions), and these occur in succession just as do the 
changes in the physical order. 
The consciousness of the movement of the body is it-
self a spiritual motion with its own duration. That 
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duration can be measured and its measurement can be applied 
to the physical movement of the body. The soul is aware 
of when a body starts to move and of when it stops moving. 
The length of the duration of the soul's awareness is the 
measure which the soul applies to the physical movement 
itself. 
When a body is moved, I measure in time how long it is 
moved, from when it begins to be moved until it ceases. 
If I did not see when it began and if it continues to 
be moved, so that I cannot see when it stops, I am 
unable to measure it, except perhaps from the time I 
begin to see it until I stop. If I look at it for 
long, I can merely report that it is a long time, but 
not how long.92 
The soul's awareness of the duration of things arises 
from the soul's awareness of its own duration. While time 
may be a distention of the soul, and while time is, per~, 
not the movement of a body, nevertheless it remains true 
that the soul shares a common duration with corporeal 
creatures. The soul becomes the vehicle by which the 
temporal movement of things outside the soul is perceived 
and measured. Thus, the soul, as distentio animi, makes 
it possible to reconcile Augustine's subjective aspect of 
time with an objective temporal order. 
Spiritual creatures are superior to corporeal crea-
tures and spiritual motions superior to physical motion. 
Yet all motion is distended from the past through the pres-
ent and into the future. Where there is change there is 
successive duration and where there is successive duration 
there is time. If there is time and it is measured, there 
must be a soul that does the measuring. From the psycho-
logical perspective, Augustine sees time as an activity 
of the soul. 
Descartes endorses this Augustinian view of time. 
Like Augustine, he recognizes that time is a fundamental 
property of all created substances insofar as they have a 
successive duration in which there is perpetual change. 
While Descartes adopts Aristotle's definition of time as 
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a number and measure, he chooses to stress the psychological 
aspect that is implicit in that description of time. 
If time is a number and measure, there must be a 
numberer and measurer and Descartes is not hesitant in 
emphasizing the subjective aspect of time, calling it a 
'mode of thought'. The soul clearly plays a pivotal role 
in the context of that definition. From the features that 
spiritual substances share with corporeal substances such as 
existence, unity, number and duration, 93 derive the clear 
and distinct ideas about corporeal substance which the soul 
first possesses about itself. These ideas can be transferred 
to any object outside the soul; duration is one of these 
'd 94 i eas. 
In the order of discovery the soul through changes 
in itself (e.g., in thought), becomes aware of its own 
successive duration prior to any awareness of the successive 
duration of things outside itself. That discovery initiates 
the recognition that the things outside the soul, with which 
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the soul coexists, share a common duration with the soul: 
Jene connois pas autrement la duree successive des 
choses qui sont mues, ou meme celle de leur mouvement 
que je fais la duree des choses non mues; car le devant 
et l'apres de toutes les durees quelles qu'elles saient, 
me parait par le devant et par l'apres de la duree 
successive que je decouvre en ma pensee avec laquelle 
les autres choses sont coexistantes.95 
The soul, intimately joined with its body, perceives 
an objective order with which the soul coexists. The common 
duration of both spiritual and material substances brings 
the soul into a relationship with the physical order and 
gives the soul access to the movements of material sub-
stances. That mutual coexistence means that the soul can 
intellectually accompany the movement of things and that 
it "puis assigner a chacun de ces mouvemens toutes sortes 
de durees." 96 
Descartes concurs with Augustine that time is not, 
per se, the movement of a body. Even if there were no 
bodies in the world, the duration of the thinking substance 
would still be successive (cf. ftn. #48). And if no bodies 
existed, there would still be time. Insofar as the thinking 
substance is aware of the changes in its own consciousness, 
it is aware of its own duration and that duration could be 
measured. And if no physical movements existed outside, 
the soul could still measure its inner duration by con-
trasting the duration of one state of consciousness with 
another, noting the one to be 'longer' or 'shorter' than 
another. It is accurate to say, then, that the soul 
measures tracts of time in the soul. For Descartes, time 
is the number of movement and a measure of duration. That 
numbering and measuring must be referred to the soul. In 
this sense, time is clearly a 'mode of thought'. 
1. Summary of Augustine vs. Descartes 
The psychological aspect of time provided by St. 
Augustine prevails as one of his most innovative theories 
and the convergence of thought between Descartes' theory of 
time and Augustine's theory gives weight to the thesis 
that Augustine had an influence on Descartes' theory of 
time. No doubt there are dissimilarities between Augustine 
and Descartes regarding time. But these are not substan-
tive differences, they are, rather, perspectival differ-
ences. 
The context in which Augustine gives expression to 
time is one quite removed from that of Descartes. Augus-
tine's theory of time finds its meaning within the context 
of his spiritual life. The soul, in time, finds itself 
subject to the dispersion of temporal existence even as 
it discovers the eternal in the contrast with time. Life 
is a distention, that is, a distraction that keeps the 
soul from rising to a higher life of grace and ultimately 
to a contemplation of God. 
But since "your mercy is better than lives," I behold, 
my life is a distention, or distraction. But "your 
right hand has upheld me" in my Lord, the Son of man, 
mediator between you, the One, and us, the many, who 
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are dissipated in many ways upon many things; so that 
by him "I may apprehend, in whom I have been appre-
hended," and may be gathered together again from my 
former days, to follow the One; "forgetting the things 
that are behind" and not distended but extended, not 
to things that shall be and shall pass away, but "to 
those things which are before"; not purposelessly but 
purposively, "I follow on for the prize of supernal 
vocation," where "I may hear the vo~ce of your praise," 
and "contemplate your delights," which neither come 
nor go.97 
While Augustine approaches time as a wayfarer on a 
journey taking him to God, Descartes approaches time as a 
"savant" on a journey leading him to a contemplation of the 
truths of nature. For Augustine the soul as distentio animi 
suffers from the distractions that keep the soul from 
achieving a greater unity with God. For Descartes the soul 
can only be quasi-attentive for any one moment. Hence, the 
soul immersed in a world of change can be distracted and 
turn its attention away from the very evidence that the soul 
must assent to in order to see the truth. The method for 
attaining truth in the sciences is fundamentally Descartes' 
attempt to show how the soul can surmount the dispersion 
of thought and fix its attention on the cumulative elements 
that constitute the ultimate intuition in which the whole 
is seen "a la fois". 
For both Augustine and Descartes the soul moves in 
time. For Augustine that movement has spiritual conse-
quences. It is a movement to the "Light which brings 
light 11 , 98 a movement from the temporal to the eternal. 
For Descartes, the soul's movement in time has epistemic 
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consequences. It is a movement to see the light whose 
source is God as the creator of all truth. 99 It is a-move-
ment to see the incontestable, unchangeable truth that is 
present to an attentive mind. Ultimately, for both 
Augustine and Descartes, the movement of the soul in time 
is a drive towards eternity. This drive partially over-
comes the soul's temporality which is marked by perpetual 
change and by the distractions caused by change. 
The extent of Augustine's influence on Descartes' 
theory of time is open to debate. Perhaps H. Marrou's 
assessment is not far off when he makes the dramatic state-
ment that "it is often through the Cartesian prism that 
they [men] learn to discover Augustinian thought" (cf. ftn. 
#5). If this last statement is not true, nevertheless, as 
the comparative analysis indicates, we can derive a clearer 
understanding of Descartes' theory of time if we are 
familiar with St. Allg~stine~sc:theeryi-
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: A COHERENT THEORY OF TIME 
This study has accomplished its four intended goals. 
First of all, it has examined time as an integral part of 
an entire philosophical system, a close network of inter-
related themes and concepts. For an understanding of time 
this study has focused on Descartes' primary aim, namely, 
to establish a universal science, essentially a mathematical 
kind of physics. That goal prompted him to formulate a 
metaphysical foundation which polarized the finite order 
into two radically heterogeneous kinds of substances. Al-
though both material substances and thinking substances 
share a common duration, their fundamental disparity affects 
the manner in which their temporality is manifested in the 
Cartesian system. For that reason, we presented a dual 
perspective approach to time. This explicated the dynamic 
ways in which the temporality of the two kinds of substances 
functioned within Descartes' overall scientific concerns. 
Secondly, this study discredited the classical thesis 
that time, for Descartes, is discontinuous and that Descartes 
endorsed the theory that time was constituted by absolutely 
indivisible instants of no temporal duration. An in-depth 
look at the relevant texts testifies that such beliefs are 
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not grounded on fact. 
Thirdly, time is the number of movement and a measure 
of duration. For this reason we considered time from a 
mathematical perspective in accordance with Descartes' 
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view that number expresses both order anq measure. Because 
the duration of all substances is successive, yet continuous, 
it can be perceived as both discrete quantity and continuous 
quantity, as such duration is both numerable and measurable. 
And time is the number. We have also, when applicable, 
utilized graphic mathematical examples to illustrate certain 
points. This was appropriate in light of Descartes' belief 
that the discovery of truth and resolution of problems 
could be achieved by using the mathematical method. As 
evidenced by the Regles graphic illustrations were part of 
that method. 
Fourthly, the comparative analysis of Descartes' theory 
of time with those of both Aristotle and Augustine has 
demonstrated how Descartes utilized traditional historical 
thought for his own purposes. Unlike Aristotle and Augus-
tine, Descartes never treated time as a special issue in any 
concentrated and systematic fashion. Yet this does not mean 
he failed to have a theory of time. What Descartes did was 
to make use of certain elements found in both Aristotle and 
Augustine. Descartes utilized Aristotle's description of 
time as a number of movement and a measure of duration. He 
coupled that with Augustine's psychological perspective on 
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time. Descartes, countenancing Augustine's emphasis on the 
role of the soul, called time a 'mode of thought'. 
Descartes' lack of a totally original theory of time 
suggests that Descartes was not so much concerned to offer 
an elaborate and unique theory of time as he was to have a 
theory that could be reconciled with other constitutive 
elements of his philosophy. What we may presume is that 
Descartes was content to take what he needed from others who 
had already given their concentrated efforts and considera-
tion to the subject. Having done this, Descartes was free 
to focus his own mental energies on the greater task of 
constructing a metaphysical foundation for his science. As 
the volume of Descartes' works and his own admission indi-
cate, his ultimate concerns were scientific. Time as a 
number and measure, and time as also a mode of thought, fit 
well within the framework of those concerns. 
Does Descartes have a coherent theory of time? Diver-
gent interpretations of his theory found in the commentaries 
suggest that he did not provide a doctrine that was clear 
and unambiguous. There are two reasons that may occasion 
this assessment. The first reason is that, unlike Aristotle 
and Augustine, Descartes never treated time as a special 
topic. Hence, what Descartes has to say about time is 
dispersed throughout his works and is most often treated 
incidentally as a subordinate issue within the immediate 
context in which it appears, and, more importantly, within 
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the broader context of Descartes' ultimate scientific 
concerns. 
There is a second reason for the divergence of opin-
ion: More fundamental problems endemic to Descartes' 
metaphysical dualism. Because of the incoherencies within 
that metaphysics it would seem to follow that Descartes 
cannot have a coherent theory of time. However, an assess-
ment of Descartes' theory of time based solely on his meta-
physics fails to result in an accurate interpretation and 
judgment of his theory. Descartes' metaphysics is simply 
one component of a complex philosophical system and it is 
in relationship to that system that his metaphysics derives 
its meaning. 
Throughout this study it has been our thesis that any 
evaluation of Descartes' theory of time must take into 
account Descartes' philosophical system as an integrated 
whole. The sole purpose of Descartes' metaphysics was to 
provide a foundation for a mathematical kind of physics that 
would be characterized by its certitude and self-evident 
knowledge. To insure this, Descartes polarized the finite 
order into two disparate substances. Epistemic considera-
tions prompted Descartes to attribute one essential attri-
bute to the material world. That attribute was extension. 
As extended, the physical universe could be treated mathe-
matically, since it would operate in accordance with the 
principles and laws of mathematics. Given the mathematical 
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structure of the world, it was theoretically possible to 
arrive at some moral certitude about the phenomena in ~ature. 
The thinking substance, in the world but not of the world, 
was so endowed that by virtue of its sole essential attri-
bute, thought, the thinking substance cou~d attain increasing 
knowledge about the manner in which the universe operated. 
This vision of nature required him to use a method that was 
employed in the mathematical sciences for the attainment of 
truth. 
It is within the context of that overall project to 
construct a mathematical physics that we must evaluate 
Descartes' theory of time. Hence, the question should not 
be: Does Descartes have a coherent theory of time? Rather, 
the question should be: Does Descartes' theory of time 
accommodate the metaphysical dualism which constitutes the 
foundation for his mathematical physics? I believe it does. 
A comprehensive analysis of Descartes' theory of time 
has been provided. That analysis considered time as a 
fundamental property of two heterogeneous kinds of substances. 
For that reason, we could not treat time as a univocal con-
cept applicable to all substances. Although both kinds of 
substances share a common successive duration, the tempor-
ality of both kinds of substances is manifested in distinct 
ways. As our dual perspective approach has demonstrated, 
time is an analogical concept in the philosophy of Descartes. 
Examined as such, Descartes' theory of time appears to be 
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neither paradoxical nor incoherent. On the contrary, time 
constitutes a neatly woven strand within the tapestry .of 
Descartes' total philosophy and serves to complete the 
intended design. Our summary will place this statement into 
perspective. 
A. Summary of Descartes' Theory of Time 
Time is real. It is a property of the existing sub-
stance insofar as that substance endures. But what else is 
time for Descartes? Accepting Aristotle's definition, 
Descartes describes "le temps" as "le nombre du mouvement". 1 
He couples this with the psychological perspective of 
Augustine by also calling time "une certain facon dont nous 
pensons" about the duration of all things. 2 Fundamentally, 
that duration, shared by both material and thinking sub-
stances, is successive. Because duration is successive, 
there is a numerable aspect to it insofar as it is consti-
tuted by parts ordered one to another as 'before' and 'after'. 
Since one of the functions of number is to express 
order, it is possible to number the parts of duration per-
ceived as 'before' and 'after'. Insofar as they are discrete 
quantities they are countable. The ordinal aspect of dura-
tion means that time can number the successive 'before' and 
'after' parts of duration as the first moment, second moment, 
third moment, etc. These parts can then be transposed into 
countable units so that the first, second, and third become 
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one moment, two moments, three moments, etc. Time can 
number duration because duration is a species of quant_i ty. 
As successive, duration falls under the category of discrete 
quantity and is numerable. 
However, if time is to truly function as a number, it 
must also serve to number continuous quantity. While the 
fundamental mode of duration is successive, nevertheless, 
Descartes recognizes another aspect of duration, its 
measurable aspect; for "la duree est un mode ou une facon 
dont nous considerons cette chose en tant qu'elle continue 
d'etre", and that duration "est etendue et divisible 11 • 3 
Analogous to extension, duration is continuous in the same 
way that a magnitude is continuous. The magnitude is 
measured in the same way that we measure the length of a 
spear as an undivided whole. Because duration is continuous 
and hence measurable, time can be a number for measuring 
duration. With due consistency, we find Descartes referring 
to this function of time, "le temps qui mesure leur duree. 114 
Thus, when we conceive of the duration as a continuous whole, 
it is measured as a unit of length, and time is the number 
that expresses that measure. We are here conceiving dura-
tion as an unbroken whole whose parts exist simultaneously. 
Thus, continuity of existence is measured by time, such as 
ten minutes. 
We see, then, how time functions as a number to express 
both the ordinal and measurable aspects of duration. But 
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time remains a mode of thought. For what is numberable and 
measurable can only be numbered and measured if there -is a 
soul to number. Nevertheless, the soul qua numberer and 
measurer is not absolute in the sense that it needs no 
objective standard of measure. Adhering.to the Aristotelian 
theory that time itself is measured by some movement, Des-
cartes acknowledges the movements of the astronomical system 
to be the most general and ordinary standards of measure. 
The clock, as an artifice of man, can serve to measure 
smaller intervals of time. It is the soul, however, that 
determines which unit of measure to apply. 
All movement has some measurable duration, and the rate 
of speed of the movement of the body, that is, the movement 
between two points, can be measured by using a reciprocal 
measure of motion, namely time. The standard of measure is 
a selective process, since the duration of a movement of a 
body can conceivably be measured in terms of one hour or 
sixty minutes with equal validity. Suppose that the soul 
wishes to focus its attention on a very brief phase of the 
movement, a phase less than a minute. What is to be used as 
a standard of measure? Would it be possible to say the 
motion was a short as the twinkling of an eye, or a flash of 
lightning, or instantaneous? The point is that it is the 
soul that applies to the movement a measure which conforms 
to the purpose of the soul in measuring the duration. 
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Time is a mode of thought, a way in which we think 
about the duration of things. It is that definition o~ time 
which resolves the paradox of how the instant can be indi-
visible and still constitute a part of continuous duration. 
To explain the point we need only recall that one of the 
primary characteristics of mathematics is its concern with 
order. Thus, to conceive of movement in terms of instan-
taneous phases is to view movement from a mathematical 
perspective. It is analogous to dividing a line by the im-
position of points. A line without points is an actual 
measurable continuum without any actual parts. 
On the other hand, a line on which points are imposed 
is, by virtue of these points, no longer an extended magni-
tude whose parts exist simultaneously. With the imposition 
of points the line is divided into parts ordered one to 
another as prior and posterior. The prior and posterior 
parts are numerable, and their number is determined by the 
position of each of the parts in relation to the other 
parts. Thus, the segment posterior to the first is numbered 
second, and the segment posterior to the second is third, 
and what follows that is fourth, etc. The significance of 
this is that the number of the segment in a successive series 
is determined by its relation to the other segments to which 
it is ordered. 
If we transpose this geometric operation to Descartes' 
concept of movement, we find somewhat of an analogy. Movement, 
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like an extended magnitude, is actually continuous. As a con-
tinuum the movement has no separate phases. However, it is 
possible to mentally divide the movement, to freeze a seg-
ment for inspection and to consider its relation to the 
other phases. When this is done, the mo~ement is not con-
sidered as a measurable whole whose parts exist simul-
taneously. Rather, the movement is conceived as being 
constituted by phases ordered one to another as 'before' and 
'after'. In terms of Descartes' physics, this means that we 
can talk about the movement of a body in one instant and its 
relationship to the movement of a body in the next instant. 
No doubt the ordinal aspect of duration prevails in 
the Cartesian physics. Moreover, that ordinal aspect is 
expressed in terms of the temporal 'instant' which measures 
the elementary phases of motion. When the soul considers 
the instantaneous phases of movement, the latter are con-
sidered as indivisible. Each phase is isolated in thought 
and is divided from the instant before and the instant after. 
They are not, however, indivisible in the sense that they 
are without duration. Movement takes place in an instant 
and all movement has some duration, "car il est impossible 
de concevoir .•. le mouvement prive de toute duree. 115 As to 
the duration of "l'instant", Descartes always conceived it 
to have some measurable quantity. It is an "espace de temps", 
albeit a "peu de temps", "le plus court 11 • 6 
The 'instant' with its mathematical implications is 
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well accommodated to Descartes' mathematical physics. It 
cannot, however, be adopted as the way in which we think 
about the duration of the thinking substance. The duration 
of the thinking substance is manifested in terms of cognitive 
events that take place in the 'present'. That part of time 
can be viewed in two ways. The 'present' is conceived as 
discrete quantity ordered to the other parts of time, or it 
is conceived as continuous quantity, the parts of which exist 
simultaneously. Descartes considers the 'present' in both 
ways. 
In terms of his doctrine of method, Descartes stresses 
the self-evidency and immediacy of truth and conditions 
intuition on a 'present' in which the mind clearly and dis-
tinctly sees the truth of the evidence present to the under-
standing. This 'present', which is integral to the method of 
intuition, is ordered to the other parts of time. It is op-
posed to the past which is no longer, and the future which is 
not yet. Both of these parts of time have slipped out of 
present consciousness and are for that reason imbued with in-
certitude. In terms of intuition, the 'present' is a species 
of discrete quantity ordered to the other parts of time. In-
sofar as the 'present' is so conceived, the event of intuition 
reveals the manner in which the ordinal aspect of time func-
tions as a feature of the duration of the thinking substance. 
However, while the ordinal aspect of time comes into 
play, it does not predominate. As far as Descartes' doctrine 
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of method is concerned, deduction prevails as the method 
most utilized in the acquisition of truth. Deduction is 
really a series of intuitions; nevertheless, the intuitions 
are not discrete when they are part of the deductive pro-
cess. While there is an order in the thought process such 
that the consequent necessarily follows from the immediate 
antecedent, the order is not projected as a series of 
discrete thoughts. The past and future are not separate 
units ordered to the present. On the contrary, the mind 
moves in a continuous and uninterrupted manner so that 
there is always a perpetual synthesis and convergence of 
past, present, and future. The 'present', which includes 
the past and future, has no determined duration. It must 
be long enough for the mind to hold both the antecedent 
and consequent in its present field of attention. The 
'present' with its inclusive past and future endures for 
as long as attention abides. 
As the deductive method clearly illustrates, there 
are no time gaps. Time is successive, but it is contin-
uous.7 Like time, the duration of the thinking substance 
is continuous. That continuous duration means that the 
substance perdures as the same substance throughout all of 
the moments in which it exists. It is that continuous 
substantial permanence as a subject of cognitive actions 
which constitutes the noetic condition for the Cartesian 
physics inasmuch as the latter demands not only a knowable 
272 
object, but an agent of knowing. Descartes' doctrine of 
method prescribes the manner in which the thinking substance, 
endowed with an intrinsic faculty of knowing, can move in 
time towards an ever-increasing, though not exhaustive, 
knowledge about the universe. 
Viewed from another dimension, the continuity of the 
duration of the thinking substance is the condition for the 
measurement of the duration of movement. A body moving 
between two points traverses an indefinite number of points; 
this movement can be measured only if it is perceived as a 
continuum corresponding to the magnitude which the body 
traverses. In order to measure the motion, the successive 
phases of the movement must be synthesized into a cohesive 
whole that is perceived as a continuum. In that case, the 
movement falls under the category of continuous quantity and 
is measurable. The measurement of the movement presupposes 
a corresponding measurable motion in the understanding mind 
which does the measuring. The interior continuous motion 
of the mind allows the latter to participate in the flux of 
external motion, and thus [I] "puis assigner a chacun de 
ces mouvemens toutes sortes de durees." 8 As material sub-
stances move from place to place, so, too, does the thinking 
substance move along in thought. For both substances co-
exist and share a common duration that is continuous. 
Descartes' definition of time as the number of movement 
adapts itself not only to material substances insofar as they 
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undergo perpetual movement, it serves equally well to· 
measure the duration of thinking substances. Descartes 
unequivocally maintains that, even if no bodies existed in 
the world, the duration of the thinking substance would be 
successive. Still, he draws attention to the continuous 
aspect of that duration, noting it "sa dureee ••• est etendue 
et divisible". 9 
The soul always thinks and thinking is a species of 
movement contained under the broader category of funda-
mentally successive change. Because it is successive, the 
'before' and 'after' phases can be perceived as discrete 
quantity ordered one to another. Time can function as a 
number to express that order. Insofar as thought is con-
tinuous, it can be measured and time is that which measures 
it. Time as a number serves to express both order and 
measure. Just as with material substances, the thinking 
substance has both an ordinal and continuous aspect to its 
duration. These aspects can be adapted to the definition 
of time as a number of movement. 
Duration is numerable because it can be perceived from 
its ordinal aspect (successive duration). Duration is 
measurable because it can be perceived from its continuous 
aspect. When we wish to think about those aspects we think 
about them in terms of time which expresses both order and 
measure. Time and duration (which time numbers and measures) 
fall under the category of mathematics. Thus, questions 
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regarding duration and time (as the number applicable to 
duration) are, in essence, questions about order and m~asure. 
Our procedure is, perhaps, an example of what Descartes had 
in mind when he proposed his universal mathematics: 
Et si l'on y reflechit plus attentivement, on remarque 
enfin que seules toutes les choses ou l'on etudie 
l'ordre et la mesure se rattachent a la mathematique, 
sans qu'il importe que cette mesure soit cherchee dans 
des nombres, des figures, des astres, des sons, ou 
quelqu'autre objet; on remarque ainsi qu'il doit y 
avoir quelque science generale expliquant tout ce qu'on 
peut chercher touchant l'ordre et la mesure sans 
application a une matiere particuliere, et que cette 
science est appelee, non pas d'un nom etranger, mais 
d'un nom deja ancien et recu par l'usage mathematique 
universelle, parce qu'elle renferme tout ce pourquoi 
les autres sciences sont dites des parties de la 
mathematique.10 
Descartes was not unmindful of the implications of his 
definition of time as a number. For if duration is number-
able and time is the number, there must be a numberer. Des-
cartes' insight prompted him to include as a part of his 
definition of time the psychological aspect of time. Time 
is a mode of thought. Although Descartes polarized the 
world into two distinct kinds of substances, there is always 
an implicit unity between the two. From an epistemic stand-
point, material substances are related to the thinking 
substance as knowable objects. Correlatively, the thinking 
substance is related to material substances as the subject 
who can and does perceive the physical universe as a mathe-
matical model which, Descartes believed, "agit en tout 
mathematique. 1111 Because material substances and thinking 
substances share a common duration, the thinking substance 
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can apprehend the events in the physical order and, through 
reflection, come to have intellectual vision of the patterns 
according to which these events occur. 
In spite of the radical heterogeneity between material 
substances and thinking substances, there is a metaphysical 
unity. Both substances exist, and to exist is to endure, 
and that duration is measured by time. As a consummate 
metaphysician with an extended and committed vision of a 
mathematical physics, Descartes formulated a coherent theory 
of time that served his purposes well. 
NOTES - CHAPTER VI 
1Prin. I, 57, A.T. IX, pp. 49-50. " ... the time ... the 
numberofmovement ..• " 
2Ib'd " 1 • , ••• a certain way of thinki~g." 
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3Prin. I, 55, A.T. IX, p. 49. H.R. I, p. 241. " •.• the 
durationof each thing is a mode under which we shall con-
sider this thing insofar as it continues to exist." 
4 I Med. A.T. IX, p. 15. " ••. the time which measures 
their duration." 
5Regle XII, Pleiade, p. 83. " •.• for it is impossible 
to conceive ••• movement deprived of all duration." 
6Prin. II, 33, A.T. IX, p. 82. " ••• space of time". 
Prin. III, 63, A.T. IX, p. 135. " .•• little bit of time". 
AHyperaspistes, Aug. 1641, Pleiade, p. 1133. " ••. the 
briefest [instant]." Perhaps a duration equal to what we 
now know as a 'millisecond'? 
7
since Descartes stresses the necessity of the uninter-
rupted movement of the mind in the process of deduction, it 
(deduction) provides a more apparent indication than does 
intuition that time is continuous. However, as we have 
argued in Chapter IV, even intuition implies the continuity 
of time since each of the intuitions is contingent on 
previous known truths that provide the evidence for the 
present intuitions. Intuition has a discursive aspect to it, 
but it is not stressed by Descartes because he wishes to 
focus on the self-evidence and immediacy of intuition. Hence, 
he conditions intuition on a 'present' that excludes the no 
longer existing past. Descartes does not, however, exclude 
the immediate past that is retained by and is part of present 
consciousness. Cf. Chapter IV, pp. 161-164. 
8 V Med. A.T. IX, p. 50. " •.• [I] can assign to each of 
these movements all sorts of durations." 
9A Arnauld, 4, June, 1648, A, M, VIII, p. 47. Ent. 
avec Burman, Pleiade, p. 1358. " ••• its duration ..• is ex-
tended and divisible." 
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lORegle IV, Pleiade, pp. 50-51. H.R. I, p. 13. "But 
as I considered the matter carefully, it gradually came to 
light that all those matters only were referred to Mathe-
matics in which order and measurement are investigated, and 
that it makes no difference whether it be in numbers, 
figures, stars, sounds or any other object that the question 
of measurement arises. I saw consequently that there must 
be some general science to explain that element as a whole 
which gives rise to problems about order.and measurement, 
restricted as these are to no special subject matter. This 
I perceived, was called 'Universal Mathematics', not a far-
fetched designation, but one of long standing which has 
passed into current use, because in this science is contained 
everything on account of which the others are called parts 
of Mathematics." 
11 A Mersenne, 11, March, 1640, A.T. III, p. 37. " 
acts totally mathematically." 
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